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ABSTRACT
This thesis evaluates the efficiency of the program of in-
centives to private developers contained within the Venezu-
elan housing policy of 1979-1983, which aimed at promoting
the construction of low-cost housing units for moderate in-
come families.
This thesis argues the program of incentives was not effec-
tive because; a) the program was too broad in scope, it in-
tended to cover a very wide range of households and did not
consider limitations in resources, b) it intended to encou-
rage construction of units which were not profitable real
estate investments, given the market costs and inflation,
without implementing complementary measures that either re-
duced costs or increased subsidies, c) the features of the
program which could orient production favored the construc-
tion of the most expensive units within the program, and d)
the outcomes of the producer approach tend to respond more
to producers' interests and expected profits than to the
needs of the potential consumers. As a result, units
produced were not affordable by the target households.
The conclusions and recommendations are targeted to impro-
ving the producer oriented approach and to search for alter-
native, more effective producers. The changes proposed are;
a) to reduce the range of target households, and to include
variables controlling quality of production, b) to implement
strategies for cost reductions and to evaluate complementary
subsidies, c) to eliminate tax exemptions from the program,
and d) to implement measures to increase the confidence in
the marketability of the low cost units. A mixed approach
which combines the modified formal private sector approach
with an additional program for smaller scale developers is
likely to be more effective in producing housing units for
moderate income groups.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynn Sagalyn
Title: Professor of Urban Planning
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7INTRODUCTION
The intervention of the Venezuelan government in the
housing market is 55 years old. The creation of the Labour
Bank (Banco Obrero) in 1928 signaled the beginning of the
official programs to orient the production of housing in
Venezuela. However, until 1958, the government intervention
was concentrated mainly on the direct construction of hou-
sing units for the working class. Those actions focused on
the main cities of the country which were urbanizing rapid-
ly. That constructivist approach was exacerbated during the
dictatorship period, when the problem of increasing margina-
lity was intended to be solved by building large scale high-
rise developments. In that period, the policy called "war
against the shacks" proved to be a big failure in the solu-
tion of the housing needs for the rapidly urbanizing
Venezuela.
The true beginning of the Venezuelan housing policies
started after the dictatorship was overthrown in 1958, when
wholistic and integrated nation wide approaches were develo-
ped. Those policies considered the different affordability
levels of the demand and tried to match them with the dif-
ferent mechanisms available to supply housing. Thus, for 26
years the different housing policies have included incen-
tives and regulations to stimulate the formal private sector
to produce socially targeted housing units called "social
8interest housing". Progressively, the government has
switched from the direct production of units for the
lower-middle class to the direct and indirect provision of
solutions for the lowest income groups, but using the
private sector to produce the former. Those had been, at
least, the stated goals. Consequently, the policies have
increasingly broadened the range of targeted income groups
and raised the sale prices of the units considered to be of
"social interest." Similarly, the policies have increased
the amount of direct and indirect subsidies to the private
sector and have incursioned in the field of financing stra-
tegies. There are no doubts, the policies of the two more
recent governments expressed clearly these trends. However,
regardless of the amount of resources invested by the gov-
ernment to stimulate private production, the producer orien-
ted approach has failed. The majority of the units produced
had been too expensive to be bought by the groups the policy
intended to serve. Even though most of the units had been
channelled into the market, we can argue about the extra
costs paid finally by the consumer or by the government, and
about the efficiency of the approach. In addition, the
characteristics of the units produced responded more to a
profit maximization orientation than to the consumer needs,
raising questions about the adequacy of the production.
Several reasons have been responsible for the critical
role assigned to the production of low-cost housing units by
9the private sector. One of them is the belief the private
sector could play an important role in alleviating the hou-
sing shortage in the country if the government kept away
most of the restrictions for private investment in low cost
housing. These arguments have been backed up by the statis-
tics showing the traditional and relevant share the cons-
truction sector in general, and the residential sector in
particular, had in the GNP, and the importance of this sec-
tor as a source of nation wide employment. An additional
argument has been the speed in production that could be
built in, given the private sector has the expertise and the
access to the necessary resources7 namely land, labor, capi-
tal, and entrepreneurship. Also, it is argued the private
sector is already part of the system and possesses the ne-
cessary connections to put housing units up. Lastly, we can
not forget the importance placed on private production also
responds to the strong political and economic ties the
industrial sector, counted construction, have with the
political power.
In addition, the advocates for the potential role of the
private sector in low cost housing production point out the
inefficiencies in production by the public sector in terms
of output, production speed, and efficiency of resources in-
vested. A complementary assumption is that although the
private sector could produce units at most for the lower-
middle income groups, the effects of filtering down would
10
extend the benefits to the lower income groups by liberating
previously occupied housing units. These units will then be
taken by less wealthy families. Thus, the belief is that in
the long run, the benefits will spread to the overall spec-
trum of the housing needs.
This thesis focuses on the evaluation of the program of
stimulus to the private sector contained within the housing
policy for the presidential period 1979-1983. It examines
the adequacy of the units produced to the affordability
level of the target groups, the feasibility of construction
of the units targeted by the program given market costs and
inflation, and the adequacy of the producer approach to the
country's political and economic situation. It is argued
the program was not efficient because the distribution of
prices of the units produced did not correspond to the
policy target goals. Private production concentrated on the
most expensive units within the program. Those units were
not affordable by a high proportion of the target households
regardless of the late implementation of a subsidy program
for the buyer. The program, overall, was not realistic
because it intended to encourage construction by the private
sector of low-cost units that were very difficult to build
given the private market construction costs, regulations,
and procedures. The construction of the cheaper units was
very unlikely without the government implementing complemen-
tary measures oriented toward reducing costs and restric-
11
tions or increasing the level of subsidies to the producers.
Because of the lack of an integrated approach, which had
taken into consideration all variables affecting private
production, the program could not modify the way the market
works and the outcomes reflected that. Production concen-
trated on the most expensive units, the ones which offerred
the potential to obtain the standard returns in residential
construction in Venezuela. That outcome was exacerbated by
the features of the program, which made it less risky and
more profitable to build the expensive units, and did not
modify drastically the perceived marketability risks for the
cheaper units. The producer approach also contributed to
that outcome because it is very likely to expect the units
produced would respond more to producer interests and expec-
ted profits than to the needs of the potential consumers.
As a consequeqnce of the characteristics of the produc-
tion, inventory accumulated, construction of ongoing pro-
jects stopped, and a "crisis" in the housing market of the
country was voiced by the mass media. The market distortion
was exacerbated by the country's financial and political
situation. However, we will argue that regardless of the
increase in the interest rates, the currency devaluation,
and the lack of liquidity, the problem would have been pre-
sent, although maybe in a less dramatic fashion. This would
have occurred because the true root of the problem is in the
level of prices of the units produced which are not afford-
12
able by the demand side. The upcoming elections undoubtedly
worsened the problem because they created a lot of expecta-
tions from the suppliers and the buyers, both sides waiting
for the new government to solve the problems in the way most
convenient to them.
This thesis argues that in order to effectively encou-
rage the production of low-cost housing units by private
developers, more drastic measures and a more integrated and
coordinated program has to be undertaken. That program must
consider the different elements that intervene and affect
private production of housing, otherwise the outcome will
not be adequate. First of all, if the government wants the
formal private developers to produce low cost units, the be-
nefits from producing more expensive units within the pro-
gram or outside it have to be drastically smaller. This
argument supports the recommendation of reducing the target
group intended to be covered by the program, concentrating
the design of the program of incentives and regulations for
the first three housing categories. Similarly, the finan-
cial conditions for the non-regulated market must differ
substantially from those favoring the regulated market.
Secondly, the government will have to look for ways of redu-
cing the different kinds of costs incurred in the production
of housing units. Some of these costs relate to construc-
tion costs, others are embedded in the mechanisms for hou-
sing production in Venezuela. The government must re-exa-
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mine all the ordinances, norms, and standards affecting
housing production in order to adjust and adapt them to the
production of low-cost housing. Unnecessary and stringent
conditions need to be eliminated. More realistic and appro-
priate norms and standards would contribute to making the
production of low-cost housing more feasible. Likewise, the
government could reorient the design and technical characte-
ristics of the building systems commonly in use, in order to
allow, together with the modification of the norms, the
development of low-rise cluster housing solutions with a
high proportion of built-up area, and which are likely to
produce great savings in costs. That reorientation in de-
sign and technology must include evaluation of the materials
used in construction, seeking the reduction in imported in-
puts, similarly, the trade-offs between labor versus capital
intensive technologies must be evaluated. It is also para-
mount that an evaluation of the efficiency of the mechanisms
and procedures necessary to obtain building and occupancy
permits, which imply time and money losses be undertaken.
In relation to construction costs, additional subsidies will
have to be considered if we want private developers to pro-
duce the cheaper units within the program. Those subsidies
could be in the form of construction financing and land
availability which seem to have been effective in the period
analyzed, or supplying materials and equipment at below
market prices. An evaluation of the amount of subsidies
required by a developer to build the cheaper units must be
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carefully done. Thirdly, the features contained in the
program would have to be examined, strengthening the effec-
tive ones, and graduating them in order to orient different
concentrations of the production at different price levels,
and eliminating those which have proved to be ineffective.
An important recommendation is to evaluate alternative pro-
ducers for moderate income housing. In this sense, it is
proposed to reorient the program of incentives for the pri-
vate sector by channelling the program to other scales of
producers and non-profit oriented developers like coopera-
tives and civil societies. With this approach, the govern-
ment could reduce the amount of subsidies because some of
the costs incurred in the development of housing units by
formal private developers would be avoided. Also, the
likelihood the units produced respond better to consumer
needs is higher. In addition, this alternative will encou-
rage the development of small to medium sized contractors
and will promote a better distribution of wealth. The
author recognizes this change in orientation is likely to
generate a lot of political controversy.
The search for alternatives becomes very important when
the resources of the country have been reduced so drastical-
ly, the country faces a period of austerity, and there is a
need to look for more efficient utilization of resources.
An evaluation of the policy outcomes becomes critical when
we recall the oversupply is happening in a period when
15
squatter settlements are proliferating in the main cities of
the country. It also becomes critical when we consider what
could have been some alternative outcomes if the country had
employed the resources in another way. It is certain the
residential construction sector in Venezuela has dynamism,
and the potential to increase the production of units. It
is also certain that it has access to the resources needed
for housing production, but that is not a guarantee of suc-
cess. Only in light of past experiences can housing poli-
cies be more effective in obtaining the kind of units we
believe the country needs the most.
While an in depth evaluation of the overall housing po-
licy for the country will provide us with a wider knowledge
to assess the problem, it is out of the scope of this paper.
This analysis will concentrate on the evaluation of the po-
licies affecting the production of units by the formal pri-
vate sector, namely private constructors and developers,
even though the broader context will be provided. Our ana-
lysis will not include the proportionately greater contribu-
tion to housing production by the informal sector, similarly
it will not include the evaluation of housing production by
governmental agencies. Likewise, the analysis will concen-
trate on the policy program of incentives for the private
sector during the last presidential period (1979-1983). Al-
though a framework for historical reference would be neces-
sary to compare the outcomes with those of the most recent
16
governments, we are unable to carry out that comparative
analysis. The information about outcomes is not available
in the country. The oldest statistics recording private
sector production are from 1978, and they only account for a
few central cities. That circumstance, together with the
lack of a control group, doesn't allow us to be certain
about causal relationships. However, backed up by the sta-
tistics available for the period considered, field observa-
tions, and interviews, we will be able to infer relations
with which to support the arguments.
This thesis is developed over six chapters. Chapter 1
starts by providing a general background of the situation in
the housing market in 1983 and an historical framework for
the most important political and economic events affecting
the housing market. Here we will see the interactions bet-
ween the government regulations, the production sector, and
the economic situation. Also, we will explore in general
terms the effects of the economic changes in the demand side
of the market. The role of events like the liberation of
the interest rates, the currency devaluation, the lack of
investment and liquidity, the decrease in the level of sa-
vings, and the upcoming elections will be highlighted. We
will characterize this period as one of high economic insta-
bility, a lot of regulatory changes, growing inflation, and
bad business expectations.
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Chapter 2 analyzes the housing policy for the period
considered. The argument made is that even though the
policy, from its very conception, stated the resources were
to concentrate on the provision of housing for lower income
groups, the planned distribution of resources did not gua-
rantee that concentration. We will demonstrate the resour-
ces targeted to the lowest groups, the ones to be attended
by direct government intervention and community participa-
tion, were comparable to those channelled through the pri-
vate sector for the provision of units for middle income
groups. We will argue that the design of the policy was not
realistic, given the limited resources of the country, and
did not respond to the well known concentration of the defi-
cit on the lowest income groups. Moreover, the policy did
not propose any drastic modification of the traditional
channels for housing production because the resources plan-
ned for the consumer-oriented approach were very small. The
policy was very ambitious for it pretended to cover 95% of
the Venezuelan households, and as a consequence of the poli-
cy design, there was the potentiality of diluting the ef
forts through a broad range of households or of concentra-
ting the resources on the production for those households
who represented a more profitable market.
In this chapter, we will identify the policy goals and
its premises, the different programs and how the government
planned to approach them, and the amount of resources chan-
18
nelled to each program. The main institutions acting in the
market will also be identified. For the analysis, we will
use the VI General Plan for the Nation (Cordiplan), and the
National Housing Program (MINDUR).
Chapter 3 provides a more detailed analysis of the Pro-
gram 4, the one affecting the supply of housing by private
developers. We will argue first that the range of house-
holds the program intended to benefit was very broad and
that the so-called "social interest housing" included houses
affordable only by the high middle class. The range of
prices the policy stimulated was not affordable by the
income groups targeted by the policy, even considering no
changes in the financial(conditions of thelmarket. In order
to be able to afford the units, the lower group of targeted
households would have to spend a very high expense/income
ratio or receive heavy subsidies. We will discuss the fea-
ture intending to improve the affordability level of the
target groups; a consumer subsidy program; was implemented
in the middle of the period when the prices of the units
offerred were already too high. An additional critique
relates to the lack of quality control measures within the
policy because the additional criteria stated to qualify the
units was the number of bedrooms. As a consequence, it was
likely to expect the producers could reduce areas and locate
the units in inappropriate places in order to get the most
out of the program protection. Those weaknesses in design
19
could cause marketability problems later on. We will argue
the features of the program were likely to favor the
production of the most expensive units because the benefits
were higher while the perceived marketing risks were lower.
Those design features also reduced the marginal benefits of
producing the lowest cost units compared to the benefits
offerred by the regulations of the former presidential
period. The benefits built up within the program were also
likely to stimulate the entry of new producers in the
housing market, but only of those with access to resources
like land, capital, and political connections. Therefore,
it did not really encourage any innovative way of producing
low cost housing. A complementary argument is that the
conditions for housing production outside the regulated
market were still attractive to produce expensive units
given the marginal benefits, thus it was likely to expect
the production of expensive units would be maintained. We
will question whether given the limitations of financial
resources in the country and the stated goals of the policy,
this potential outcome was appropriate.
Finally, since the policy did not consider potential
changes in the financing conditions nor potential limita-
tions in government resources, and given the possibility the
units produced were the most expensive, it was likely the
government resources will be exhausted and adjustments to
the policy would be imperative.
20
In the development of this chapter, we will analyze the
program structure in terms of the graduated benefits to the
developers, financing institutions, and buyers, according to
the sales price of the units produced; and the necessary in-
stitutional arrangements to implement the program. We will
also compare the changes in the potential benefits related
to those offerred in the former presidential period. We
will explore the benefits that the non-regulated market of-
ferred to the developers. For the analysis of the Program
4, the Decree Number 214 and the complementary resolutions
of the Ministry of Financing and Urban Development, and of
the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV), will serve as the source
of information. The affordability analysis will be carried
out using income statistics by the Central Office of Statis-
tics and Information (OCEI). Those statistics are based on
nation wide surveys carried out systematically every 6
months and they are the most reliable source of information
for incomes given the deformed results of the 1980 census.
Chapter 4 evaluates the private sector production, its
relations to the policy goals, and the behavior of that seg-
ment of the housing market. The evaluation focuses mainly
on the price adequacy of the units produced to the target
households and to the policy goals. An analysis of the way
units got financed, built, and purchased will also be inclu-
ded. It will be demonstrated that production concentrated
on the most expensive units within the policy. We will
21
argue that even though it can not be demonstrated, the con-
centration of the production on the most expensive units was
influenced by some features of the Program 4. In addition,
we will explore how the other conditions and traditional
practices in that segment of the housing market contributed
to making the investment in the higher priced units more
attractive, regardless of real higher risks of marketability
because of the reduced potential demand for those units. We
will follow the concentration of the production on medium
sized units, and we will speculate about inconvenient
project locations that contributed later to the problems of
marketability. We will evaluate the steady production of
high cost units built outside of the policy protection and
we will argue the supply for those non-regulated units
remained unaltered regardless of the policy. We will
speculate in light of this fact about the probability, the
supply for the most expensive units covered by Program 4
could have a similar behavior. We will realize the subsidy
program financed in its majority the most expensive units,
thus benefiting the households with the highest incomes. We
will also argue the restrictions to obtain formal financing
faced by the lower income groups within the scope of the
program were not really reduced, as a consequence, financing
to build and purchase the units was minimal regardless of
the portfolio restrictions imposed by the policy. In
contrast, huge amounts of construction financing were
provided to produce the most expensive units and in many
22
cases, intentionally or not, feasibility studies were not
thoroughly carried out by the banks. Consequently, many
projects without appropriate market studies were put up.
These characteristics, together with the difficult economic
situation generated inventory accumulation that provoked the
so-called "housing crisis". We will highlight how the
figures of financier and developer joined in many projects,
even though that participation is prohibited by law. That
level of investment banking undoubtedly gave to some
developers greater control of the market and facilitated
manipulation of resources.
In sum, during this period, the deformation of the
production of housing by the private sector was exacerbated.
Production concentrated on the high cost units, too expen-
sive to be bought by the policy targeted groups. Those
empty buildings stand as a symbol of the market deformities
exacerbated by the wrongly conceived policy and by the over-
all socio-political-economic structure where the policy was
introduced.
The quantitative evaluation will be developed based
mainly on statistical figures from FundaconstrucciOn, and
some indeces from the Venezuelan Central Bank. The qualita-
tive analysis will be based on field observations, newspaper
23
and journal articles, and on interviews given by some deve-
lopers in February of 1984. Project cases will serve to
highlight some of the arguments.
Chapter 5 analyzes the feasibility of the construction
of the units promoted by Program 4 being undertaken by the
private developers, given the market costs and price rest-
rictions contained in the program. This chapter will illus-
trate that the set of costs and regulations affecting resi-
dential construction in Venezuela, made very unlikely that
production of low-cost units could be carried out and still
leave profits for the developers. That happens because of a
combination of factors that involve not only direct cons-
truction costs, such as land, materials, and labor7 but also
costs incurred as a consequence of the building technology
employed, the current standards and regulations, and the
procedures and mechanisms necessary to obtain construction
and occupancy permits.
This chapter will illustrate the cost restrictions in-
volved in the production of low-cost housing units by deve-
loping three hypothetical building cases corresponding to
apartment units with 2, 3, and 4 bedrooms. In order to de-
velop the cases, some assumptions regarding areas and costs
were made. The first reflects the building and urbanization
standards, the second refers to cost indicators. From the
cases, we will observe how, in order to sell the cheaper
24
units at the regulated prices, reductions in costs of up to
50% would be necessary and lower returns than the common
ones would be earned. Even though less extreme, some cost
reductions would also be necessary for the higher cost units
to be as profitable as other real estate investments.
Also explored in this chapter will be the fact that un-
its of similar characteristics to those promoted by Program
4, but with lower sales prices, are produced in Venezuela.
Those units are developed, some by government institutions,
and the majority by the informal sector. We will discuss
the informal sector's ability to achieve great cost reduc-
tions by avoiding many restrictions and regulations faced by
the formal sector.
We will conclude by saying the program was unrealistic
because it intended the private develoeprs undertake real
estate investments that were not as profitable for them
without including complementary measures to reduce construc-
tion costs or increase the level of subsidies. Finally, we
recommend the search for alternative developers that could
reduce the amount of necessary subsidies and increase the
potential for more adequate units produced for the consumer
needs.
25
Chapter 6 summarizes the conclusions from the analysis
carried out in the preceding chapter and provides recommen-
dations for a more effective way of influencing the supply
of housing for low-middle income groups. The conclusions
refer to the changes necessary to increase the efficiency of
a program of incentives to the private developers. The
changes proposed are divided into three categories; those
which refer to the modification of the variables to qualify
the units produced, being the reduction of the program
target group, and the inclusion of the variable area; those
oriented toward increasing the investment feasibility of
low-cost housing construction, namely strategies for cost
reduction and the evaluation of complementary subsidies; and
last, those changes to the features contained within the
program, aiming at strengthening the measures which seem to
have been effective in orienting production, like land
availability and construction costs, and eliminating those
measures which were not, such as tax exemptions.
Three non-exclusive alternatives are explored, identify-
ing for each one the advantages and disadvantages, and their
likelihood for success. The first alternative evaluated is
maintaining the producer oriented approach, but implementing
more drastic changes in the design of the policy in order to
obtain units more suitable to the target group. This ap-
proach relies on production by traditionally well developed
medium to large sized firms. It will be argued that the
26
likelihood of success with this approach, even if drastic
modificatons are introduced, is uncertain because some of
the changes proposed would require structural modification
in the way the system works. The second approach considers
the government as a direct producer, a straightforward cri-
tique is whether the government could allocate the huge
amount of resources needed if direct construction is going
to be undertaken, and whether we can guarantee an efficient
production in time and quantity, given the known inefficien-
cy of large bureaucracies in Venezuela. The third approach
is consumer oriented. It requires the participation of both
public and private sectors, the difference lies in the kind
of producers targeted by the policy. The challenge consists
of producing lower cost units for the low-middle class by
small to medium scale producers with the promotion done by
cooperatives and civil societies, and support from the pub-
lic sector. That support could be technical, financial, or
organizational, and can be oriented toward facilitating the
access to land, capital, materials, equipment, and entre-
preneurship.
The recommendations are based on past observed behavior
and current trends. Among the criteria used in the evalua-
tion are quantity produced, time for production, amount of
government directed resources or equity required, potential
for adequacy of the units produced, degree of utilization of
existing resources and market mechanisms, political clout of
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each approach, degree of government control of the program,
and short and long term consequences on the supply of hou-
sing units and on the distribution of wealth. The need for
further studies to specify better the recommendations is
also highlighted.
A mix of the first and third alternative will be recom-
mended as the most appropriate because it makes use of the
existing resources and expertise in building housing units
and because it allows the development of an alternative way
of producing housing which seems to have a high potential
for success. Recommendations about the necessary changes to
be introduced in the design of a program to orient the pri-
vate sector production are included. Similarly, criteria
for planning a program of incentives for medium scale pro-
ducers promoted by cooperatives and associations are explo-
red. It is argued with this mixed approach the amount of
units produced will be reduced less drastically, the likeli-
hood that the units are more appropriate to the target con-
sumers is higher, and the extra cost for the government and
for the overall country will be lower. It is likely with
this approach, deformities in the way the market works, like
the one observed in the five past years would not occur be-
cause production would be more consumer oriented and would
respond less to uniquely business interests. Moreover, a
learning experience would be built in the process and the
profits would be distributed among different producers and
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not among a few big developers. Surely, this approach would
face political opposition, mainly because of the political
influence the formal production sector has through Fedeca-
maras and La Camara de la Construccion. However, this
alternative is viable if we think some of the existing
resources could be channelled to alternative construction
activities instead of to expensive high rise units that do
not sell. After all, what the government should look for is
that the resources invested by the country produce the
planned outcome and be employed in the most efficient way. V
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CHAPTER 1
THE CONTEXT
The year 1983 was a hard year for Venezuelans. For the
first time since the electoral democracy started 26 years
ago, Venezuelans felt their possibilities for rapid upward
mobility were seriously threatened. Venezuela's economy,
dependent on oil for 70% of its revenue and for 96% of the
hard currency, was suffering from the effects of the sharp
decline in oil prices , a world wide economic recession, and
the closing of the international financial markets. After a
period of artificial bonanza, Venezuela's financial situa-
tion came to a critical point.
For the first time in the Venezuelan democracy, the fe-
deral government imposed controls on the currency exchange,
imports, and domestic prices. However, these controls ar-
rived too late. By February 1983, when the government an-
nounced the fiscal and monetary measures, foreign and domes-
tic investors had withdrawn $15 billion in a 15 month peri-
od, shrinking the once abundant foreign currency reserves
and causing a serious liquidity problem.
1. The value of the oil exports was reduced by 12.6%
between 1982 and 1983. That reduction exacerbated the
decrease in oil revenues experienced between 1981 and 1982.
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The control of the currency expressed the official re-
cognition of a state of economic emergency in Venezuela and
the nation of almost 16 million people experienced the fear
of going the way of economic catastrophe. The internal and
external government debt which had been skyrocketing in the
1last few years seemed impossible to repay . In addition,
the political campaign preceding that year's elections
brought out cases of rampant administrative corruption.
Those scandals together with the monetary crisis, growing
unemployment 2, and fear of inflation3 originated a nation-
wide moral crisis called by an american journalist, "The
,4
Venezuelan Crisis of Confidence"
The negative impact of the international economic situa-
tion on the country's income for the concept of oil exports
and the control of the currency undertaken to control it,
generated a reduction in the Gross National Product, esti-
mated as 2.4% for nominal GNP and 4.5% for real GNP 5,
1. Venezuela's foreign debt was estimated at $35 billion in
1983.
2. Some estimations assume that the unemployment rate rose
20% in 1983.
3. Even though inflation between 1982 and 1983 was estima-
ted at 7%, it was a consequence of strict control of the go-
vernmentT controls that could not be sustained much longer.
4. The Boston Globe Magazine, October 16, 1983.
5. BCV Boletin Trimestral. Ano 2, No. 4, Octubre-Diciembre
1983. Producto Territorial Bruto (Gross National Product),
page 13.
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compared to the year 1982. That reduction was a consequence
of a decrease in capital formation and the level of savings,
the decrease in activities of construction, manufacturing,
and agricultural sectors, and a general reduction in the
level of investment and personal consumption.
1983 was also a year when many sectors of the economy
showed a dramatic lack of equilibrium. One of them was the
construction sector, and in particular, one of its greatest
components, the residential sector. The formal private
supply of housing, which had been oriented mainly toward the
high middle class seemed to have exceeded the demand with
the logical consequence of inventory accumulation. That
circumstance, together with the overall economic situation
of the country and the coming national elections stirred up
an array of concerns and protests, mainly from the produc-
tion sector of the housing industry, the constructors and
developers. They blamed the government and the financial
sector for the situation. They accused the government of
changing the monetary regulations and of modifying the sub-
sidy program. They complained about the banking institu-
tions arguing against the extraordinary increase in the
interest rates. Statistics illustrating the situation in
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the housing industry were discussed in newspaper articles,
television programs, and conventions organized for that
1
purpose in the main cities of the country
Statistics accounting up to September 19832 expressed
that Venezuela had accumulated 55,219 finished units, of
those, 41,677 or 75%, were ready for sale. Of the units on
sale, 33% were built in 1983, 35% in 1982, and 18% had been
on the market since 1981. Thus, developers were having fi-
nancial losses due to the interest payments on construction
loans. Sales had reduced dramatically, and inventory was
increasing, even though the activity in residential cons-
truction had also reduced. 21,729 units were paralyzed due
1. A national convention was organized by the Chamber of
Construction on July 9, 1983, to discuss and analyze the
crisis in the construction sector. The crisis was voiced
indicating that more than 40,000 apartments were frozen in
the country and more than 20,000were paralyzed because of a
lack of construction financing. Similarly, in Zulia state,
the regional branch of that organization publicly announced
a convention to look for solutions to the paralyzation of
the industry (August 11, 1983). In that conference, it was
revealed that 3,852 housing units were in stock in Maracaibo
City, of which 34% or 1,310 units had been on sale for more
than a year (considered frozen units); 89% of the stock or
3,426 units had sale prices of over Bs 200,000. Even under
the program of graduated payment mortgages subsidized by the
federal government, only families with incomes higher than
5,000 Bs/month could afford an apartment of that price. Ac-
cording to the statistics of CONZUPLAN (Consejo Zuliano de
Planificacion) only 20% of the urban families in the whole
state had incomes over Bs 5,000/month in 1980. Panorama.
August 1983.
2. Fundaconstruccion. Oferta Actual y a Corto Plazo al
30/9/83.
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to diverse financial reasons. As a consequence of the
reduction in construction activity, unemployment in the
construction sector had risen.
The crisis in the housing market was exacerbated by the
economic and regulatory changes but we will argue that it
was also increased due to the characteristics of the units
produced. The economic measure that affected mostly the
housing market, was the liberation of the interest rates.
The 25th of August, 1981, el Banco Central de Venezuela
(BCV) decided to substitute the mechanism of discretional
control of the interest rates, in use since the beginning of
1979, by a system of floating interest rates that would be
determined by the market. According to the BCV2  the main
reasons for that decision were to make the system more
flexible to the international financial markets in order to
avoid the flight of Venezuelan money to foreign markets
which were paying much higher interest rates, and to guaran-
tee an adequate level of international reserves to meet the
external payments. The arguments to support the decision
were, first, that the financial market in Venezuela had
reached a development stage which made inoperative the
control on the interest rates7 second, the stimulus that
2. See Informe Economico Banco Central de Venezuela, 1981,
pp. 79-80.
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would be placed on savings and on banking competence-, and
third, the elimination of the administrative and technical
complications involved in the determination of the interest
rates. Overall, the political pressures on the Central Bank
would be eliminated. The decision was made in a time when
the differential between internal and external rates was
high. As a consequence, interest rates went up dramatically
and so did the price of credit. Once the differentials were
eliminated, the flow of Venezuelan money to the internatio-
nal market diminished.
The interest rate for housing acquisition increased from
12% in August 1981 to 17% in the rest of the year. Cons-
truction financing went from 17.5% to 19.5% at the end of
1981. The increases continued in the following years, as of
April 1983 the interest rates for home construction and
purchasing had reached the incredible level of 21.5% without
considering extra commmissions and additional charges
The decision makers expected the internal interest rates
would rise in the beginning, but they also expected the
interest rates would fall with the change in conditions in
the financial market. However, the interest rates have
maintained a high level, showing resistance to dropping. As
1. See Boletin Trimestral BCV, Julio-Septiembre 1983, p. 9.
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it was expressed by Dr. Bruzual, the president of the BCV2
"We could ask why the interest rates are still high if there
is currently an oversupply of resources in the financing
sector. There are many reasons. The ability to attract re-
sources from savers is one of them. In the second place, it
is obvious that the weakening of the economic system has in-
troduced financing difficulties in companies that otherwise
would not have them; the financing institutions are protec-
ting themselves by overcharging on new credit due to the
fear of no recovery. Thirdly, we cannot discard the possi-
bility that the financing institutions are speculating given
the higher level of earnings in the sale and purchase of
dollars in the free market. That business now has a lower
level of risk compared to the legitimate functions of the
financing institutions."
A complementary explanation for the declaration of Dr.
Bruzual (one many times expressed by the developers in the
interviews) is that during the last governmental period,
credit facilities were enourmous. Many small entrepreneurs,
and individuals with appropriate connections to the
financing sector, used the credit facilities to open new
banks. These small banks or financing societies worked
2. See Boletin Trimestral BCV, October-December 1983,
Declaracion de fin de ano, p. 20.
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almost without reserves, despite governmental regulations.
When many companies, given the economic situation, started
defaulting on loans, the banks competed frantically to
attract savers by raising the interest rates trying to
overcome the lack of equilibrium in their portfolios.
In the housing market, the increase in interest rates,
but also the economic situation, caused a decrease in the
level of sales. In addition, the government implemented
three changes in the housing policies concerning the private
sector, two related to the subsidy program, the other rela-
ted to the refinancing program. They were intended to dimi-
nish the losses the government was also facing because of
the great differences between the market rates and the sub-
sidized interest rates.
In the first modification of December 6, 1983, FONDUR
gave preference for the subsidy to those units which, be-
sides complying with the housing program regulations and
being built before December 31, 1982, had obtained long term
mortgages from the banks at 12% interest rates or lower.
The second modification to the subsidy, published December
21, 1983, reduced the subsidized interest rates for housing
categories "C", "D", and "E", the most expensive ones within
the program. Related to the refinancing program, enacted on
June 1, 1983, FONDUR reduced the amount of the refinancing
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for construction or acquisition of the units within catego
ries "A", "B", and "C". These modifications did not change
categories "D" or "E".
Undoubtedly, the changes in the interest rates and in
the housing policies affected the demand for the housing
units, However, it would be narrow minded to consider those
as the only factors affecting the level of sales. 25,767
housing units, or 62% out of the 41,677 units on sale belon-
ged to categories "D" and "E". According to the features of
the subsidy program enacted on July 16, 1981, monthly in-
comes higher than 5,000 Bs were required to purchase units
"C" and higher than 7,000 Bs to purchase units "E". Only
14,623 families, or 25% of the national households had in-
comes higher than 5,000 Bs in 1983, and 327,825 families, or
13% of the total households in the country had higher than
7,000 Bs1 . In addition, in order to be able to afford the
payments to the bank and to the government, the families
will have to expect an increase in yearly income of at least
7.75% (see Chart 13), or to increase the expense/income ra-
tio over 40%, the ratio established by the subsidy program,
and which, by the way, was considered high.
1. OCEI, Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo. ler Semestre
1983.
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5,917 units, or 14% of the stock belonged to category
"E", in this case more than 3,000 Bs of monthly income was
required, and the expected increase in yearly income would
have to be 13% (see Chart 12). Of the 2,360 units, or 6% of
the stock within categories "A" and "B", 1198 units were in
Ciudad Guayana, a planned industrial city where residental
construction had a late boom. A large amount of emigration
to Ciudad Guayana was expected as a consequence of a huge
planned industrial expansion. However, the project did not
take place, and units for middle income families remain va-
cant1 . The expected annual increase in income for a family
wanting to buy a unit "A", according to the features of the
subsidy program, would have to be 16.5% (see Chart 11). The
remaining 7,513 units or 18% of the stock, were housing
units whose prices were higher than 350,000 Bs, thus they
were out of the regulated market. In summary, the crisis in
the housing market, we could argue, was also caused by the
prices of the units produced in addition to the increase of
the interest rates, and the overall economic situation.
Unemployment was growing in Venezuela and Venezuelans
were losing confidence in the economic and political stabi-
lity of the country. We can assume many decisions to buy
were postponed given the unwillingness of the people to ac-
1. Sidor, Plan IV.
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quire such a strong financial compromise. In the real es-
tate market, specifically, people had lost confidence in
developers. Many cases of administrative corruption were
denounced. It was known of projects where potential buyers
had lost their equity downpayment. Some of those projects
had been backed up by the government and the whole country
2
was scandalized
The upcoming election also developed a lot of expecta-
tions from the population. In general, the feeling was that
a new government could only improve the situation. Vene-
zuelan governments have been very paternalistic and people
sought a panacea.
The Attitude of the Government:
During the year of 1983, the attitude of the leaving
government was to step back from the problem and wait until
the new government took office on February 2, 1984. The new
government, representative of one of the two strongest poli-
tical parties in Venezuela (the other one was represented by
2. One of those was la Chamarreta in Maracaibo City where
more than 2,500 low income families were misled with a pro-
ject in which they put down 19 million Bs from their savings
as a pre-purchasing fee and the developer flew the coop. In
addition, more than 800 million Bs were obtained from public
and private institutions to finance the construction of the
project. The project was a joint partnership between a pri-
vate developer, FONDUR and INAVI (The National Institute of
Housing). El Diario de Caracas, Febrero 26, 1984.
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the leaving government) which had been alternating the pre-
sidency in the 26 years of democracy, adopted the first of-
ficial measures affecting the housing market, on February
25, 1984.
The new measures were related to new controls on the in-
terest rates. A mixed approach was adopted in which inte-
rest rates on savings accounts would fluctuate with the mar-
ket while the interest rates for investments were fixed by
the BCV. The minimum interest rates for savings accounts
was 6% for the Savings and Loans, and 8% for other financing
institutions. The interest rate for housing construction
was fixed at 14% for the social interest housing and at 16%
for the construction of non-regulated housing units. For
home purchasing, the interest rates were fixed at 12% for
social interest housing, and at 14% for the purchase of
1
non-regulated housing units
On March 3, 1984, the new Ministry of Urban Development
in charge of MINDUR announced the government had decided to
keep the program of incentives for the sector, or Decree
214, and the subsidy program of Decree 1134 under the same
conditions as in the previous period, however, he announced
the frozen units would be subject to a special program that
soon would be announced2 . On March 29, 1984, the mass media
1. El Universal, Martes 28 de Febrero de 1984.
2. El Nacional, Sabado 3 de Marzo de 1984.
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announced the Decree 69 named "Regimen of Stimulus for the
Fluidity of the Housing Market"3 . That Decree affected the
units that had been on the market before March 31 of 1983,
those finished units without condominium documents, and
those units whose construction had been paralyzed because of
a lack of financing, or because of the previous stages
hadn't been sold.
Basically, this Decree authorized higher subsidies to
the frozen units in terms of lower initial interest rates
and a longer subsidy term than for those units under the
subsidy protection, but not considered frozen units. For
all the units under this Decree, the minimum allowed long
term financing is 20 years (5 years longer than for the
other units wihtin the subsidy) and the same as in the
original subsidy program, the rate of annual increase in the
initial interest rate will be 1%. The conditions of the
Decree are outlined in the chart below.
Housing Maximum Price Minimum Terms of Initial
Category of Primary No. of Subsidy Interest
Sale (Bs) Bedrooms (years) Rate
A 160,000 2 10 5%
B 250,000 3 8 6%
C 350,000 4 6 7%
3. El Universal, Jueves 28 de Marzo de 1984.
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Consequently, we observed the government implemented the
measures to channel the housing units through the market.
That approach was undertaken to alleviate the paralyzation
of the industry and thus, to decrease the level of unemploy-
ment, to alleviate the delicate financial situation of many
credit institutions which were holding unpaid mortgages for
more than 12,000 million Bs in apartments unsold , and over-
all, to alleviate the pervasive political climate. In
short, given the income level of the population, the govern-
ment would help the buyers to purchase the units by absor-
bing part of the losses. Therefore, the excessive prices
will be paid not by the financial sector, which has specula-
ted with the interest rates; nor by the developers, who will
earn the pre-established profits anyhow; but by the buyers,
who will pay for an inflated product, and by the new govern-
ment, who will have to play the conciliator.
1. El Universal, Jueves 29 de Marzo de 1984.
This estimate includes construction loans issued by the
Venezuelan Workers Bank (BTV), the Savings and Loans, and
the Mortgage Banks.
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CHAPTER 2
THE VENEZUELAN HOUSING POLICY FOR THE PERIOD 1979-1983
"Homeownership for all," was the political slogan used
by the leaving government to identify its housing policy for
the period 1979-1983. The expressed general goal of the
policy was to give to the Venezuelan population a "better
access to appropriate housing solutions" in which the con-
cept of appropriate housing solutions included not only fi-
nished units, but core houses, sites and services projects,
and home improvement loans for the lowest income groups. In
addition to the shelter for the individual families, the po-
licy included in the definition of housing the related in-
frastructural services and communal facilities. The overall
housing policy was not officially formulated until 1980 with
the publications of the VI General Plan for the Nation and
the National Housing Program , even though the first regula-
tions and decrees were dictated in 1979.
The VI Plan outlined by Cordiplan contains the socio-
economic development plan for the Nation. These general
plans are formulated every five years and provide the gene-
1. VI Plan de la Nacion. Period 1981-1985. Capitulo VI,
Desarrollo Urbano, Vivienda y Servicios Conexos. Cordiplan
1980, and Programa Nacional de Vivienda. 1980-1984.
MINDUR, 1980.
44
ral framework for the more specific policies of the country.
The Housing Program is developed by the Ministry of Urban
Development and provides the specific targets, strategies
and programs for housing and urban development.
The VI plan assigned to the housing policy one of the
highest priorities due to the multiplier effect housing
construction was expected to play in the economic growth,
and due to the critical role that appropriate housing would
play in the well-being of the population. The policy esti-
mated that as of 1979, 800,000 families lacked adequate hou-
sing and their related services and that the deficit was
strongly concentrated in the lower income groups. It was
estimated that an additional demand of 500,000 housing units
would be generated in the following five years caused by
both population growth and migration. Given the spatial
distribution of the Venezuelan population, it was estimated
that 81% of the total demand for housing and services would
concentrate in the bigger cities. The policy statement ex-
pressed the view that due to the magnitude of the deficit
the housing problem in Venezuela could not be solved in the
short time; however, it estimated that with the continuous
implementation of appropriate policies an acceptable level
could be reached within 20 years. That clarification was
contradictory with the slogan of the policy which advertized
every family would have a housing solution of its own. The
target was to produce 668,923 housing units in five years.
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391,423 units or 58% of the total would be produced by the
public sector; the difference of 277,500 or 42% of the units
were expected to be supplied by the private sector through
different incentives and regulations. This distribution of
tasks, the policy document states, would allow the govern-
ment to concentrate on the direct production for the most
needy groups while the private sector would supply the units
for the middle income families.
The broader goal of "appropriate housing for all" was
planned to be achieved by the implementation of two main
strategies. One, to maximize the production of units by the
complementary construction of the public and the private
sector. The other, to broaden the range of income groups
benefiting from the policy by generating more affordable
solutions and by implementing government supported financing
mechanisms which facilitated production and acquisition.
The income groups to benefit from the policy ranged from
the population living in the informal areas to the middle
income families. In this sense the policy was very ambi-
tious, given the limited resources of the nation. In 1979,
the year when the first housing regulations were dictated,
Venezuelan households totaled 2,259,9627 around 90% of the
households or approximately 2 million families fell within
the policy protection. Chart #1 from OCEI1 depicts the dis-
tribution of households according to income. Even though we
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know not all of the 2 million households were in need of
housing the amount serves to illustrate the wide scope of
the policy. According to the housing program direct govern-
ment production would concentrate on households with monthly
incomes up to 3,000 bolivares. The OCEI survey indicated
that 1,527,937 families or 68% of the Venezuelan households
in 1979 belonged to this category. Of those, 1,114,142 or
73% had incomes below the subsistence level, estimated at
2,000 bolivares per month for a family of five 2 . These
amounts indicate the government direct intervention would
attend a sector for whom formal housing was not one of the
first priorities and whose payment capacity was very low.
The housing program estimated that private production
would attend the rest of the households, those earning more
than 3,000 bolivares monthly, but with one important differ-
ence. The private sector would receive incentives to pro-
duce housing units affordable by households whose incomes
were between 3,000 and 7,000 bolivares per month. The sup-
ply of units for the rest of the households, those with mon-
thly incomes higher than 7,000 bolivares per month, would be
left to market forces. Even though there are not statistics
available which quantify the size of the two househould
1. Oficina Central de Estadistica e Informatica (OCEI).
Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo. Primer Semestre 1979.
2. Estimated by Cordiplan. Presidencia de la Republica.
Coordinacion de Planificacion Nacional.
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groups separately, we get an indication by noting that the
household group earning more than 5,000 bolivares per month
represented only 13% of the households of the country in
1979, or 301,173 families. It can be estimated that fami-
lies with incomes higher than 7,000 bolivares per month
could represent not more than 5% of the total households.
The policy was to be implemented without introducing any
drastic institutional changes. The existing public and
private institutions would continue working as usual, but
CHART No 1
DISTRIBUTION OF VENEZUELAN HOUSEHOLDS
ACCORDING TO INCOME LEVEL
First Semester 1979
MONTHLY INCOME LEVEL
Bs/month
Until 300
301 - 450
451 - 700
701 - 1,000
1,001 - 1,500
1,501 - 2,000
2,001 - 3,000
SUB TOTAL
3,001 - 4,000
4,001 - 5,000
5,001 - and more
SUB TOTAL
Not declared
TOTAL
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS
No %
36,324 1.6
51,823 2.3
139,289 6.2
227,289 10.1
325,793 14.4
330,740 14.6
413,795 18.3
1,524,937 67.5
266,620 11.8
160,104 7.0
301,173 13.2
727,897 32.0
4,128 0.5
2,259,962 100
Source: OCEI. Oficina Central de Estadistica
e Informatica. Encuesta de Hogares.
Primer Semestre 1979. Total Nacional.
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the government planned to strengthen and regulate the system
by assigning financial resources to it. The underlying
philosophy considered that the formal private sector under
the right incentives and regulations would produce tradi-
tional units but at lower prices; thus allowing the public
sector to concentrate on the lowest income level without
overlooking the supply of housing for the middle income
groups. We could argue that given the political context of
Venezuela, where the middle class has a lot of political
leverage, the government would not design a housing policy
which did not favor also the middle groups. As a conse-
quence, resources were planned to be spread over a broad
range of households. As we will see in the development of
this chapter, even though the policy expressed that the con-
centration should be in the lower income groups, the resour-
ces targeted to the middle income groups were comparable to
those oriented to the lower sector of the population.
The Features Identified as Critical in the Housing Problem
Policies are formulated to contribute in the solution of
a problem and their formulation intends to correct those
elements identified as critical in the solution. Hence, our
understanding of public policy can not be complete until we
comprehend what element influenced the focus of the housing
policy.
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The key features identified in the official documents as
critical in the solution of the Venezuelan housing problem
covered demand and supply side characteristics as well as
the institutional setting. From the demand side, the acce-
lerated population growth, the excessive concentration in
urban centers and the low level of affordability were high-
lighted as the most critical. From the supply side the mag-
nitude of the deficit, the limitations of the financing and
materials resources, inflation and its effects on construc-
tion and financing costs, and the lack of experimental re-
search in the production of low cost housing were mentioned
as important. It was also mentioned the lack of interinsti-
tutional coordination among public agencies and the lack of
complementarity between public and private production.
These last drawbacks were not described precisely in the
policy. However, it is understood, by "lack of coordina-
tion," the doubled efforts over the same project undertaken
by two different institutions, the lack of timing in the
supply of infrastructural services with the construction of
housing units and in general contradictory plans over the
same problem between institutions. The term "lack of com-
plementarity" refers to the fact that private developers are
encouraged to supply housing units which could eventually
compete with those supplied by INAVI and sold at below
market prices.
50
The annual rate of, grow'h of the Venezuelan population
is recorded at 3.5%.\ This very high rate of growth comple-
mented with high concentration in the main urban centers
cause an explosive demand for housing and public facilities.
To illustrate this point, in 1979, a few urban centers con-
centrated 75% of the Venezuelan population compared to the
1936 figures that showed only 35% of urban population. Ac-
cording to the same 1979 figures, only 25% of the population
lived in towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants. The rapid
concentration of population and the lag in the supply of
housing and services has caused the explosive development of
squatter settlements around the main cities.
The distribution of incomes is very unequal. As it was
mentioned before, in 1979, 49% of the Venezuelan households
or 904,671 families were below the subsistence level, drawn
at an income of 2,000 bolivares per month. For the same
year, 68% of the households or 1,527,937 families had in-
comes lower than 3,000 bolivares per month, consequently
they could not afford the units produced and financed by the
formal private sector whose average price was above 265,800
Bs 2 . The Chart #2 illustrates the proportion of income a
family earning 3,000 Bs/month in 1979 would have to allocate
2. BCV Anuario de Series Estadisticas, Construccion
Privada. Precio Premedio de Apartamentos Financiados segun
fuente por Regiones Administrativas. Cuadro No. VI - 91,
page 369.
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to housing consumption given different prices of housing
units. It can be observed that to purchase the average unit
would require 83% of the 3,000 Bs family income for housing.
To purchase a unit costing 100,000 Bs would require spending
33% of the income, which was not considered an exaggerated
1
proportion for a low-middle income family . However, the
main problem was that those cheaper units were rarely pro-
duced by the private market. A complementary limitation to
homeownership was that families with low levels of income
can not comply in most cases with the documents required to
obtain formal financing. The families with monthly incomes
below 3,000 Bs were also out of the market for the finished
public housing produced by INAVI, because to be eligible for
the single family or multifamily units, a family should
demonstrate incomes higher than 3,000 Bs/month.
The policy also identified as critical the limitations
of the supply of funds for housing finance, given the com-
petition housing must face in the financial markets with
1. According to Mindur (Direccion de Vivienda), 25% of
income spent on housing is an appropriate index to estimate
affordability, because it leaves money available for other
prior expenses. The 25% expense/income ratio is a rule of
thumb applied more or less universally. However, recently,
world wide organizations such as AID and The World Bank,
have recognized it is a parameter applicable to middle-
income but not to low-income families in informal areas
which usually spend less than 20% on housing consumption.
CHART No 2
MONTHLY PAYMENTS REQUIRED IN 1979 TO ACQUIRE UNITS FROM THE PRIVATE MARKET
(by a family earning Bs 3,000 ofmonthly income)
1* 2* 3* 4* 5* 6*
PRICE OF LOAN TO INTEREST TERM MONTHLY PROPORTION OF MONTHLY MONTHLY
THE UNIT VALUE RATIO RATE years PAYMENT INCOME REQUIRED! INCOME REQUIRED INCOME REQUIRED
(Bs) ._. (Bs/month) , (Ba/month)
100,000 90% 12% 20 990 33% 3,960 2,475
150,000 90% 12% 20 1,487 50% 5,948 3,718
200,000 85% 12% 20 1,871 62% 7,848 4,677
250,000 80% 12% 20 2,202 73% 8,808 5,505
300,000 75% 13% 20 2,477 83% 9,908 6,193
350,000 75% 13% 20 3,114 100% 12,456 7,785
NOTES: 1*
2*
3*
4*
5*
6 *
According to the housing policy 1974-1979
Real interest rate charged for home acquisition in 1979. It includes the
so called commissions on balances. "El factor financiamiento en la pro-
duccion de la mercancia vivienda en Venezuela". A. Cilento Sardi, page 20.
15 year term was the minimun term allowed in 1979.
It considers a monthly income of Bs 3,000.
It considers 25% of income for housing consumption.
It considers 40% of income for housing consumption.
U,
ti"
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other uses of funds, and the reduction on the level of sa-
vings experienced in the last years caused by higher inte-
rest rates offerred in the external financing markets. For
these reasons, the policy stated the need to secure an ade-
quate supply of funds to housing by channelling increasing
government resources to the housing financing markets.
Other features identified as critical in the housing
problem were the excessive increases in land prices, cons-
truction, and financing costs. The statement also mentioned
the earning of excessive profits due to the control exerted
by private groups on land, construction equipment and mater-
ials, and construction and long term financing. The lack of
interinstitutional coordination among the different public
agencies was also highlighted as critical. Consequently,
the policy stated the level of cooperation expected between
the public sector and the developers should be clearly spe-
cified. Similarly, the incentives and regulations to the
private sector should be stated clearly to achieve an effec-
tive and reasonable participation, compatible with the
policy goals.
The Official Institutional Framework
In Venezuela the task of designing, implementing, and
administering the housing program is assigned by the execu-
tive power to the Ministry of Urban Development (Ministerio
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de Desarrollo Urbano, MINDUR). This institution formulates
the program which includes the strategy to be followed by
the public sector and the set of goals; in addition, it inc-
ludes the set of norms, incentives, and regulations to be
applied to the private sector to orient the production of
housing to a more efficient outcome. MINDUR is also in
charge of the overall urban development policy for the coun-
try, the supply of public buildings and communal facilities,
and the programs for community development. The housing
program designed by MINDUR must be in accordance with the
overall economic development policy formulated in the Gene-
ral Plan under the competence of the Ministry of Planning
(CORDIPLAN).
In the field of housing, MINDUR works together with a
set of complementary supporting agencies, each of which
concentrates on a specific set of problems. The National
Institute of Housing (Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda,
INAVI) is in charge of the construction and administration
of public housing developments for homeownership. These
developments are to serve low and low-middle income groups.
The housing developments are mostly contracted to private
designers and developers under the guidelines and super-
vision of INAVI. After completion, the units are turned
back to INAVI who sells and administers them. INAVI also
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administers a program of popular credit to complement its
sites and services programs and to assist in home improve-
ment programs developed in informal areas.
The National Fund for Urban Development (Fondo Nacional
de Desarrollo Urbano, FONDUR), acts as the official supplier
of land and financial resources for the housing market. Its
critical function is to guarantee an adequate level of cir-
culation of two important resources, land and mortgage capi-
tal. FONDUR's main activities include the purchase and
development of land for low cost housing, the refinancing of
the mortgage credit institutions, the administration of sub-
sidy programs for buyers of low-cost housing, and the crea-
tion of the public-private partnerships to develop low and
middle cost housing. The functions of FONDUR are in sum, to
act as developer of land for low and middle cost housing and
to secure and support financing for the purchase of low and
middle cost units.
The Foundation for Community Development (Fundacion para
el Desarrollo de la Comunidad, FUNDACOMUN) is concerned with
the design and implementation of integral development plans
for the squatter settlement areas. Its plans include ac-
tions oriented toward social organization of the communi-
ties, economic development programs, and home and community
upgrading. FUNDACOMUN is also a nationwide institution with
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regional branches in the main cities of the country. This
institution is in charge of the needs of the lowest urban
income group of the Venezuelan population.
The Ministry of Health (MSAS) and its Division of Rural
Housing is responsible for the construction of single family
units for rural areas. Although its actions are limited
spatially1 , its labor has been very effective in producing
the lowest cost single family units in the country (without
including the land price). Part of its success has been due
to the mechanisms adopted for the construction of the units,
which is based on small scale contractors and payments by
weekly valuations. Unfortunately, the resources assigned to
it have been traditionally small due to institutional compe-
tition with INAVI.
This set of institutions work together with the private
suppliers of housing such as the financing institutions,
private constructors and developers, and the suppliers of
equipment and materials.
1. The Housing Program for the period 1979-1983 limited the
actions of Vivienda Rural to those centers with less than
15,000 inhabitants and located in areas where agricultural
development is planned. Even though in exceptional cases,
they have been allowed to build in the outskirts of some
important cities like Ciudad Guayana and Maracaibo.
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The Housing Financial Sector
The main financing institutions intervening in the
housing market in Venezuela are the National System of
Savings and Loans (Sistema National de Ahorro y Prestano,
SNAP), The Mortgage Banks (Banca Hipotecaria), The Financing
Societies (Sociedades Financieras) and the Venezuelan Wor-
kers Bank (Banco de los Trabajadores de Venezuela, BTV). The
National System of Savings and Loans (SNAP) includes public
and private institutions and has its own regulations. The
system is integrated by the National Saving and Loan (Banco
Nacional de Ahorro y Prestamo, BANAP), official bank which
has its own patrimony and acts as the central bank of the
system, the private savings and loans institutions (EAP) and
the Superintendence of Savings and Loans (Superintendencia
de Entidades de Ahorro y Prestamo). The BANAP is the
central bank in the SNAP assigned to the Ministry of Finan-
cing. Its main functions are to give financial assistance
to the EAP's and to guarantee the mortgages issued by those
institutions. Similarly, BANAP guarantees the savings
accounts to companies of individual savers and serves as an
overall intermediary for the system.
The EAP are private financing institutions, structured
as mutualist societies whose main objective is to promote
savings from people and institutions. The superintendence
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of Savings and Loans exerts the overall control over the
operation of the system.
The Mortgage Banks and Financing Societies are under the
regulation of the General Law for Banks and other Credit
Institutions. The SNAP and the mortgage banks are the two
main components of the housing financing system in Vene-
zuela. In 1979, the SNAP and the Mortgage Banks financed
the acquisition of 25,490 units. The SNAP financed 14,492
of the units sold, or 57% at an average price of 263,600
Bs/unit and the average loan to value ratio was of 68%. The
same year, the Mortgage Banks financed 10,999 units, or 43%
at an average price of 204,500 Bs/unit and an average loan
to value ratio of 61%. The same year, 4.6 million Bs in
construction mortgages were financed by these two institu-
tions. Out of this total, 2.7 million, or 59%, were finan-
ced by the Mortgage banks, the rest, or 1.9 million (41%),
were financed by the SNAP.
The financing system in Venezuela leaves out of the
formal market a considerable amount of households who simply
can not afford the units produced due to the high sales
prices and to the financing terms and requirements.
59
The Housing Policy Approach
The design of the housing policy was approched by class-
ifying the demand in three broad categories, according to
the household monthly income level: The first group was
identified as those families having monthly incomes lower
than 3,000 Bs. The policy stated the housing solutions for
this level would be provided by direct government construc-
tion in urban and rural areas. The units to be supplied
included a variety of solutions from sites and services,
core housing, single family housing, multifamily housing,
rural housing, and home improvement loans. In order to
facilitate the purchase of the solutions, the government
would implement special financing programs at below market
interest rates and with longer terms. It was also planned
to promote the development of community groups who could act
as intermediaries to channel the programs of popular cre-
dits. The official institutions planned to participate in
this group were INAVI, FUNDACOMUN, and MSAS.
The second group included households with income levels
between 3,000 and 7,000 Bs/month. For this group, two pro-
duction approaches would be taken- direct construction by
the government, and incentives to stimulate the production
by the private sector. Public-Private partnerships would
also be encouraged. In addition, regulations would be dic-
tated to secure short and long term financing, and to pro-
60
vide favorable purchasing conditions. Related to the deve-
lopers, the incentives will include financing facilities and
tax exemptions. Moreover, the government will guarantee the
sales of the lowest cost units produced by the public-
private partnerships. Related to the financing sector, the
government will provide mortgage funds to the system and
will guarantee and insure a certain proportion of the long
term mortgages. In order to channel the use of funds, the
government will also regulate the portfolio composition of
the mortgage financing institutions. Incentives to coopera-
tives, societies, and foundations would also be encouraged
to stimulate their participation in the supply of housing
units.
The institutions to participate in the housing solutions
for the second group were INAVI, through direct intervention
and the participation in public-private projects; the SNAP,
the Mortgage Banks, and the BTV, through their special fin-
ancing programs; FONDUR, through the refinancing to the cre-
dit institutions' participation in public-private partner-
ships, and the administration of the subsidy program for the
buyers, and last, the private cooperatives and societies.
Even though the statistics available for the year 1979 did
not classify the income groups under the same categories, it
is known that 426,724 families or 19% of the overall popula-
tion had incomes between 3,000 and 5,000 Bs/month. It can
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be assumed that the proportion of households falling within
the second target group would have been around 27% of the
families in the country.
The analysis of the classification of the demand by the
policy suggest important conclusions. First, the conceptu-
alization of the demand by income groups was too simplistic.
In analysis of home affordability, more important than the
household net earnings is the proportion of resources a
family could allocate to housing consumption. This is espe-
cially critical for the lower income groups. The proportion
of income assigned for housing consumption varies greatly
with the level of income, and in the policy this sensitivity
analysis was left out. However, in practice, private mort-
gage institutions apply their own affordability estimation
procedures to overcome this weakness of the governmental
policy. Hence, the classification of target groups by the
policy did not correspond with realistic affordability pro-
cedures. Second, the income categories were too broad and
they don't include considerations related to future income
expectations or upward economic mobility. For instance, the
first category could include people employed in the informal
sector as well as administrative personnel employed in for-
mal offices. Obviously, from the point of view of afforda-
bility and access to resources, both households differ dra-
matically. Also, in the second group, the classification
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could include from typical worker class households to star-
ting professionals. Here again, differences can be drama-
tic. An additional conclusion is that the classification
did not include considerations about family size. This
element represents an important consideration in terms of
home purchasing capability, unit size and price.
The Policy Programs
The housing policy would be implemented through four big
programs- land acquisition and development, housing cons-
truction, squatter settlement upgrading, and support to the
private sector.
Program 1 - Land acquisition and development. As was
mentioned, one of the elements considered a key in the diag-
nosis of the housing problem was the availability of urban
land. Consequently, the policy proposed an ambitious plan
of land acquisition and development to provide this
resource; not only for the housing developments in the
period, but also for future developments. The land was to
be acquired with government funds by both INAVI and FONDUR.
The first to develop its own housing programs and the
public-private programs- the second to secure current and
future supplies of urban land to control land speculation.
FONDUR would also develop a proportion of the land acquired
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to promote the production of units for middle income groups
in conjunction with private developers.
The program estimated that in the period 1981-1985,
FONDUR would acquire 9,205 Hectares with a total investment
of 5,192 million bolivares at an average of 56.4 Bs/square
meter. In addition, FONDUR would develop 6,000 Hectares of
that land at a cost of 1,551 million Bolivares. INAVI would
acquire 8,000 Hectares of land at an average price of 11.5
Bs/square meter and for a total investment of 989 million
bolivares. Therefore, INAVI would acquire 1,000 Hectares
less than FONDUR and the land would be five times cheaper.
The total amount of resources to be invested in the five
years by both FONDUR and INAVI would total 7,732 million
3bolivares3. We could consider that most of the resources to
be invested by FONDUR in land purchasing and development
would benefit middle income families, given the comparative
price of the land and the fact that according to the policy
design FONDUR housing developments were mainly targeted to
middle income groups. Therefore, 87% of the total resources
to be invested in land would mostly benefit middle income
groups.
3. Componentes Fundamentales de la Politica Habitacional de
Venezuela, MINDUR, Noviembre 1982, pages 3.3 and 3.5.
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CHART No 3
ESTIMATED INVESTMENT IN LAND ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT
INSTITUTION HECTARES INVESTMENT Bs/Square Meter
millions of Bs
FONDUR 6,743
-Land acquisition 9,205 5,192 56.4
-Land development 6,000 1,551 -
INAVI 8,655 989 11.5
Total investment in land acquisition and development Bs 7,732
Source: "Componentes de la politica habitacional de Venezuela.
MINDUR 1982, pages 3.3 and 3.4.
Program 2 - Housing Construction. With this program,
the government tried to maximize the number of solutions
produced by INAVI and the Ministry of Health though the
Division of Rural Housing. THe program contemplated the
construction of various solutions such as single family hou-
sing, multifamily housing, rural housing, core units, sites
and services, and home improvement loans. The units offer-
red by these institutions were strongly subsidized with in-
terest rates which varied from 1 to 7% anually and with low
expectations of recovery.
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The total planned investment by INAVI for the period
1981-1985 was of 16,553 million bolivares for a total of
269,990 housing solutions which included the related ser-
vices and communal facilities. Of that total, 49,585 hou-
sing solutions and 5,152 million or 31% of the resources
were to be invested directly into the construction of single
and multifamily units affordable only by middle income
groups.
MSAS would invest 1,820 million bolivares throughout the
period and its production was planned in 74,000 rural units.
These units would be built in towns with less than 15,000
inhabitants and were targeted to lower income groups. In
addition to the institutions mentioned, two special programs
were included in the policy; the construction of the Simon
Bolivar Center and the housing for the Corporacion Venezie-
lana de Guayana.or CVG. The Simon Bolivar Centre would
build 2,464 multifamily housing units while the CVG would
built 5,259 units, of which 4,459 were to be single family
and multifamily dwellings. The rest were 800 "housing solu-
tions" of which 600 were serviced lots and 200 home improve-
4
ment loans
It is interesting to note from Chart #4 that out of the
total of units planned for the period, 14% or 56,508 units
4. VI Plan de la Nacion, Cordiplan 1981, pages 118 - 120.
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were to be single family units or multifamily units in urban
areas. The average price for these types of units built by
INAVI were respectively 75,000 Bolivares and 100,000 boli-
vares and they were not sold to families with incomes lower
than 3,000 Bolivares per month. Similarly, 11,576 million
bolivares or 43% of the investment in housing solutions
would be channeled to these types of units not targeted to
low income groups. Therefore, we concluded that a high pro-
portion of the resources was targeted to the second group of
the demand, which is contrary to the stated focus of the
policy, expressed as stronger emphasis on the supply for
lower income groups. We will see later in the analysis of
the program 4, how part of the government incentives were
channelled into producing housing at similar purchase prices
to the single and multifamily units produced by INAVI, but
with the difference that the units offered by the public
sector enjoyed higher direct subsidies and facilities for
credit.
Program 3 - Squatter Settlement Upgrading. This program
would be carried out by FUNDACOMUN. The resources assigned
for the period 1981-1985 were 1,709 million bolivares which
represented 6.5% of the direct resources channelled through
the public sector. The low level of concentration of re-
sources in this program is contradictory with the policy's
stated goal of concentrating in housing solutions for the
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CHART No 4
PROGRAMMED HOUSING SOLUTIONS AND GROSS INVESTMENT:
NATIONAL HOUSING PROGRAM 1981-1985
SECTOR, AGENCY, PROGRAM NUMBER GROSS INVESTMENT
OF SOLUTIONS million of Bs.
PUBLIC SECTOR 391,423 (58%) 26,506
INAVI 269,990 16,553
- Home improvement loans 49,499 963
- Site and Services proj- 92,154 3,812
ects
- Core units 78,752 4,885
- Single Family Housing 41,446 3,894
- Multifamily Housing 8,119 1,258
- Communal Facilities - 1,741
M.S.A.S. - Rural Housing 74,000 1,820
FUNDACOMUN 39,710 1,709
- Relocation loans 5,321 161
- Home improvement loans 24,299 300
- Home construction loans 10,090 242
- Infrastructure and com- - 278
munal facilities
- Other programs - 728
CENTRO SIMON BOLIVAR 2,464
6,424
C.V.G. 5,259
- Home improvement loans 200 -
- Site and Services 600 -
- Single Family Housing 1,628 -
- Multifamily Housing 2,831 -
PRIVATE SECTOR 272,500 (42%) -
TOTAL PUBLIC/PRIVATE SECTOR 668,923 -
Source: VI Plan de la Nacion. Cordiplan 1981. Page 117.
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lower income groups. In addition, it is contradictory with
1
the concentration of the deficit in urban housing
Program 4 - Support to the Private Sector. This program
reflected the concern of the government for the solution of
the housing needs of the middle income groups. The content
of the policy stated that given the inflationary conditions
of the economy, middle income groups were facing serious
limitations to purchase housing, consequently, government
assistance was imperative.
Government action would be channelled through three sub-
programs, government assistance and refinancing to the hou-
sing sector, stimuli and incentives for constructors and de-
velopers, and the subsidy program for the buyers. The poli-
cy estimated with the incentives, 277,5002 units would be
produced by the private sector in the five year period or
approximately 55,500 units per year. That amount represen-
ted 42% of the total expected production. The assistance to
1. According to the survey of squatter settlements carried
out by FUNDACOMUN in 1977 (Inventario de Barrios) 4.5 mil-
lion families, or approximately 50% of the Venezuelan popu-
lation lived in shacks. This inventory was carried out
nation wide in cities with more than 20,000 inhabitants.
Also, Alberto Lovera, in his article, "Who Can Have Housing
in Venezuela? (Quien puede tener una vivienda en Vene-
zuela)," estimated 55 to 60% of the Venezuelan population
was living in squatter settlements in 1979. Revista I.S.C.,
Septiembre-Octubre 1979.
2. VI Plan de la Nacion Cordiplan, 1981, page 117.
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the financing sector included an allocation to FONDUR of
2,400 million bolivares to serve as a refinancing fund for
mortgages supplied by the mortgage banks and financing soci-
eties. Similarly, 750 million bolivares would be allocated
to BANAP to increase the refinancing fund for the mortgages
supplied by the savings and loan institutions. The total
new injection of funds for refinancing of conventional hou-
sing summed 3,150 million bolivares. In additdion, FONDUR
would reinsure up to 75% of the loan amount if the mortgage
had been already insured.
The incentives to the developers included variable tax
exemptions until a maximum of 100% and the availability of
100% construction financing. We could obtain a rough esti-
mate of the foregone tax payments by making some general as-
sumptions. Let's assume an average project with 150 housing
units at an average price of 200,000 Bs, the gross earnings
would be 30 million bolivares. Assuming net earnings were
25%2 of gross sales, we would obtain 7.5 million bolivares
in net earnings. The tax rate for this amount of earnings
is around 40% 3; consequently, we obtain the tax deduction
1. Programa Nacional de Vivienda, Period 1980-1984, MINDUR,
1980, pages 14 and 16.
2. 25% of net earnings on sale is a conservative return in
middle class housing investments in Venezuela.
3. Ley de Impuesto Sobre la Renta. Gaceta Oficial No.
2.277, Extraordinaria del 23 de Junio de 1978, pages 38-42.
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would be around 3 million bolivares per project. If the
227,500 units planned to be built by the private sector were
constructed and if we roughly consider that they were deve-
loped in projects of 150 units each then we would obtain
1,817 projects which multiplied by the 3 million on tax
payments per project would total 5,410 million bolivares in
tax payments. Assuming only 70% of the projects were tax
exempt we would get 3,815 million bolivares in foregone
taxes for the country. To give an idea of the magnitude of
that amount, a standard lot in an INAVI sites and services
project costs 12,000 Bs. and a rural housing unit costs
24,000 Bs. with the foregone taxes the government could
build around 300,000 sites and services lots or 150,000
rural houses.
Similarly the subsidy program would establish subsidized
interest rates for the buyer. In order to make a rough es-
timate of the amount of funds the government could expect to
channel to the subsidy program, we will assume the purchase
of an average unit costing 200,000 Bs. financed by a stan-
dard fixed rate mortgage of 179,000 Bs. with a 20 year term
and at 17% interest rate. Let's assume the interest rate in
charge of the buyer were 7% during an 8 year period in which
the government paid to the bank the difference. The monthly
amount the government would have to pay would be around
1,200 Bs., the difference between the market monthly pay-
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ments, or 2,500 Bs., and the payment assigned to the buyer,
or 1,300 Bs. Thus the present value of the stream of pay-
ments made by the government would be around 69,000 Bs. per
loan. Assuming the government would recover 20% of that
subsidized loan from the buyer, the average expense per unit
would amount to 55,200 Bs. If we assume the 272,500 units
targeted to the private sector were produced, and of those
70% or 179,750 units received and average subsidy, the
amount of government funds needed for subsidy payments would
amount to 12,400 million bolivares, of that, only 2,500
million bolivares are likely to be recovered.
In sum, the implementation of the main components of
Program 4 would require around 19,365 million bolivares of
government resources; including in the estimation, 3,150
million for the refinancing program, 3,815 million in fore-
gone tax payments, and 12,400 to support the subsidy pro-
gram. Of that amount, around 13,715 million or 70% would
not be recovered. If we recall gross investment by the
public sector in direct government production, oriented
toward the lower income groups, was estimated around 26,506
million; we conclude the proportion of public resources ori-
ented toward the production of middle income housing was in-
deed considerable, even with conservative estimates. This
1. The 20% recovery assumes the buyers would only repay to
the government the principal or the principal plus a very
low interest charge.
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fact is in obvious contradiction with one of the main goals
of the policy which was to concentrate resources in the
supply of housing for the lower income groups due to the
distribution of the deficit.
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CHAPTER 3
THE PROGRAM 4 - THE INCENTIVES TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR
We have seen in Chapter 2, the emphasis that the design
of the general housing policy placed on the supply of hou-
sing for the middle income groups. Here we will analyze in
detail the content of the Program 4, which affected directly
the supply of units by the private sector. It will be ar-
gued first that the range of income groups the Program 4 in-
tended to benefit was too broad given real limitations in
resources. Second, that the affordability level of the
targeted income groups was overestimated, as a consequence,
the prices of the target units were since the beginning too
high for the groups they intended to benefit. For this rea-
son, continuous adjustments needed to be introduced in the
program. Third, the design features of the program tended
to concentrate the production on the higher cost units be-
cause the expected benefits of producing the higher cost
units were higher and the perceived risks lower. In addi-
tion, the policy did not include a complementary feature
from the beginning to produce better distributional effects.
That feature, a program designed to remove some of the fi-
nancial restrictions faced by the lower income buyers, ap-
peared as a subsidy program later, in the middle of the
period. Fourth, the policy did not consider potential chan-
ges in the financing conditions nor potential limitations in
government resources. Last, the program did not introduce
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any drastic changes in the channels for housing production
and it did not really encourage any innovative way of produ-
cing lower cost housing by the formal private sector; how-
ever, it expected the suppliers to produce great amounts of
lower cost housing. For all these reasons, it was likely
that a good proportion of the units produced would conce-
ntrate on the units the suppliers were comfortable produ-
cing, for a market they believed would handle well. It was
also likely to expect government resources would not be suf-
ficient to back up the planned production and some adjust-
ments to the regulations would need to be made.
The Initial Regulations
The initial regulations that affected the private pro-
duction of housing in the period considered were the decree
Number 214, of July 27, 19797 the related resolutions of the
Ministry of Finance, Number 2744, and Urban Development,
Number 48, dated July 30, 19807 and the resolutions of the
Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) of July 31, 1979, November 13,
1979, and May 6, 1980. This set of norms intended to stimu-
late the formal private sector to provide housing and ser-
viced land for the lower-middle income group of the country.
They provided incentives and regulations for the financing,
production, and purchasing of the housing units promoted by
the decree Number 214. On July 16, 1981, the Program 4 was
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complemented with the Decree 1134 which established a sub-
sidy program for homebuyers. Although this subsidy had been
announced together with the decree Number 214, it was not
formulated until 2 years later. The subsidy program's pri-
mary goals were to increase the level of affordability to
the homebuyer, to stimulate continuous production of the
units promoted, and to implement an innovative mechanism for
low-cost housing finance. Later, on March 24, 1982, the
subsidy program was modified by the decree 1452, which ex-
panded the coverage of the subsidy to those units financed
by any credit institution. In addition, two subsequent mo-
difications were introduced to account for changing condi-
tions in the financial market. FONDUR was designated the
institution which would qualify the units eligible for the
program.
Chart #5 provides a summary of the main features of the
initial regulations, classifying them according to the in-
tended benefits to the developer, homebuyer, and the finan-
cing institutions. According to the goals of the housing
policy, the emphasis should be in the production of the
lower cost units but the range of beneficiaries would cover
households earning from 3,000 to 7,000 bolivares in monthly
income. Consequently, in the formulation of the incentives,
the degree of benefits was planned to increase with the dec-
rease in the sale price of the units produced and purchased.
However, some of the benefits were equally assigned for all
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CHART No. 5
INITIAL GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE PRIVATE
HOUSING MARKET IN VENEZUELA. PERIOD 1979-1983
It includes: - Decree No 214 of July 27, 1979
- Joint Resolution of the Ministry of Financing and Urban
Development of July 30, 1980
- Resolution of the Venezuelan Central Bank of July 31, 1979;
November 13, 1979 and May 6, 1980.
Ie The qualification of the units and the supervision of the projects done by FONDUR.
2* Primary sale is understood as that which takes place for the first time, after the
Issuance of the occupation permit. The elaboration of the sales document shall take
place after the official date of the decree No 214 to be able to quality.
3- Subject to the developer
quired in the decree and
getting for the buyer a loan at least for the amount re-
for a tere between 15 and 25 years.
4" In the case the developer Is a partnership every partner will enjoy the benefits
of 100% tax exemption for concept of sales.
5" FONDUR will acquire from the banking institutions securities with mortgage guarantee.
6* This financing includes land development and unit construction and purchasing and was
required from mortgage banks and financing societies.
REGULATION FOR
HOUSING UNITS CHARACTERISTICS INCENTIVES TO THE DEVELOPER BENEFITS TO THE BUYERS INCENTIVES TO FINANCING INSTITUTIONS PORTFOLIO COMPO-
SITION
Price of Income tax ex- RefinancTax Exemptions Mortgage Resolution of the
Category Primary Sale No Min. emptions 3 Minimum of of Maximum of Minimum of Maximum Term of by FONDUR Land develos Auruisition eBCV July 27, 197
2* of Bdras Construction Mortgage long term Mortgage Financing ment andand o served and Rein- Funds 6*Sales Rent Financing Credit Financing Credit purchase L lotsr surance
Until
Ba. 100,000 2 or 1 95% of 95%hen maxi-
A also until growing Bank valu- 90% of the Bank valu- Between 100% of the exemption mum finan-
Be. 85,000 to 100% 100% 100% of ations sale price aticredits for over the 100% tax cing is
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Until from tion cost. declared of finan- earnings the amount tutions must be
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and until or suance land pur- 95% of 90% of the 95% of the buyer land pur- of finan- the mort- fkind g of this
B Be. 200,000 2 100% of the chasing. Bank valu- sale price Bank valu- laend devel- acquisition tution over
in Caracas if 3 occu- Except in ations ation opment of of lots 75% of the
Metropolitan Bdrm pation the case of
area permit public-pri- site and sold by sale price
vate pro- services FONDUR.or if the sort-
Be 151,000 grams or ot projects INAVI gage has
to land devel- 90% of 85% of the 90% of the 7% f te carried out been already
C Be 200,000 60% opment pro- Bankcredits for by FONDUR insured
and Bs 250,000 . grams antions : ation purchase of and INAVI Condition:
in Caracas housing the min-
Metropolitan imum fi-
area.o- Condition: nancingMinimum must be
financing 65% of the
50% of the 65% of security The difference be-
D) e. 201 ,O0 3 50% 85% of 80% of the 85% of the. credits for security value with tween the proportion
to Bank valu- sale price Bank valu- purchase of value a three of mortgages finan-
Be. 250,000 ations ation housing Selling year term cing units under
serviced Ba. 200,000 and units
land to under Ba. 350,000FONDUR and must sum up 60 %
75% of INAVI the of the institutionE 20 Bank valu- 75% of the 75% of the developers share of mortgagesE to 20% ation. sale price Bank valu- will alsoBe. 350,000 ation get the
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sales prices. As we recall from Chapter 2, the inclusion in
the Program 4 of that range of households had only left out
the highest 5% of the households in the country, leaving 95%
of the population to be beneficiaries. We can argue that
any policy that pretends to be so universal in scope is run-
ning the risk of either diluting too much its effects, or
failing to benefit some of the groups, given the magnitude
of the needs and the limited resources for housing. Thus,
the importance of setting priorities or targeting realisti-
cally the programs.
We can observe from Chart #5, that the Program 4 classi-
fied the benefits of the regulations according to two vari-
ables; the price of the primary sale and the number of bed-
rooms. These two variables combined pretended to orient the
production toward those units with the lowest cost but ta-
king into account the unit size; thus they intended the
units produced matched the concentration of the demand and
the characteristic household size. However, while a rela-
tion with the number of bedrooms is necessary, without a
restriction of room size, it is likely a reduction in room
dimensions would take place in order to locate the units
within the scope of the policy, and thus to benefit from it.
Related to the target price level we observe the range
of prices went from less than 100,000 bolivares to 350,000
bolivares. This broad range was a consequence of the con-
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cern of the housing policy to secure an appropriate housing
supply for the middle income groups. As we recall from
Chart #2, to afford a unit whose price was 100,000 Bs, an
income of 3,960 Bs/month was required. The equivalent in-
come for a unit costing 350,000 Bs was 12,456 Bs/month. In
a few words, since its conception the program had the poten-
tial of not producing units affordable by the lower income
groups within the scope of the program and of producing
units for income groups higher than those targeted by Pro-
gram 4. This holds true considering the financial condi-
tions did not change, which by the way, was very unlikely.
However, this conclusion is valid if we use for the estima-
tion of affordability the expense income ratio of 25%, con-
sidered by Mindur as appropriate. In the policy document,
it is not stated what expense income ratio was considered in
the design of the programs7 but later on, when the subsidy
program was implemented, it was stated the subsidy would be
calculated using a 40% expense income ratio. Chart No. 2
also illustrates that using 40% as the ratio, the target
household group could theoretically afford the units.
Nevertheless, we know the ratio of 40% would be to high a
financial compromise for many families.
The location factor within the city boundaries was a
variable not considered in the design of the policy. The
only locational consideration refers to an allowance for a
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price increase in the units produced in the Caracas Metropo-
litan Area. This allowance tried to consider higher land
prices in the capital city. We could argue the ignorance of
locational factors could have a big impact on the location
of units for speculative reasons. It could cause that given
the perceived protection by the policy, market considera-
tions were unterestimated and generation of higher priced
units in inconvenient or inappropriate areas would take
place.
The Incentives to the Developer
Two variables were used, the income tax exemptions and
the availability of short term and long term financing. The
feature the policy stressed was the role of the tax exemp-
tion because this variable was the one graded according to
the price of the unit produced. The income tax exemption
over net earnings from the sale ranged from 100% exemption
for category "A" to 20% for "E", therefore the variation in
tax exemption varied dramatically. On the other hand, 100%
construction financing was planned to be available for all
types of units. Land financing was excluded from the regu-
lated construction financing, and construction loans would
not be given to projects developed on land with any kind of
lien associated with it. The policy did not change the
interest rates for short and long term financing. By 1979,
the interest rates were regulated at 16% for construction
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financing, 12% for the purchase of units with sales prices
below 250,000 Bs, 13% for units between 250,000 Bs and
350,000 Bs, 14% for units between 350,000 Bs and 500,000 Bs,
and 16% for those units with sales prices above 500,000 Bs.
In the non-regulated market, tax exemptions were not avail-
able to the developer. Even though in the tax law, the tax
rates vary according to the amount of declared net earnings,
we could assume an average tax rate of 35%l. Similarly, the
maximum short and long term financing obtainable from the
SNAP, mortgage banks, or financing societies was 75% of the
bank valuation, and the maximum mortgage term was 25 years2
We can assume that given the incentives, building within
the regulated market was very attractive because 100% cons-
truction financing was available, tax payments were reduced,
and the loan to value ratios for long term financing were
higher. Building outside the regulated market, we could
infer, would continue being attractive for developers with
1. Ley del Impuesto sobre la Renta, Gaceta Oficial No.
2277, extraordinaria del 23 de Junio de 1978. Page 38.
It considers an average building with 24 apartments at a
sales price of 500,000 Bs per unit and a return of 25% on
sales.
2. Normas de Operacion del Sistema de Ahorro y Prestamo,
Gaceta Oficial No. 2755 Extraordinario, 17 de Marzo de 1981,
and Ley General de Bancos y Otros Institutos de credito,
Gaceta Oficial No. 1742 Extraordinario, del 22 de Mayo de
1975.
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capital assets and in those cases where the expected profits.
would compensate for the tax payments. For this kind of
investments to be attractive, another condition would be
necessary; high confidence in the marketability of the units
because of a riskier and smaller market.
Within the program; it is very likely the combination of
these variables would influence the production by increasing
the construction of the higher cost units (opposite outcome
from that planned in the policy) because of three reasons.
First; even though the policy also graded, the availability
of long term financing and loan to value ratio, according to
the sales price, the developers know of the restrictions the
formal financing system places on the granting of credits
for low or lower-middle income groups. Therefore, given the
perceived higher uncertainty on sales, the developers would
tend to concentrate on those buyers for whom the obtention
of long term financing were more secure. Anyhow, the avail-
ability of long term financing for the more expensive units
was also contemplated in the policy. Second7 public housing
programs also produced housing units at similar prices to
categories "A" and "B" of Program 4 and those public units
enjoyed much more competitive selling conditions . Thus,
the developers could fear their projects could not have such
1. The interest rates for the acquisition of public housing
varied from 1 to 7 percent, with a mortgage term of 30
years.
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high demand given the expectations offerred by public hou-
sing. Third, the taxable income is calculated by subtrac-
ting from gross income or sales revenues the expenses or
costs incurred; the more expensive the units produced, the
more likely fictitious accounting expenses can be added.
Therefore, the higher potential for decreasing artificially
the taxable income. In addition, the potential for higher
returns is greater in the more expensive units because in
that level, buyers are willing to pay on the margin more for
perceived better amenities whose costs can be inflated
easily; for instance, imported finishings. In summary, even
if the tax exemption rate was greater the cheaper the units
and the regulated proportion of.long term financing was
higher, the production of more expensive units could more
than compensate for the tax rates. These three reasons
together with the important fact that construction financing
was available 100% for all kinds of units, which reduced
equity requirements to the owning of land, and knowing the
critical role financing plays in construction, it was likely
to expect a concentration of production on the higher cost
units. An additional consideration is that the restrictions
to issue mortgages to finance land acquisition would place
an advantage on those big developers in control of the land.
This likely consequence was in contradiction with a goal
stated very generally of encouraging housing production by
small developers and of reducing the monopoly of construc-
tion resources by few developers.
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The Benefits to the Buyer
The initial benefits to the buyer consisted of increa-
sing the minimum loan to value ratio according to the units'
sale price and requiring a minimum loan term of 15 years.
The idea was to reduce at maximum the required downpayment
and the monthly payments. Both measures intended to regu-
late the mortgage conditions to make the units produced more
affordable to the target groups. Initially, the benefits to
the buyer did not include considerations related to the in-
terest rate and did not consider mortgages instruments other
than the standard fixed rate mortgage.
The Chart No. 6 expresses the monthly payments required
to purchase the units with the initial regulations of Pro-
gram 4, and the monthly incomes required from the household
assuming the proportion of incomes assigned to housing con-
sumption were 25% and 40%. From the chart we observe that
the range of monthly incomes required with 25% expense/in-
come ratio did not match with the targeted income groups of
the program. Monthly incomes higher than 4,000 Bs were ne-
cessary to purchase the cheapest units in contrast with the
3,000 Bs/month expressed by the policy. Similarly, the last
two housing categories were not affordable by households
with less than 12,000 Bs/month in contrast with the highest
income group the program intended to benefit, whose income
CHART No 6
LEVELS OF INCOME REQUIRED TO AFFORD TARGETED HOUSING UNITS
(financing conditions according to decree No 214)
PRICE OF 1* 2* 3*
HOUSING PRIMARY MINIMUN LOAN AMOUNT DOWN PAYMENT MINIMUN INTEREST MONTHLY MONTHLY MONTHLY
CATEGORY SALE LOAN TO (Bs) (Bs) LONG TERM RATE PAYMENTS INCOME INCOME
(000's Bs) VALUE RATIO FINANCING (Bs) REQUIRED REQUIRED
A Until 100 90% 90,000 10,000 15 yrs. 12% 1,080 4,320 2,700
B 101 to 150 90% 135,000 15,000 15 yrs. 12% 1,620 6,481 4,050
C 151 to 200 85% 170,000 30,000 15 yrs. 12% 1,620 6,481 4,050
D 201 to 250 80% 200,000 50,000 15 yrs. 12% 3,150 12,602 7,875
E 251 to 350 75% 262,5000 87,000 15 yrs. 13% 3,321 13,285 8,303
NOTES: 1* Effective Market Interest Rate by December 1979.
2* 25 percent was considered in Venezuela to be the maximun proportion of income a family
should expend in housing consumption.
3* It considers 40% of expense/income ratio.
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should not exceed 7,000 Bs/month. Using 40% for expense/in-
come ratio, we observed families with 3,000 Bs of monthly
income could afford the cheapest units "A", however even
with this high ratio, the last category "E" was out of reach
for families earning 7,000 Bs/month. For all these reasons,
it is not surprising that later the government implemented a
subsidiy program to make the units produced affordable by
the planned groups.
The Incentives to the Financing Institutions
In order to assure there would be enough supply of cons-
truction and long term credit for the target units, incen-
tives and controls for the mortgage financing institutions
were included in the program. The regulations which inten-
ded to have distributional effects on the kind of units pro-
duced were the proportion of mortgages refinanced, and the
restriction on portfolio composition. The refinancing pro-
gram established that FONDUR would acquire from the banking
institutiosn securities from those loans issued with a mort-
gage guarantee. A higher proportion of mortgages would be
refinanced, the lower the purchase price of the unit finan-
ced. The loans to finance the acquisition of units "A" and
"B" would be refinanced by FONDUR in 100%, the loans to
finance the purchase of units "C" would be refinanced 75%,
while only 50% of the loans to purchase units "D" would be
refinanced.
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The restrictions on portfolio composition tried to se-
cure that at least 30% of the mortgage loans would finance
units whose purchase prices was 205,000 Bs or lower and that
at least 60% of the loans issued by the mortgage institu-
tions would finance the program target units. Given the
design of this regulation without specific loan proportions
per housing category, and knowing the restrictions the
buyers of the cheaper units faced in the formal financing
markets7 it was likely to expect the credits would concen-
trate on those loan applications with lower probability of
default and on those buyers able to meet the credit
requirements.
In order to implement this portfolio regulation periodic
check ups were scheduled. In case the institutions had not
complied, an amount equal to the difference should be depo-
sited in the Venezuelan Central Bank (BCV) until the right
proportion of credits were issued, then the deposit would be
refunded. The additional incentive, the tax exemptions,
were only granted for the financing of land purchasing, de-
velopment, and acquisition for sites and services projects7
not for the construction or purchasing of finished units.
The design of the refinancing program and portfolio
restrictions were based on a set of assumptions. FONDUR
will have enough funds to refinance the mortgages issued-
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the financing conditions would allow the financing institu-
tions to issue that kind of mortgage-, the financing insti-
tution would be willing to issue mortgages for the cheaper
units; and the target units would be produced by the deve-
lopers. Until what extent these assumptions were valid is
something we will explore in Chapter 4.
The New Regulations and the Regulations for the 1974-1978
Period
The policy for the 1974-1978 period is summarized in
Chart No 7. Comparing the benefits to the developers with
those offerred in the 1979-1983 period, we find the follo-
wing similarities and differences. The range of sales
prices covered by the 1974-1978 policy was smaller. That
policy only considered four categories, from units costing
less than 75,000 Bs to units costing 250,000 Bs. Prices for
the 1979-1983 period were raised compared to those of 1974-
1979 to account for inflation, and a fifth category was
included. Tax exemptions in the old regulation were also
graded according to the sales price. The production of the
first two categories entitled the developer to 100% tax ex-
emption, the last category was entitled to a 50% tax exemp-
tion. Thus, the tax exemption scheme was similar for both
periods. Construction financing was the same, all catego-
ries were entitled to 100% construction financing, but
opposite to the 1979-1983 period, 80% land financing was
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CHART No 7
GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE PRIVATE HOUSING MARKET IN VENEZUELA. PERIOD 1974-1979.
INCENTIVES TO FI- REGULATION FOR
HOUSING UNITS CHARACTERISTICS INCENTIVES TO THE DEVELOPER INCENTIVES TO THE BUYER NANCING INSTITUTIONS PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION
PRICE OF No MINIMUM MINIMUM INCOME TAX % OF MINIMUM INTEREST % OF DOWNPAYMENT % MINIMUM TAX EXEMPTIONS
PRIMARY SALE OF BEDROOMS AREAS 1* EXEMPTIONSTCONSTRUCTION RATES THBORRV D T LONG TERM OVER INTEREST
SALES RENT FINANCING 2nd MORTGAGE FINANCING EARNINGS 3*
100%
80% of land
purchase.
100% of land
development
and construc-
tion finan-
cing.
20% of the
downpayment
80% of land
purchase and
Until -3 or more 70 sq m 100% - land develop- 8.25% 20% of the
115,000 ment. downpayment
100% cons-
truction fi-
nancing.
60% land
Until 2 or more 60 sq m 75% 100% development' 9% 20% of the
150,000 It% cons- downpayment
truction fi-
nancing.
Until
250,000 3 or more 70 sq m 50% 100% Not specif- 9.25%
ic.
Until
500,000
It-includes: - Instruccion Presidencial No 12.
- Decree 1540 and complementary resolutions.
- Law that modifies the SNAP and other Banks.
The housing units should receive financing for purchase for at least 15 year.
(Between 15 and 25 years).
Additional Regulations: The financing for the units not qualified by the
decree could not obtain financing higher than 2,000 Bs/sq a. or 70% of the
bank valuation. In addition only projects within the decree could get mort-
gages to purchase land or to built on land with liens.
The decree 2228 dictated in 1977 established two mechanisms to control
the sales price of the units produced:
- The sales prices can not be higher than 30% of the valuatior price fixed
by the bank which provided the construction financing.
- In resale operations the price can not be higher than the original price
plus 15% of annual increase.
75%
of sales
price
100%
100%
75% 4*
At least 25% of the
mortgages issued by
the financing insti-
tutions must be ori-
ented toward the fi-
nancing of this kind
of units.
50% 5* 25% of the mortgages
issued.
In addition to the
previous percent-
ages 25% of mort-
gages should finance
units with a price
lower than Bs 500,000
1* - Minimun areas for social interest housing. It includes only the areas
fixed for multifamily units for comparison purposes.
2* - On August 4, 1978 the interest rates were raised to 9.75%, 10% and
10.25% respectively. Qualification and supervision of projects to
be done by FONDUR. These rates do not include commissions on bal-
ances which by 1979 were at 2%.
3* - Tax exemptions over the interest earnings for concept of land adqui-
sition, land development and construccion financing provided the mort-
gages are issued at the preferential rates fixed by the regulations.
4* - It does not include tax exemptions for financing of land purchase.
5* - It does not include tax exemptions for financing of land purchase and
land development.
Until
75,000 2 or more 60 sq a
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available for the first two categories. Another variation
was that while in the 1979-1983 governmental period, land
development was 100% for all categories, the 1974-1978
policy graded it in 100%, 80%, 60%, and market rate from the
cheapest to the most expensive category. Therefore, equity
requirements on land were lower in the 1974-1978 policy, and
land and land development financing were graded according to
the sales price.
The long term financing was set at 75% of sales price
for all categories, while in the 1979-1983 policy, long term
financing ranged from 95% of the sales price for the
cheapest unit to 75% of the sale price for the most expen-
sive one. However, a refinancing program was not included
in the 1974-1979 program, thus, we could assume the uncer-
tainty of lower-income buyers obtaining financing was higher
in the 1974-1978 period even though portfolio regulations
and tax exemptions for the financing institutions did exist.
Tax exemptions different from the 1979-1983 policy were al-
lowed for the financing institutions over the interest ear-
nings for home acquisition loans, while in the 1979-1983
period, the tax exemptions for the financing institutions
tried to encourage the loans for land acquisition and land
development for sites and services projects. The portfolio
regulations in both periods lumped the lowest categories
together. An additional important difference was that the
program for the 1974-1978 period established that FONDUR
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would acquire the regulated units not sold within a two year
term. The purchase price would be 95% of the sales price
and the purchase would occur with the condition that the
units would have no identifiable marketability weaknesses,
such as inappropriate location, reduced size, etc. This
incentive could have influenced the perceived risks for
marketing the units. It was also included that in case the
buyer failed to pay for a term longer than 6 months, FONDUR
or INAVI would return to the financing institution 85% of
the principal mortgage balance.
The Subsidy Program
The subsidy program, or decree Number 1134, dictated on
July 16, 1981, consisted of a government loan without inte-
rest for an amount large enough to cover the difference bet-
ween the market monthly payments on the loan and the maximum
monthly payments established by the subsidy. The Fondo
Nacional de Desarrollo Urbano (FONDUR) was designated the
administrator of the program and would also be the holder of
the secondary mortgage. The private financing institution
would hold the primary mortgage. According to the program,
once the term of the subsidy is over, the beneficiary should
pay the full market monthly payments and in addition, would
return to FONDUR the subsidy in monthly installments, but
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without interest charges. The subsidy program assumed con-
tinuous future increases in income by the buyer which would
enable him to fully afford the growing payments on the loan,
and the subsidy repayments.
Even though the implementation of the subsidy program
was planned since 1979 to complement the program 4, it ap-
peared only one month before the liberation of the interest
rates. The changes in the control of the interest rates
undoubtedly worsened the financing conditions for housing
acquisition. After the 25th of August of 1981, when the
mechanism of discretional control was substituted by a sys-
tem of floating interest rates, the rates for home acquisi-
tion increased to 17%. Construction financing went from
17.5% at the beginning of 1981 to 19.5% at the end of 1981.
We could speculate about the time coincidence of the two
regulations by saying the subsidy tried to avoid even more
stringent conditions for the purchase of the housing units
and intended to facilitate the sale of the units already
produced. Chart No. 8 illustrates the monthly payments and
income level required to purchase the target units conside-
ring 25% and 40% of expense/income ratio, if the subsidy
program hadn't been implemented. We can see how the pur-
chase of the units would have become impossible by an even
larger proportion of the Venezuelan households. According
CHART No 8
LEVELS OF INCOME REQUIRED TO PURCHASE TARGETED HOUSING UNITS
(financing conditions without subsidy in 1981)
PRICE OF MINIMUN 1* 2*
HOUSING PRIMARY MINIMUN LOAN AMOUNT DOWN PAYMENT LONG TERM INTEREST MONTHLY MONTHLY MONTHLY
CATEGORY SALE LOAN TO (Bs) (Bs) FINANCING RATES PAYMENTS INCOME INCOME
(O0'sBs) VALUE RATIO (years) (Bs) REQUIRED REQUIRED
A Until 100 90% 90,000 10,000 15 17% 1,385 5,540 3,462
B 101 to 150 90% 135,000 15,000 15 17% 2,078 8,311 5,195
C 151 to 200 85% 170,000 30,000 15 17% 2,616 10,465 6,540
D 201 to 250 80% 200,000 50,000 15 17% 3,078 12,312 7,695
E 251 to 350 75% 262,500 87,500 15 17% 4,040 16,160 10,100
NOTE: 1* It assumes 25% of income channeled to housing consumption.
2* It assumes 40% of income channeled to housing consumption.
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to the statistics of the OCEI in the first semester of 1981
only 554,330, or 23%, of the total households in the
country had incomes higher than 5,000 Bs/month. Thus, the
families could theoretically afford those units without sub-
sidies, or without increasing the proportion of the expense/
income ratio.
The subsidy established that the conditions would be
more favorable for the cheaper units. The repayment of the
subsidy will be calculated in growing amounts by FONDUR in
on a case by case basis. The basic variables which would
regulate the subsidy were:
- The inital interest rate in charge of the buyer which
will be valid only for the first year of the mortgage loan.
- At least 1% yearly increment in the initial interest
rate to reach the market rate. This increment would be
decided by FONDUR.
- The term of the subsidy, which would vary with the
unit's primary sale price.
- The term for repayment of the subsidy. This term
should not exceed the term for the repayment of the first
mortgage and it would start the year following the end of
the subsidy.
1. Oficina Central de Estadistica Informatica (OCEI).
Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo. Primer Semestre, 1981.
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- The minimum term the private financing institutions
should concede for the repayment of the first mortgage, set
at 15 years.
The subsidy also established among the requirements to
qualify for the program the following:
- Lack of adequate housing.
- To have a stable monthly income of at least 2 1/2
times the amount of the monthly payments during the first
year of the subsidy.
- To be Venezuelan or to have lived in Venezuela for
more than 5 years with one's family.
- Availability of the downpayment and incedental
expenses1 to complete the documents without the need to
incur additional financial compromises.
- To have signed the documents where the mortgage bank
has agreed on the credit terms.
In a complementary resolution between the Ministry of
Financing and the Ministry of Urban Development, the vari-
ables to regulate the subsidy were established as indicated
in Chart No. 9.
1. These incidental expenses include fire and life insu-
rance, as well as legal and adminstrative fees.
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CHART No 9
VARIABLES TO REGULATE THE SUBSIDY PROGRAM
Again, as the overall goals of the policy expressed the
benefits of the subsidy were planned to be greater the lower
the price of the unit purchased, in terms of subsidized in
terest rates, duration of the subsidy, and term for repay-
ment of the first mortgage. Similarly, those benefits in-
tended to facilitate the purchase of the units by reducing
the monthly payments in charge of the buyer and by spreading
the repayment of the loan over the years.
Chart No. 10 depicts the monthly income required to
purchase the units targeted by the decree #214 with the
financing conditions established by the subsidy. We observe
how the subsidy changed potentially the range of households
HOUSING INITIAL TERM OF THE MINIMUN TERM OF
CATEGORY INTEREST SUBSIDY PRIMARY MORTGAGE
RATE
A 5% 10 years 20 years
B 6% 9 years 20 years
C 7% 8 years 20 years
D 9% 7 years 15 years
E 11% 6 years 15 years
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CHART No 10
LEVEL OF INCOME REQUIRED TO PURCHASE TARGET UNITS
(According to features of Subsidy program, year 1981)
PRICE OF
PRIMARY
SALE
(000's Bs)
MINIMUM
LOAN TO
VALUE
RATIO
MINIMUM MARKET
LONG TERM RATE 1*
FINANCING
(years)
INITIAL
INTEREST
RATE 2*
SUBSIDIZED
INTEREST
RATE (First
year)
TERM OF
SUBSIDY
(years)
LOAN AMDUNT
(Bolivares)
TOTAL
MONTHLY
PAYMENTS
(Bs)
FIRST YEAR
DONE BY
GOVT.
PAYMENTS
DONE BY
BUYER
MINIMUM MONTHLY 3*
INCOME REQUIRED
(Bs/month)
MINIMUM 4*
MONTHLY
INCOME
A Until 100
B 101 to 150
C 151 to 200
D 201 to 250
E 251 to 350
90%
90%
85%
80%
75%
NOTES:
1* Market interest rate
20
20
20
15
15
17%
17%
17%
17%
17%
5%
6%
7%
9%
10%
12%
11%
10%
8%
7%
10 90,000
9 135,000
8 170,000
7 200,000
6 262,500
1,320
1,980
2,494
3,078
4,040
726
1,013
1,176
1,050
1,219
594
967
1,318
2,028
2,821
1 ,485
2,418
3,295
5,070
7,053
for home purchase in 1981.
2* It was estimated to increase at least 1 percent yearly and it will be determined by FONDUR.
3* The subsidy established the monthly income should be higher than 2 1/2 times the monthly
payment made by the buyer in the first year, or in other words it allows the payment
to be 40% of the income.
4* It estimates 25% of monthly income for housing consumption.
HOUSING
CATEGORY
2,376
3,868
5,272
8,112
11 ,284
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who could afford the units. From Chart No. 8, we observed
that only families with incomes higher than 5,500 Bs could
afford the units without a subsidy to cover an expense/in-
come ratio of 25%. With an expense/income ratio of 40%, the
minimum theoretical level of affordability included families
with more than 3,400 Bs in monthly income. In principle,
the subsidy reduced the income requirements to 1,500 Bs/
month; but it allowed to increase the proportion of declared
incomes channelled to housing to 40%. That proportion rep-
resents a serious burden in any family budget and becomes
even more critical the lower the monthly income. Therefore,
we can assume that many families regardless of the highly
subsidized interest rate would not be willing to undertake
such a financial compromise. However, estimating the house-
hold monthly income using 25% of income for housing consump-
tion with the subsidy program, we observe the minimum
monthly income would be 2,400 Bs, thus lower than the 3,000
Bs target income group. In summary, the subsidy tried to
match the real range of income groups benefited from the
program with the originally targeted income groups.
Charts No. 11 - 13 develop the schedule of payments in
charge of the buyer and government for housing categories
"A", "C" and "E". We see how the monthly payments would
increase during the life of the subsidy an average of 16.5%
annual for units "A", 13% for units "C", and 7.7% for units
"E". The question to ask becomes whether the households
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with those incomes could really expect such a continuous
high increase in their monthly earnings, knowing there is no
evidence in the Venezuelan history of such a sustained
growth in income. Even more, the average increases in in-
come would need to be higher for the households with lower
earnings, which in general is very unlikely. Therefore,
even with the heavy subsidies, the units were too high in
price for the affordability level of the households. Con-
sequently, two outcomes were likely. One that the govern-
ment would need huge amounts of resources to target the
units produced and second that even if the right kind of
units got produced and financed, many of the targeted house-
holds would not be willing to acquire the financial
compromise.
The first modification to the subsidy was the decree
1452 dictated on March 29, 1982, and published in the
government journal on March 30, 1982. This decree estab-
lished the subsidy could be extended to those units which
had more than 2 bedrooms and whose prices of primary sale
were within the limits established by the decree 214 even
though the construction of those units had not been financed
by the SNAP, Mortgage Banks, or Financing Societies, the
institutions targeted by the Decree 214. Thus, the exten-
sion included commercial banks and any other credit institu-
tion. The modification was valid only for the units built
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CHART No 11
REPRESENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS WITH THE SUBSIDY
FOR UNITS A
BUYER
YEAR LOAN AMORTIZATION PAYMENT PAYMENTS BY BUYER TO MONTHLY INTEREST
BALANCE INTEREST PRINCIPAL TOTAL BY GOVT BANK GVT TOTAL PAYMENT RATES(total) _
1 90,000 15,256 584 15,840 8,712 7,128 0 7,128 594 5%
2 89,416 15,148 694 15,840 7,942 7,898 0 7,898 658 6%
3 88,724 15,021 819 15,840 7,090 8,750 0 8,790 733 7%
4 87,906 14,871 969 15,840 6,202 9,638 0 9,638 803 8%
5 86,936 14,693 1,148 15,840 5,569 10,271 0 10,271 855 9%
6 85,788 14,482 1,359 15,840 4,630 11,210 0 11,210 934 10%
7 84,430 14,232 1,608 15,840 3,644 12,196 0 12,196 1,016 11%
8 82,822 13,936 1,904 15,840 2,610 13,230 0 13,230 1,103 13%
9 80,918 13,586 2,254 15,840 1,267 14,573 0 14,573 1,215 15%
10 78,664 13,171 2,669 15,840 602 15,238 0 15,238 1,269 16%
11 75,995 12,680 3,160 15,840 0 15,840 0 15,840 1.320 17%
12 72,835 12,099 3,741 15,840 0 15,840 5,361 21,203 1,767 17%
13 69,095 11,412 4,480 15,840 0 15,840 5,361 21,203 1,767 17%
14 64,666 10,597 5,242 15,840 0 15,840 5,361 21,203 1,767 17%
15 59,423 9,633 6,207 15,840 0 15,840 5,361 21,203 1,767 17%
16 53,217 8,492 7,348 15,840 0 15,840 5,361 21,203 1,767 17%
17 45,868 7,141 8,700 15,840 0 15,840 5,361 21,203 1,767 17%
18 37,169 5,541 10,299 15,840 0 15,840 5,361 21,203 1,767 17%
19 26,870 3,647 12,193 15,840 0 15,840 5,361 21,203 1,767 17%
20 14,676 1 ,404 14,435 15,840 0 15,840 5,361 21,203 1,767 17%
- Price of Primary Sale: Bs 100,000
- Loan amount: BS 90,000
- Market Interest Rate: 17%
- Initial Subsidize Rate: 5%
- Total increase in monthly payments in the first
twelve years 197% Average annual increase 16.5 X
Thesubsidy established the repayment would be
made in increasing amounts begining one year
after the end of the subsidy. FONDUR would
determine the rate of increase and the initial
repayment amount on a case by case basis.
Here, the repayment was distributed evenly
during the remaining term of the first mortgage.
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CHART No 12
REPRESENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS WITH THE SUBSIDY
FOR UNITS C
BUYER
YEAR LOAN AMORTIZATION PAYMENT PAYMENTS BY BUYER TO MONTHLY INTEREST
BALANCE INTEREST PRINCIPAL TOTAL BY GOVT BANK GOVT. TOTAL PAYMENT RATES
(total)
1 170,000 28,816 1,112 29,928 14,112 15,816 0 15,816 1,318 7%
2 168,888 28,612 1,316 29,928 12,610 17,317 0 17,317 1,443 8%
3 167,572 28,369 1,559 29,928 11,097 18,831 0 18,831 1,569 9%
4 166,013 18,083 1,845 29,928 9,584 20,344 0 20,344 1,695 10%
5 164,168 27,744 2,185 29,928 8,081 21,847 0 21,847 1,821 11%
6 161,983 27,342 2,586 29,928 6,599 23,329 0 23,329 1,944 12%
7 159,397 27,866 3,062 29,928 5,153 24,775 0 24,775 2,064 13%
8 156,335 26,303 3,625 29,928 2,533 27,395 0 27,395 2,283 15%
9 152,710 25,637 4,291 29,928 0 29,928 0 29,928 2,494 17%
10 148,419 24,847 5,081 29,928 0 29,928 6,976 36,905 3,075 17%
11 143,338 23,913 6,015 29,928 0 29,928 6,976 36,905 3,075 17%
12 137,323 22,807 7,121 29,928 0 29.928 6,976 36,905 3,075 17%
13 130,203 21,498 8,430 29,928 0 29,928 6,976 36,905 3,075 17%
14 121,772 19,947 9,981 29,928 0 29,928 6,976 36,905 3,075 17%
15 111,791 18,112 11,816 29,928 0 29,928 6,976 36,905 3,075 17%
16 99,975 15,939 13,989 29,928 0 29,928 6,976 36,905 3,075 17%
17 85,986 13,367 16,561 29,928 0 29,928 6,976 36,905 3,075 17%
18 69,425 10,321 19,607 29,928 0 29,928 6,976 36,905 3,075 17%
19 48,818 6,716 23,213 29,928 0 29,928 6,976 36,905 3,075 17%
20 26,605 2,447 27,481 29,928 0 29,928 6,976 36,905 3,075 17%
NOTES:
- Price of Primary Sale: Bs 170,000
- Loan Amount: Bs 170,000
- Market Interest Rate: 17%
- Initial Subsidized Rate: 7%
- Total increase in monthly payments in the
first ten years 133%. Average annual
13%
increase
The subsidy established the repayment would be
made in increasing amounts begining one year
after the end of the subsidy. FONDUR would
dtermine the rate of increase and the initial
repayment amount on a case by case basis.
Here, the repayment was distributed evenly
during the remaining term of the first mortgage.
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CHART No 13
REPRESENTATIVE SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS WITH THE SUBSIDY
FOR UNITS E
BUYER
YEAR LOAN AMORTIZATION PAYMENT PAYMENTS BY BUYER TO MONTHLY INTERESTBALANCE INTEREST PRINCIPAL TOTAL BY GOVT. BANK GOVT. TOTAL PAYMENT RATES
(total)
1 262,500 44,310 4,170 48,480 14,630 33,850 0 33,850 2,821 10%
2 258,330 43,547 4,937 48,480 12,240 36,240 0 36,240 3,020 11%
3 253,393 42,635 5,845 48,480 9,903 38,577 0 38,577 3,215 12%
4 247,548 41,561 6,920 48,480 7,646 40,834 0 40,834 3,403 13%
5 240,629 40,288 8,192 48,480 5,494 42,986 0 42,986 3,582 14%
6 232,437 38,782 9,698 48,480 1,894 46,586 0 46,586 3,882 15%
7 222,739 36,998 11,482 48,480 0 48,480 0 48,480 4,040 17%
8 211,257 34,887 13,593 48,480 0 48,480 6,476 54,956 4,580 17%
9 197,664 32,387 16,093 48,480 0 48,480 6,476 54,956 4,580 17%
10 181,571 29,428 19,052 48,480 0 48,480 6,476 54,956 4,580 17%
11 162,519 25,924 22,556 48,480 0 48,480 6,476 54,956 4,580 17%
12 139,963 21,776 26,704 48,480 0 48,480 6,476 54,956 4,580 17%
13 113,259 16,865 31,614 48,480 0 48,480 6,476 54,956 4,580 17%
14 81,645 11,052 37,428 48,480 0 48,480 6,476 54,956 4,580 17%
15 44,217 4,170 44,310 48,480 0 48,480 6,476 54,956 4,580 17%
NOTES:
- Price of Primary Sale: Ba 350,000
- Loan Amount: Bs 262,500
- Market Interest Rate: 17%
- Initial Subsidized Rate: 10%
- Total increase in monthly payments
in the first eight years 62%. Aver-
age annual increase 7.75%.
The subsidy established the repayment would be
made in increasing amounts begining one year
after the end of the subsidy. FONDUR would
determine the rate of increase and the initial
repayment amount -on a case by case basis.
Here, the repayment was distributed evenly
during the remaining term of the first mortgage.
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or in construction by July 16, 1982. It intended to encou-
rage the sale of the housing units built during the period
and whose characteristics agreed with those established in
the Decree #214 independent of the source for construction
financing.
The second modification was the joint resolution by the
Ministry of Finance #1989 and Ministry of Urban Development
#231 established and published on December 6, 1983. This
modification allowed the concession of preferential rates to
purchase the units whose occupation permits had been issued
before the 31st of December, 1982, and whose characteristics
matched with the ones established by the decree 214 if the
long term interest rate was 12% or lower and the maximum
commission charges were 1% of the loan amount. This resolu-
tion tried to reduce the differential subsidized rate paid
by FONDUR, due to the fact that in 1983 the interest rates
for home acquisition charged by the mortgage banks and
financing societies was 21.5%1. We can assume the subsidy
program given the conditions in the financial market was
becoming unbearable by the Government which had to implement
modifications to the original program.
1. Boletin Trimestral, Banco Central de Venezuela, Julio-
Septiembre 1983. In mid 1983, the interest rates for home
acquisition were around 21.5% for mortgage banks and finan-
cing institutions and around 17% for the savings and loan
institutions, page 9.
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The last modification to the subsidy during the period
considered was published December 21, 1983. It contained
the joint resolution of the Ministry of Finance #2005 and
Ministry of Urban Development #234 issued on December 20 of
1983. This modification changed the initial interest rates
in charge of the buyer for the housing categories "C", "D",
and "E" and kept the initial interest rates for categories
"A" and "B", and the other variables constant. The new
rates would be applied from January 1984. Chart No. 14
illustrates the proposed changes and their effects on the
increases in monthly income required to purchase the units.
Even though the modification would not have a strong impact
on affordability, it would definitely reduce the economic
burden the subsidy program represented to FONDUR.
A modification related to the refinancing program was
published June 2, 1983. The joint resolution #1719 of The
Ministry of Finance and #187 of the Ministry of Urban Deve-
lopment dictated on June 1 reduced the proportion of mort-
gages refinanced from the portfolio of mortgages held by the
Savings and Loans, Mortgage Banks, and Financing Societies.
FONDUR's compromise was reduced to refinance 80% of the
mortgages issued to construct or purchase units "A and B"
and to refinance 70% of the mortgages for units "C". The
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CHART No 14
MODIFICATION OF SUBSIDY PROGRAM AND MONTHLY INCOME REQUIRED
(Joint Resolution of December 20, 1983)
1* 2*
HOUSING INITIAL INTEREST RATE FIRST YEAR MONTHLY PAYMENT MINIMUN 
MONTHLY INCOME REQUIRED
CATEGORY DECREE 1134 MODIFICATION DECRE 1134 MODIFICATION DECREE 1134 MODIFICATION
A 5 - 594 594 1,485 1,485
B 6 - 967 967 2,418 2,418
C 7 10 1,318 1,640 3,295 4,101
D 9 11 2,028 2,273 5,070 5,683
E 11 12 2,821 3,150 7,053 7,876
NOTES:
1* It assumes market interest rates of 17%
2* According to the subsidy program the minimun monthly income would be 2.5 times the monthly
payment during the first year.
H-
C)
U,
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modification did not consider changes in the refinancing of
mortgages for units "E", therefore the proportion to be re
financed remained at 50%. Again, this modification reflec-
ted the need for reducing government expenses channelled to
the Program 4 due to the financial crises in Venezuela.
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CHAPTER 4
THE RESPONSE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR:
THE PRODUCTION OF HOUSING UNITS,
ITS RELATION WITH THE POLICY GOALS, AND THE MARKET BEHAVIOR.
Even though it can not be said the production of housing
units in a given period responds uniquely in either a posi-
tive or negative way, to the instruments of the related hou-
sing policy, we can argue that by analyzing the characteris-
tics of the supply and the market behavior and taking into
account other factors involved, we can get quite a good un-
derstanding of the policy impact. In our case, causal rela-
tions are very difficult to establish from a statistical
point of view. First of all, the level of information re-
quired is simply not available. Secondly, many subtle and
important elements affecting the outcome are not expressed
numerically or are not documented. Thirdly, the subsequent
changes in the policy and in the economy complicate the pic-
ture even further. In sum, a strictly quantitative analysis
will leave out many of the variables at the heart of the
problem and will not allow us to fully understand the out-
come. However, from the data available, we can analyze the
evolution of the supply of units and the market characteris-
tics during the period. We can also relate the observed be-
havior with the policy features and complement the analysis
with field observations and direct interviews. This
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strategy can give us insights into the problem. That com-
bined approach will be the one followed in the elaboration
in this chapter.
Two limitations to the analysis must be mentioned.
First, the data used for the evaluation of the supply inc-
ludes only multifamily units. This is a direct consequence
of the availability of the informationi. However, this li-
mitation is less serious when we consider the share of
single-family units and row-houses in the total production
was estimated at 16%2. Moreover, it is not likely their in-
clusion would have changed our conclusions given that the
price of the single family units offerred by the private
suppliers concentrated mostly on the higher prices. The
second limitation relates to the lack of a control group and
an historical framework.
Given that we want to analyze changes in the supply
characteristics and the impact of the program on those
changes, our evaluation remains speculative because we are
unable to record what happened in the absence of the pro-
gram. Similarly, we should consider a time frame longer
1. Fundaconstruccion funded in 1978 traced mainly evolution
of apartment units.
2, Vivienda. La Gestion del Gobierno. Revista Inmobilaria
No. 83-45, p. 19.
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than five years and compare the outcome to what was happe-
ning in the preceding period with the former regulations.
Unfortunately, that information is also unavailable in the
country. The statistics to record housing unit production
started being collected in 1978 and they included only a few
central cities. This circumstance limits this analysis to
saying how well the supply characteristics matched with the
policy goals, and to make some inferences, drawn upon comp-
lementary information. But if it is true that we can ana-
lyze the response, we can not really argue whether that be-
havior responded to the policy being analyzed or it would
have been present without it.
This chapter will show how out of the array of units
regulated by the Program 4, production concentrated on cate-
gories "D" and "E", the most expensive ones. Even though
the deflated average price of the units produced dropped,
the majority of units remained at levels unaffordable by a
large share of the targeted income groups. Hence, even
though in one way or another, a great share of the units
produced got channelled into the market, the consumer or the
government had to pay the excess prices. We will argue that
the policy features, but also the traditional practices in
the market and in the Venezuelan political and socio-econo-
mic environment contributed to this outcome. We will dis-
cuss how one of the serious drawbacks of the program design
was the range of prices of the regulated units. That range
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was too broad if the intended goal was to concentrate on
low-cost housing, because the program did not grade approp-
riately the benefits from building each category of units
and as a consequence, production concentrated on the most
expensive ones. The developers had the choice among a wide
range and they chose to produce the units which they be-
lieved could give them the higher potential returns and
fewer marketability problems. As a consequence production
concentrated on units "D" and "E" until a level of inventory
accumulation was reached that caused a publicly declared
"crisis in the housing market." We will also observe how
the subsidy program subsidized a high proportion of the most
expensive units within the policy and we will observe the
weak effect of the subsidy on sales. We will question the
equitability and the adequacy of the subsidy as a government
expenditure. We will conclude by saying that given the mar-
ket conditions, there seems to be a standard of prices for
the units built by the formal private sector and if the go-
vernment wants to stimulate the production of lower cost
units that are affordable to the lower-middle income groups,
more strict regulations should be dictated and alternative
suppliers should be promoted.
The Characteristics of the Units Produced
Some general characteristics of the overall production
will give us a broader framework for the evaluation of the
ill
private sector production. According to MINDUR statistics
depicted in Chart No. 14, between 1979 and the first three
months of 1983, 412,071 housing units were built in Venezu-
ela. Of these, 189,552 units or 46% were public sector pro-
duction, 225,519 units, or 54% corrseponded to the private
sector. This outcome differs from the 1979 housing policy
in the total production and in the distribution of the pro-
duction. According to the general policy, 668,923 units
would be produced and 391,423 units or 58% of the production
would be the task of the public sector. Likewise, 272,550
units, or 42% would be in the hands of the private sector.
We can observe that even though neither sector reached the
target goals, the public sector production was further away.
It fell short by about 200,000 units, while the private
sector difference was around 47,000 units.
The intensity of production by the public sector showed
dramatic variations. Comparably, the production by the pri-
vate sector was more stable. Both fell dramatically in the
first year due to the drastic changes in the country's eco-
nomic situation. The reduction experienced by the two sec-
tors between 1980 and 1981 could be attributed to the
adjustments to the new policy dictated in July of 1979.
1. Informe Prelimirar, Vivienda, La Gestion del Gobierno,
op. cit., p. 19.
112
Chart 15
Variations in Production
Public and Private Sector
Sector 1979-1980 1980-1981 1982-1983 1982-1983
Public +21% -8% +13% -45%
Private +16% +9% +13% -28%
Source: Vivienda. La Gestion del Gobierno. Revista Inmo-
biliaria No. 83-54, p. 19 and Fundaconstruccion; Apartamen-
tos Ofrecidos en el Periodo Cuatro No. 04.
The figures indicated in Chart 16 and Figure 1 illus-
trate the distribution of the units produced by the private
sector according to price. We can observe the dramatic re-
duction in the proportion of units "A" and "B" and the in-
crease and concentration on the production of units "D" and
"E". The proportion of units "C" and "Others" (more than
350,000 Bs.) remained relatively constant. In 1979, when we
could say the policy hadn't affected the production, units
"A" and "B" represented 26% of the total production, 3% be-
ing the shares of units "A". In 1981, units "A" dropped to
0 in the formal private market and the proportion of units
"B" reduced to 7%. In 1983 the reduction was even more dra-
matic- units "A" almost disappeared and units "B" represen-
ted only 1% of the total production. On the other hand,
while in 1979, units "D" and "E" represented together 37% of
the production, in 1983 their comparative share was 68%.
That increase was continuous for every year. Related to "C"
DISTRIBUTION
CHART No 16
OF UNITS OFFERED ACCORDING TO PRICE
PERIOD
PRICE OF PRI- 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983* 1979-1983
CATEGORY MARY SALE (Bs) No % No % No % No % No % No %
A 100,000 844 4 1,000 3 160 0 90 0 16 0 2,110 1
B 150,000 5,702 23 5,469 18 2,290 7 1,019 3 158 1 14,638 10
C 200,000 3,877 15 5,576 18 6,422 19 5,845 15 2,983 15 24,703 17
D 250,000 5,169 20 8,144 27 11,617 35 14,798 39 6,726 35 46,454 32
E 350,000 4,380 17 5,134 17 7,306 22 10,434 27 6,387 33 33,641 23
0 More than
(Others) 350,000 5,643 22 5,196 17 5,646 17 5,999 16 3,072 16 25,556 17
TOTAL 25,615 100 30,519 100 33,441 100 38,185 100 19,342 100 147,102 100
Source: FUNDACONSTRUCCION. Area Urbana 99. Total Nacional. Cuadro 04. Apartamentos ofrecidos
en el periodo clasificado por Area y Precio de Venta.
Note: Statistics for 1983 include only until September production.
H
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FIGURE No 1
DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS ACCORDING TO PRICE
979 1980
-23% 17%-
-I
15%
-18%
18%
1!
20% 27%
1982
, 7-
17% J.
1 7 I
~% 27%
-15%
35%
UNIT TYPES A M B . C D E 0ers)
Source: FUNDACONSTRUCCION. Area Urbana 99. Total Nacional. Cuadro 04.
Apartamentos ofrecidos en el periodo clasificado por Area y Precio
de Venta.
Note: Statistics for 1983 include only until September production.
22%-
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and "Others", their proportion was similar during that per-
iod. The constant production of units "0", the ones not re-
gulated, gives us an indication of a market independent from
the effects of policy regulation.
As we recall the goals of Program 4 were to encourage
the production of low-cost housing affordable by households
earning between 3,000 and 7,000 Bs in monthly income. How-
ever, when we analyze who could afford the average unit pro-
duced, we concluded that no households within those classi-
fied by the policy as low-middle income groups could afford
the units without the subsidy program. Chart No. 17 illus-
trates the weighted average of the units produced related to
the number of households who could afford the units with and
without the subsidy program. We observe that the average
unit was affordable only by households with more than 8,000
Bs of monthly income. From 1981 on, only the households
earning more than 9,000 Bs/month could afford the units pro-
duced without subsidies. The subsidy program lowered the
requirements to 5,000 Bs/month, but less than 40% of the
targeted households had incomes above that level. Moreover,
40% of the expense income ratio is high given the families
have more urgent priorities.
We observe how the outcome was inconsistent with the
program's goal, which pretended to stimulate production for
the lower income groups. Even though we observe the defla-
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CHART No 17
AFFORDABILITY OF UNITS PRODUCED
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
AVERAGE SALES PRICE
(000's Bs) Current B8 279.52 258.25 282.02 289-93 307.66
REAL Ba 144.53 109.85 103.38 97.0 96.5
NO OF UNITS PRODUCED 25,615 30,519 33,441 38,185 19,342
MONTHLY INCOME 8,000 8,000 9,000 9,000 9,000
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS
IN THE COUNTRY 203,397 207,641 180,991 185,810 186,169
I % OF HOUSEHOLDS
WITHIN TARGET GROUP 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
% OF HOUSEHOLDS OF 2*
THE COUNTRY TOTAL 9% 9% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6%
MONTHLY INCOME NA NA 5,000 5,000 5,000
NO OF HOUSEHOLDS
WITHIN TARGET GROUP NA NA 260,535 289,366 286,798
II NO OF HOUSEHOLDS
IN THE COUNTRY NA NA 554,330 612,479 614,623
% OF HOUSEHOLDS
WITHIN TARGET GROUP NA NA 33% 33% 33%
% OF HOUSEHOLDS OF
THE COUNTRY TOTAL NA NA 23% 25% 25%
I. Households who could afford units without subsidy. Considers 40%
of expense income ratio
II. Households who could afford
of expense income ratio.
units without subsidy. Considers 40%
1* Production included until September 1983.
2* Estimated from proportion in 1981
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ted price of the average unit decreased annually by 6%, the
average unit remained in category "E". Likewise, the ave-
rage price of the units produced, and the average price of
the units financed also belonged to category "E". The ave-
rage loan amount made possible the purchase of units "D".
Chart 18
Average Price of Units Financed (000's Bs)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Current Ave-
rage Price 265.8 280.1 265.5 282.8 286.6
Real Average
Price* 154.3 144.8 112.9 103.45 95.88
Unit Category NA E E E E
Source: BCV Anuario de Series Estadisticas 1982, Cuadro No.
VI - 91, p. 369.
* Base year 1968 = 100
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Chart 19
Average Loan Amount of Units Produced (000's Bs)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Current Loan
Amount 156.8 168.8 190.9 193.7 221.1
Real Loan
Amount* 91.0 87.2 81.2 71.0 73.9
Unit Category NA C D D D
Source: BCV Anuario de Series Estadisticas 1982, Cuadro No
VI-92, p. 370.
* Base year 1968 = 100
From the evaluation of the units financed using the sub-
sidy program, we observe in Chart No. 20 that 68% of the
units benefiting from the subsidy belonged to categories "D"
and "E". Likewise, 76% of the amount financed concentrated
on those categories. Supposedly, the subsidy was implemen-
ted to increase the accessibility level of the lower-middle
income households to "appropriate" housing units. However,
68% of the buyers benefited from the subsidy had to prove
incomes over the median of the target group. Besides, those
units got channelled into the market, but the government
could have benefited more households had the units not been
the most expensive. In addition, we could also argue that
the households, benefited from the subsidy early years but
later on, they would have to bear the financial compromise
of buying an expensive unit. Therefore we could question
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CHART No 20
GRANTED SUBSIDIES CHANNELED THROUGH THE SNAP,
MORTGAGE BANKS AND FINANCING SOCIETIES
(From September 1981 to August 1983)
AMOUNT FINANCED
HOUSING HOUSING UNITS (000's Bs)
CATEGORY No % No
A 1,507 3 138,869.8 1
B 3,932 9 575,621.1 6
C 8,568 20 1,543,843.3 17
D 17,689 41 3,776,255.8 41
E 11,826 27 3,230,903.6 35
TOTAL 43,522 100 9,265,499.6 100
Source: FONDUR. Taken from "Inmobiliaria", No 83-45.
Vivienda: La gestion del Gobierno.
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whether we should look for an alternative way of distribu-
ting better, the government resources, in a way more
harmonious with the goals.
The Reasons Behind the Supply Response
We will question now why the units produced concentrated
on the most expensive categories. There are many complemen-
tary arguments to explain that behavior. Some of the rea-
sons can be found in the features of the Program 4, but
others respond to traditional practices of the formal supply
sector, and to the political and socio-economic conditions
of the country.
Related to the features of the program, we could argue
the potential benefits from building the alternative catego-
ries were not differentiated enough as to orient the produc-
tion toward the lower cost units. 100% construction finan-
cing was available for all kinds of units and even though
tax exemptions decreased for the more expensive units, we
can argue that given the supply response, that component
seemed not to be so critical in determining the investment
decision. In other words, the developers expected the po-
tential for higher benefits from selling the more expensive
units would compensate for the potential higher tax pay-
ments. Here it is opportune to recall that the regulations
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to control tax payments are very loose in Venezuela. Inves-
tors find many loopholes in it and it is well known there
are broad opportunities to evade or diminish the payments.
In addition, tax payments are money due in the future, while
construction financing is money needed in the present to
carry out the project. Moreover, the benefits from obtai-
ning higher construction financing extends over the project
itself. A complementary consideration relates to the avai-
lability of long term mortgage credit. Even though the per-
centage of long term mortgage credit was graduated higher,
the cheaper the units produced, we can argue that the deve-
lopers perceived the marketability of the units "A" and "B"
as being riskier. This behavior is comprehensible if we re-
call the availability of formal financing in Venezuela is
restricted for those households who can not prove their in-
comes, don't have stable jobs, or formal documentation. The
majority of the Venezuelan households with incomes below
5,000 Bs/month fall within that category. Thus, regardless
of the policy protection, many developers believed the ob-
taining of credit by families willing to buy units "A" and
"B" would be more difficult. An illustrative side comment
for this argument is that by the end of 1981, the financing
institutions hadn't met the requirements of portfolio compo-
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sition, however, no deposits had been required by the go-
vernment to be kept in the BCV as established in the
regulation
We can also argue that the fact the subsidy program, im-
plemented in July 1981, covered all categories, also contri-
buted to the concentration of production on the more expen-
sive units. With the subsidy, the potential buyers could
afford a more expensive unit, so the developers' expecta-
tions of secure sales were raised. We also can argue the
subsidy created a gap in the real demand for the cheaper
units because if we consider every household could theoreti-
cally buy a more expensive unit, those who now would aspire
to units "A" and "B" would face the restrictions of the re-
quirements for formal financing. The liberation of the in-
terest rates, established one month after the subsidy pro-
gram, undoubtedly also contributed to the concentration of
the production on the most expensive units because the cost
of construction financing increased from 16% in 1979 to
21.5% in 1981. That fact would have discouraged many deve-
lopers from building the cheaper units. An additional con-
sideration related to the subsidy is that even though in the
most favorable case, the buyer will pay well below market
rates for 10 years, after that, full market payments plus
the return of the subsidy would be due. Venezuela was going
1. A. Cilento Sardi. El Factor Financiamiento en la Pro-
duccion de la Mercancia Vivienda en Venezuela, p. 18.
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into a serious recession and given the high economic insta-
bility and growing unemployment, it was likely to expect
many buyers, mainly the lower income ones, would prefer to
defer their investments.
Another feature of the program which could have contri-
buted to the characteristics of the supply was the lack of
restrictions regarding apartment areas. The additional fea-
ture to qualify the units produced was the number of bed-
rooms, not the areas. We could argue that in many cases by
adding a small bedroom to an apartment without increasing
proportionately the other common areas, a developer could
get his unit to qualify for a higher price within the pro-
gram protection. Thus, the marginal cost of increasing the
area would be more than compensated by the marginal revenue
from sales. Similarly, it could happen that before planned;
larger units were reduced to comply with the number of bed-
rooms, yet still sold at the same price. Chart No. 21 and
Figure 2 illustrate the evaluation of the distribution of u-
nits according to areas. From them we observe how the units
increasingly concentrated on middle sizes which we can argue
illustrate the preceding argument about the optimization of
size. That argument is also complemented with Charts 22,
23, and 24, as well as Figures 3, 4, and 5. In Chart 22 and
Figure 3, we observe that production of small sized units
for categories "A" and "B" decreased, while the share of
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CHART No 21
DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS ACCORDING TO AREA
(Period 1979-1983)
Source: FUNDACNSTPUCCION. Total
Area y Precio de Venta.
Nacional. luadro 4. Apartamentos ofrecidos por
* Statistics account until September.
FIGURE No 2
DISTRIBUTION OF UNITS ACCORDING TO AREA
LARGE UNITS,
(up to 70 sq n)
MEDIUM UNITS
---- (71-150 sq a)
SMALL UNITS
(over 150 sq a)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
1981 1982
AREA 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
sq.meters No % No % No % No % No %
50 657 3 492 1 1,085 3 377 0 110 1
51-70 853 4 952 3 627 2 1,072 3 586 3
61-70 2,686 10 3,435 11 2,507 7 4,432 12 976 5
Sub Total 4,196 17 4,879 15 4,219 13 5,881 15 1,672 9
71-80 4,222 16 6,064 20 6,902 21 6,714 18 4,077 21
81-90 4,132 16 6,268 21 8,149 24 11,316 30 5,850 30
91-100 2,693 11 4,783 16 5,387 16 6,844 18 3,161 16
101-150 7,746 30 6,953 23 7,285 22 6,147 16 3,821 20
Sub Total 18,793 73 24,069 80 27,714 83 31,021 82 16,909 87
151-200 1,811 7 980 3 1,129 3 684 2 508 3
200 815 3 591 2 379 1 599 1 253 1
ISub Total 2,626 10 1,571 5 1,508 4 1,283 3 761 4
TOTAL 25,615 100 30,519 100 33,441 100 38,185 100 19,342 100
IN.................................................................................................................................................................................................. .................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .......................... .  ......................................................................................................... ....................................................................... ...................................................................................................
..... .... ...
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.............................................................................................................
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CHART No 22
EVOLUTION OF THE SUPPLY OF SMALL SIZE UNITS
(Area 50 to 70 sq m)
Period 1979-1983
PERIOD
PRICES 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983* 1979-1983
(Bs) No % No % No % No % No % No %
100 255 6 98 2 64 1 66 1 16 1 499 2
101-150 1,617 39 1,842 38 570 14 863 15 112 7 5,004 24
151-200 1,113 26 1,095 22 1,530 36 2,383 41 824 49 6,945 33
201-250 866 21 646 13 774 19 1,155 20 139 8 3,582 17
251-350 277 7 976 20 852 20 722 12 452 27 3,279 16
350 66 1 222 5 429 10 692 11 129 8 1,538 8
TOTAL
SMALL SIZE 4,196 100 4,879 100 4,219 100 5,881 100 1,672 100 20,847 100
Source: FUNDACONSTRUCCION. Total
periodo clasificados por
Nacional. Cuadro No 4. Apartamentos ofrecidos en el
Area y Precio de Venta.
* Statistics account until September 1983.
Within the housing program: It is very unlikely a four bedroom unitcould fit in less
than 70 sq. m. Thus we assume that the category 251-350 would not qualify.Hence only
the four first category of prices would qualify for the benefits of the housing pro-
gram. We assume a 2 bedroom and a 3 bedroom unit could be built in less than 70 sq. m.
FIGURE N 3
EVOLUTION OF THE SUPPLY OF SMALL UNITS
(Area 70 sq m)
50 % F
-W
............
.-,,
KEY, PRICE, TYPE
(000's Bs)
100 A
101-150 B
151-200 C
201-250 D
251-350 E
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1981 1982 1983
40 %
30 %
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CHART No 23
EVOLUTION OF THE SUPPLY OF MEDIUM SIZE UNITS
(Area 71 to 150 sq m)
Period 1979-1983
1* PERIOD
PRICES 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1979-1983
(Bs) No % No % No % No % No % No %
100 587 3 872 3 96 0 24 0 0 0 1,579 1
101-150 4,085 22 3,626 15 1,720 6 156 0 45 0 9,632 8
151-200 2,763 15 4,470 19 4,862 18 3,458 11 2,157 13 17,710 15
201-250 4,226 22 7,458 31 10,481 39 13,594 44 6,587 39 42,346 36
251-350 3,809 20 4,009 17 6,210 23 9,579 31 5,877 35 29,484 25
350 2 3,323 18 3,603 15 3,981 14 4,210 14 2,243 13 17,360 15
TOTAL
MIDIUM SIZE 18,793 100 24,069 100 27,714 100 31,021 100 16,909 100 118,506 100
Source: FUNDACONSTRUCCION. Total Nacional. Cuadro No 4. Apartamentos ofrecidos en el periodo
clasificados por Area y Precio de Venta.
1* Statistics account until September 1983.
2* Units of this price did not qualify for the housing program benefits.
FIGURE No 4
EVOLUTION OF SUPPLY OF MEDIUM SIZE UNITS
(Area 71 to 150 sq m)
50 % -
0 %
0 %
0%0 % 1 981*19..198
YEARS 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
KEY, PRIcE, TYPE
(000's Bs)
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101-150 B
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201-250 D
251-350 E
)30 0
(others)
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CHART No 24
EVOLUTION OF THE SUPPLY OF LARGE UNITS
(Area 150 sq. m.)
Period 1979-1983
PERIOD
PRICES 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1979-1983
(Bs) No % No % No % No % No % No %
100 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0
101-150 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 0
151-200 1 0 9 0 30 2 4 0 2 0 46 1
201-250 75 3 47 4 2 0 51 4 0 0 175 2
251-350 294 11 138 9 244 16 133 10 58 8 867 11
350 2,254 86 1,371 87 1,232 82 1,095 85 700 92 6,652 86
TOTAL
LARGE UNITS 2,625 100 1,571 100 1,508 100 1,283 100 761 100 7,749 100
Source: FUNDACONSTRUCCION. Total Nacional. Cuadro No 4. Apartamentos
periodo clasificados por Area y Precio de Venta.
ofrecidos en el
* Statistics account until September 1983.
Within the housing program: It is very unlikely a four bedroom unit could fit in less
than 70 sq. m. Thus we assume that the category 251-350 would not qulify. Thus only
the four first category of prices would qualify for the benefits of the housing pro-
gram. We assume a 2 bedroom and a 3 bedroom unit could be built in less than 70 sq. m.
FIGURE No 5
EVOLUTION OF THE SUPPLY OF LARGE UNITSL (Area 350 sq m)
90 % t-
KEY, PRICE, TYPE
(000s Bs)
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units "C" grew during the five years. In Chart 23 and
Figure 4, which depicts the evolution of the middle size
units, we observe production of units "A" and "B" decreased
dramatically and it is very obvious the concentration is on
units "D" and "E". Lastly, in Chart 24 and Figure 5, we ob-
serve how units "A", "B", and "C" are almost nonexistent,
which is partly understandable due to construction costs.
But we see that even though units "C" and "D" were required
to have the same number of bedrooms, large units "C" were
almost not produced at all.
The second group of arguments to explain why the lower
cost units were not produced in the amounts expected relates
to traditional practices in the supply of housing units in
Venezuela by the formal private sector. The Program 4 re-
quired from the developers the land as equity investment.
It is a common and well known practice in Venezuela to in-
flate the price of the land to facilitate and get a higher
percentage of construction financing but also to increase
the price of the units to be produced. In the program, fi-
nancing was 100% of construction costs anyway, for all cate-
gories, but inflating the price of the land helps to make
more credible the declared construction costs and thus the
value of the projected units. This is so, given the price
of land is also a component of the unit's price. One could
claim mortgage banks have specialized personnel to evaluate
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the feasibility of credit proposals, but in Venezuela access
to credit depends also on other variables like kinship and
connections, therefore projects with inflated land prices do
pass through.
Here it is also convenient to mention the links between
financiers and developers. The regulations of the SNAP and
the general law of banks prohibit the participation of bank
presidents, directors, or staff in construction projects for
which the financing institution is evaluating or granting a
credit1 . However, there are many covert cases of bank per-
sonnel involved in real estate investments2
Similarly, developers raise the declared costs of cons-
truction. Raising construction costs implies developers
would be well protected against any major contingency in the
construction process that could require additional equity,
but also they could have capital available for other invest-
ments. Even though these arguments can not be documented,
declarations by the developers themselves confirmed that.
Raising construction costs at the end will also raise the
1. Normas de Operacion del Sistema Nacional de Ahorro y
Prestamo Titulo III, p. 11. Ley General de Bancos y Otros
Institutos de Credito.
2. For an illustration, see the case of the Project,
Ciudadela Faria at the end of this chapter.
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level of profits even before sales are finished. Moreover,
additional capital will reduce the level of risks. In this
sense it is easier to inflate construction costs when the
units are more expensive because there are more items where
costs can be covered and additional ammenities in some cases
imported where prices can not be checked easily.
Consequently higher cost units have also higher potential
for increasing costs and thus profits.
An additional consideration relates to the Venezuelan
building codes. In order to obtain construction and occu-
pancy permits, interminable red tape must be carried. It is
a lengthy and complicated process where payment of bribes is
involved. Those bribes must be paid even if compliance is
total. It is just a non-recorded extra cost built into the
process, otherwise permits don't get through. Moreover,
standards are not graded according to the price of the units
produced. In many cases they are too high in relation to
the unit's cost. For instance, infrastructure costs to
build units "A" are the same as those to built units "E".
Consequently, it is more profitable for the developers to
build the most expensive units given the level of investment
required.
The third group of arguments are related to the per-
ceived marketability risks. We can argue that housing
investment decisions in Venezuela are not based on market
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studies. First of all, there is not sufficient base infor-
mation to carry them out in depth. The available informa-
tion regarding income lumps together many kinds of house-
holds. For instance, until 1981 the highest level was de-
signated as those families with monthly incomes of 5,000 Bs
or more. This level of aggregation is not enough so as to
be used for evaluating the private housing markets. The in-
formation corresponds to the surveys made by the OCEI given
that the national census of 1980 was a big failure. Second-
CAly, the most recent nation wide housing market study, Mere-
cui 70, is already 14 years old. Thirdly, there is the ge-
neralized confidence in Venezuela's economic welfare. Deve-
lopers believed in the security of a market for the most
expensive units and they based their beliefs on the real es-
tate boom of the late 1970's. They were expecting consider-
able increases in the population's income. For these rea-
sons decisions were carried mostly at intuitive levels and
based on political and economic expectations. Therefore,
although the developers knew the market for the more expen-
sive units was smaller, they expected as individuals it
would be wide enough. Moreover, they did not believe in the
credit facilities promulgated by the Decree 214. Regula-
tions are rarely enforced in Venezuela and in this case they
involve the control of the financing institutions which un-
doubtedly held political and economic power. A complemen-
tary argument is the potential competition between the units
"A" and "B" and those built by INAVI. Even though both
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would be competitive in quality, the INAVI units could be
obtained more cheaply and without using the formal financing
markets. Regardless of INAVI's level of production, which
is low, low-middle income households have expectations for
getting a house directly subsidized by the government.
In the interview in February 1984, I asked five develo-
pers why categories "A" and "B" had not been offerred in the
amounts expected. The common answer was that the developers
were not interested in building them, because the construc-
tion of housing units is a long, expensive, and complicated
process in Venezuela. There, the payment of bribes is an
accepted part of the common process of building. There are
many complications and extra expenses until the units are
finally built. They expressed that given the conditions of
the system and the regulations; it was almost impossible to
build the units at the price without the developers losing
money. Some of them stated that those prices could only be
possible when the government owned the land and facilitated
all bureaucratic procedures. Two of them added that the
people for whom those units were targeted, prefer to live in
"unsanitary housing, " and that they were "not responsible
enough to meet monthly payments." In addition, they said it
would be very complicated to get formal financing for them.
The reasons for this being that they cannot formally prove
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their level of income, they don't have stable jobs, and they
lack the necessary formal tax declarations and required
documents.
The Evolution of the Market
From Charts 25 and 26, and Figures 6 and 7, we observe
the comparative evolution of the units produced, sales, and
inventory accumulation. The graphs depict the number of
finished units increased until 1982 when it shows a reduc-
tion that we can attribute to the restrictions on construc-
tion financing in 1983. However, even though the total and
monthly average of finished units increased until 1982, the
monthly average of new starts was decreasing since the be-
ginning of the period. That decrease showed a recovery in
1982 which we could attribute to the implementation of the
subsidy program. The starts, however, did not reach the
levels of 1979 and 1980. Finally, the starts reduced drama-
tically in 1983. In general, we can talk about a reduction
in private housing investment. This conclusion is backed up
by the statistics of the Venezuelan Central Bank that stated
an average annual reduction of 15% in the value of private
residential construction for sale between 1979 and 1982 in
real bolivares1 . From the figures, we observe how inventory
1. BCV Anuario de Series Estadisticas 1982. Cuatro No. VI-
87.
CHART No 25
EVOLUTION OF UNITS PRODUCED
AND SOLD, AND INVENTORY
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
UNITS FINISHED 25,615 30,519 33,441 38,181 19,342*
UNITS SOLD 17,469 22,904 24,855 28,415 19,620
STOCK 19,078 25,750 33,465 41,173 41,557*
Until September 1983.
Source:- FUNDACONSTRUCCION. Total Nacional. Area Urbana 99.
Cuadro No 4 : Units Finished.
- FUNDACONSTRUCCION. Total- Nacional. Area Urbana 99.
Cuadro No 1 : Sales.
- FUNDACONSTRUCCION. Informe Oferta Actual y a corto plazo
al 50/9/83: Stock.
FIGURE No 6
EVOLUTION OF NEW UNITS, SALES AND STOCK.
KEY
m =a=*
UNITS FINISHED
(..--projected**)
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* Until September 1983.
Projected taking the average production until September.
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CHART No 26
MONTHLY AVERAGE OF UNITS FINISHED
NEW STARTS AND NEW SOLD
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
UNITS FINISHED 2,135 2,543 2,787 3,181 1,612*
NEW STARTS 3,463 3,196 2,488 2,962 1,063
UNITS SOLD 1,456 1,909 2,071 2,368 1,681
* Statistics account until September 1983
Source: FUNDACONSTRUCCION. Total Nacional. Area Urbana 99.
- Cuadro No 01: Units finished.
- Cuadro No 04: Units Sold.
- Informe Oferta Actual y a corto plazo: New Starts.
FIGURE No 7
MONTHLY AVERAGE OF UNITS FINISHED, NEW STARTS AND UNITS SOLD
AVERAGE
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was building up since the beginning, because although sales
were also increasing until 1982, the rate of increase was
smaller. At the end of 1983, the stock had reached 41,677
units. These did not include 13,677 already finished units
which did not have the condominium document.
Knowing the subsidy program was implemented in July
1981, we can argue the subsidy did not affect notoriously
the number of units sold or the average price of the units
sold. Figure 8 shows the fluctuations in the level of sales
during the period. It will be very difficult to attribute
the fluctuations observed after 1981 to the subsidy. The
most identifiable trough corresponds to the sharp decreases
in sales in the last three months of 1983, which is explai-
ned by the crisis in the economy of the country. Figure 9
depicts the monthly evolution of average sales prices.
Similarly, it is hard to attribute the variations to the
subsidy program because variations in price are similar to
those before the subsidy. But one conclusion is certain,
the subsidy did not change the average price of the unit
sold. Units remained belonging to the highest category "E"
so we could perfectly argue against the efficiency of the
subsidy. Regardless of the income level of those households
who purchased the subsidized units, we note in Chart 28, the
prices of the units sold remained at the high levels. We
could then question whether with or without subsidy the
units sold would have had similar prices.
CHART No 27
MULTIFAMILY UNITS, MONTHLY EVOLUTION OF SALES AND AVERAGE SALES PRICE
JAN. FEB. MARCH APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUGUST SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC. TOTAL
No APTS. 838 1,235 1,837 1,145 1,708 1,650 1,042 1,574 1,555 1,475 1,700 1,710 17,469
AVERAGE*
SALES PRICE 255.69 261.60 273.99 269.92 284.44 300.24 276.81 274.04 280.31 296.61 310.07 292.23 283.41
NO APTS. 1,430 1,646 2,242 1,145 1,452 2,158 1,375 2,342 2,820 2,309 1,903 2,082 22,904
SAAV PRICE 205.78 269.64 267.28 291.41 277.44 269.75 283.13 256.70 245.92 288.91 302.87 294.16 270.51
NO APTS. 1,940 2,599 2,639 1,477 2,307 2,341 2,097 1,812 1,572 1,553 2,081 2,437 24,855
AVERAGE'
SALES PRICE 248.87 253.76 251.07 281.39 300.19 285.30 289.47 284.24 316.07 316.07 305.19 300.23 281.65
NO APTS. 1,288 1,851 3,143 1,439 2,681 2,967 2,158 2,529 2,746 2,303 2,690 2,620 28,415
AVERAGE*
SALES PRICE 278.74 291.43 288.30 276.19 292.05 287.43 288.17 289.98 292.97 302.79 294.54 307.56 291.81
NO APTS. 1,766 1,130 2,540 1,589 2,206 2,528 2,141 2,188 2,586 264 279 403 19,620
AVERAGE*
'SALES PRICE 298.51 333.49 312.17 320.35 320.40 320.30 317.26 328.02 338.43 263.05 317.55 285.81 318.24
Sourcp: FUNDACONSTRUCCION. Total Nacional. Area Urbana 99. Viviendas multifamiliarps: Evolucion mensual
de las ventas de apartamentos. Cuadro No 1.
Average sales price in thousands of Bolivares.
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Chart 28
Average Sale Price of Units Sold
Price (in 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
000's Bs)
Current Bs 279.18 265.13 275.44 289.29 311.16
Real Bs 144.35 112.77 100.97 96.78 97.82
Chart No. 29 confirms the argument, the apartments sold
increasingly concentrated on units "D" and "E". The share
of units "D" and "E" sold during the period was 53%. Due to
the concentration of production on units "D" and "E" the un-
sold units also concentrated on those categories. Chart No.
29 shows how by September 1983, 62% of the unsold units
belonged to those two categories, and curiously enough, 68%
of the units unsold had been on the market after 1981, the
year of the subsidy program, but also the year of the libe-
ration of the interest rates. By September 1983, the ave-
rage price of the unsold units was 297,130 Bs in current bo-
livares, or 93,410 in real Bs. In any case, it fell within
category "E".
The Situation of the Housing Market in 1983
By the end of September 1983, Venezuela had accumulated
55,219 finished units, of those, 41,677 or 75% were ready
for sale. The rest, or 13,542 units, were already finished,
but the developers had been unwilling or unable to formalize
the condominium documents required to market the units. Of
CHART No29
APARTMENTS SOLD CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO SALES PRICE
* Statistics account until September 1983
H
fp
CATEGORY SALES PRICE 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983* TOTAL
(000's Bs) Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %
A Until 100 256 1 1,847 8 721 3 36 0 118 1 2,978 3
B 101 to 150 3,373 19 3,755 17 2,135 7 841 3 404 2 10,506 9
C 151 to 200 2,758 16 4,124 18 5,092 21 5,255 19 2,344 13 19,573 18
D 201 to 250 4,173 24 5,075 22 7,452 30 11,656 41 6,128 33 34,484 31
E 251 to 350 3,156 18 3,926 17 5,576 23 6,488 23 5,727 31 24,873 22
OTHER More than 3,753 22 4,177 18 3,848 16 4,123 14 3,691 20 19,592 17
350
TOTAL 17,469 100 22,904 100 24,855 100 28,399 100 18,410 100 112,006 100
CHART No 30
MULTIFAMILY HOUSING. APARTMENTS UNSOLD CLASSIFIED BY PRICE AND TIME ON THE MARKET
Source: FUNDACONSTRUCCION. Total Nacional. Area Urbana 99. Cuadro No 13. Cantidad de Apartamentos por
vender clasificados por precio de venta segun afno del documento de condominio.
I-
APRIL-SEPTEMBER JANUARY-MARCH
CATEGORY SALES PRICE 1983 1983 1982 1981 BEFORE 1981 TOTAL
(000's Bs) Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %
A Until 100 15 0 0 0 30 0 22 0 365 7 433 1
B 101 to 150 135 1 8 0 315 4 556 8 681 12 1,927 5
C 151 to 200 1,945 17 387 13 1,837 13 897 12 983 17 5,917 14
D 201 to 250 4,039 38 852 28 5,380 37 2,625 35 1,231 21 13,783 33
E 251 to 350 3,164 29 1,211 40 4,145 28 1,992 30 1,466 25 11,984 29
OTHER More than 1,615 15 585 19 2,512 18 1,081 15 1,090 18 7,513 18
350 1 1 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 10,784 100 3,068 100 14,641 100 7,671 100 7,671 100 5,994 100
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the unsold units, 13,852 or 33% had been finished in 1983,
14,641 units or 35% of the stock had been on the market
since 1982, 7,671 units or 18% had been finished since 1981.
These statistics illustrate that even though the heavy accu-
mulation started after 1981, inventory built up was a char-
acteristic of the whole period. Even more; 5,944 units or
14% of the stock was recorded to be on the market before
1981. The inventory of units was generating financial los-
ses to the developers due to interest payments on construc-
tion loans. In addition to the 55,214 finished units,
32,063 units were in construction and expected to be ready
in less than 2 years. The situation worsens when we add the
21,729 units whose construction was paralyzed due to finan-
cial problems. In summary, assuming all units were finished
and marketed, almost 5 years would be needed to sell the
109,111 units, assuming the average annual sale rate showed
during the period, or 22,613 units per year.
Some Illustrative Cases
Given the firms' and projects' individual characteris-
tics, many are the situations and the reactions to the prob-
lem. Based on the interviews we could classify the supply
side in three categories- those who although at a slower
pace are selling the units- those who are not selling the
units; and those who have the construction of the projects
paralyzed. The project Ciudadela Faria in Maracaibo City
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illustrates very well the first case. It represents the
case of a long experienced big developer who can assimilate
the decrease in sales by compensating delays in earnings
with other projects or investments. During the interview,
the developer mentioned as the main reasons for the sus-
tained sales, the confidence that the purchasers and the
financing institutions have in the firm, the appropriate
location, and the characteristics of the project. He ex-
pressed the 40 years of experience in the market has provi-
ded the firm with a good reputation and given the actual
circumstances, prestige has been a winning note. The buyers
in this period of crisis hesitated prior to buying from
someone to make sure the seller could respond to their
claims long after the sale was made. In addition, this pro-
ject had the long term financing secured before the project
was started. It should be mentioned that given the scale of
the project and in order to obtain the interim financing,
many regional mortgage banks had to be involved. This gives
us an idea of the developer's accessibility to the source of
financing for the short and long term. In addition, the
project site has good accessibility and it is located in an
area considered good for middle class residential use. This
characteristic, the developer said, has been critical to
gain buyers in the current circumstances.
Complementary to the construction of units, this deve-
lopment firm has as subsidiaries other companies involved in
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the supply of construction materials like cement, hardware
stores, and bricks. This characteristic makes the develop-
ment firm less vulnerable to scarcity and cost escalations
of materials, inconveniences that delay construction and
increase contingency expenses. Wages were raised 8-10% in
the last 2 years due to claims from the union, but the
developer stated the project did not experience any serious
interruptions, delays, or serious increases in costs in the
construction stage. Therefore, the cash flow of the project
did not suffer from serious alterations.
Ciudadela Faria is a project of 5,000 units of which
2,487 units were built in the first stage. The construction
of the second phase (2,500 units), contrary to what one
would expect, is being planned for the short run. Their
confidence in good market conditions is backed up by the
fact that they are selling 10% of the total sales in the
three major cities of Zulia state. The construction of the
project started in 1980 and sales started in 1981. Thus,
since the beginning, the sales were benefiting from the sub-
sidy program. The prices of the apartments fell within ca-
tegories "D" and "E" of the decree 214. The developer ex-
pressed that to build units "A" and "B" is a utopia and
could only be carried out in locations where the incidence
of the cost of land on the prices were very low. Moreover,
he said the government is backing up construction but it is
not securing sales. He added the important thing was to
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build units below the 350,000 Bs mark, or in other words,
falling within the benefits of the program, but in the high-
er categories. The land was assembled in three stages by
the firm. The first purchase took place in 1959, the last
in 1973. Until 1980, when construction started, the land
was held empty regardless of the good location (Northwest of
the city, next to the University Campus). Ciudadela Faria
represents a case of financial strength in a difficult mar-
ket condition. They have enough capital and assets to use
as collateral for their borrowings, and they have good con-
nections with the financial sector. In addition, they can
compensate for delays in sales with earnings from other pro-
jects and they don't have to worry about bottlenecks with
construction materials. In sum, they have control of the
two most critical components of residential construction-
financing and materials. With this advantage they have a
degree of flexibility to adapt to changing market
conditions.
In the second group are those developers who are not
selling the units. I could identify two opposite responses
to the problem. The majority are waiting for the action the
recently elected government is going to take and which they
expect are going to be favorable. A minority has started in
a very subtle way dropping the prices. The reductions in
prices are made in the downpayment (up to 100%). This kind
of negotiation is done in private between developers and
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buyers. In the two cases that illustrate the first situa-
tion, the developers expressed they are having big losses
but they do not plan to, nor can they, lower the prices.
One of the projects is carried out by another big and
experienced development firm in Maracaibo City. They built
a project called La Florida, with 28 buildings and 1,049
units in the northwest section of Maracaibo, on a piece of
land which used to be occupied by a barrio. Certainly, the
area is not identified as appropriate for middle class resi-
dents, and we could conclude this has been a determining
factor, given the reduction in the general level of sales.
Financing, for the short and long run, as in Ciudadela
Faria, was secured prior to construction. In this case,
sources of financing were multiple too. The land was ac-
quired by the company in 1974 and was "cheap" according to
the developer. Construction started in 1978. Between 1979
and half of 1980, the first 405 apartments were sold at
215,000 (category "D"). Between 1980 and 1981, 4114 addi-
tional units were sold at 250,000 Bs (top price, category
"D"). Lately, the price of the apartments is 330,000 Bs
(category "E"). These increases average 11% yearly in five
years. I asked the developers whether the project had
troubles with cost escalations of materials and labor. The
answer was that only labor had risen by around 10% in the
past two years, but he expressed they hadn't had any prob-
lems with materials because they had in stock 80% of the
needs, and in addition, they own supplies of bricks, cement,
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and ceramic tiles. In this project, even though the bene-
fits of construction financing did not occur since at- the
beginning, the late stages of the projects benefited from
it. It was precisely in those last stages where the increa-
ses of prices took place, attributed to increases in the
interest rates. When asked about market studies, the deve-
loper expressed there weren't any. We did an "appreciation"
of the market, he said. In addition, he stated "D" and "E"
were the only feasible units to build within the decree be-
cause to get long term financing for the cheaper ones was
more difficult. He was confident incomes of the people
would rise with inflation. "Housing units used to get sold,
besides, we thought the susbidy would help," he expressed.
Sales were successful in the first three years of the pro-
ject (1979-1981), they sold an average of 273 units yearly.
After 1981 sales dropped dramatically. Currently, the firm
is lowering the downpayment, in some cases up to 100%.
The second case is El Bosque, a project in La Victoria
City. It has 528 units- which had also pre-sale contracts
before construction for almost 100% of the units. The cons-
truction started in June 1981, and ended in November 1982.
This project is a public- private program (desarrollo mixto)
between a private development firm and INAVI, the Venezuelan
National Institute for Housing. The developer is the promo-
ter, seller, and builder of the units. INAVI sold the unde-
veloped land to the developer in 1979, on the condition of
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building according to INAVI's criteria for price, size, ser-
vices, etc. (categories "B" and "C" of decree 214). The
site is perimetral to the city although it has good accessi-
bility. Formal sales started in 1982 and after a while they
were no longer successful. By January 1984, 144 apartments
remained unsold, 140 units in category "C". Many of the
potential buyers have argued they have lost their job or
they have referred to the uncertain economic future. Others
have simply expressed they have found cheaper units they can
better afford. Many of them have retired, even though long
term financing was already approved with the subsidy pro-
gram. In those cases, the buyers have preferred to lose
around 1% of the price of the units for bank charges, but
not to undertake the financial compromise. This case
illustrates very well the contraction of the demand for
apartments due to the unfavorable economic expectations.
Both developers expressed they plan to recover partially
the losses. They are strongly convinced they can sell the
units even at higher prices in the long run. Both of them
asserted that a strong inflationary period is expected and
as a consequence, prices will rise dramatically. They ex-
pressed people will need to invest in assets that appreciate
with inflation, and real estate investments are a primary
choice. They referred to the proportion of people in Vene-
zuela who did not take their capital out in dollars before
the currency devaluation, and who will seek a hedge against
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inflation. In addition, they expressed that even if sala-
ries don't keep pace with inflation, the population growth
will secure the demand for housing. Given that the produc-
tion of housing units will be further slowed down, they will
be forced to buy the existing inventory. The answer to how
they were going to meet the interest payments, was that
banks were not interested in taking units they could not
sell and that the banks' business was selling credit, not
units. Thus, the banks were also waiting. Furthermore,
given the current crisis, banks prefer to hold the loans as
paper assets and not as frozen built capital. They will not
allow the developers, even if they wanted, to lower the
prices of the units fearing a portfolio crisis. The develo-
pers expressed that the production and the financing sector
of the housing industry have big hopes that the new govern-
ment, elected in December 1983, will take "favorable"
economic measures to solve the situation. For all these
reasons they thought it made a lot of sense to wait in most
cases because in the end they would be better off.
The third group of developers, represented by those who
have the construction of projects paralyzed, must be separa-
ted into two categories. The first category is represented
by those projects subject to legal or fiscal actions due to
mismanagement. The second category represents the projects
that were financed by the Banco de los Trabajadores de
Venezuela (BTV) and Banco Nacional de Descuento (BND) which
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stopped receiving the valuations due to the intervention in
1982 of the Venezuelan government in the two banks. It has
been estimated that out of the units paralyzed, 11,000 units
or approximately 50% were units financed by the BTV.
The project Ciudad El Sol in Maracaibo is representative
of the first category. It is an example of administrative
corruption and speculation between developers and the direc-
tor of the traditionally most solid and big savings and loan
institution in Zulia state. The ambitious project was gran-
ted a loan for 450 million Bolivares to build a project of
4,000 units without a serious financial evaluation of the
viability of the project. It is well known the director of
the savings and loan was a partner in the project. This was
an express violation of Venezuelan banking regulations. The
project is stopped because it had cash flow problems even
before 12 out of the 87 buildings were finished. Even
though part of the land was resold to other companies to
compensate for the lack of available funds, they could not
fill the gap. The savings and loan discovered the mismana-
gement and it took legal action against the company and its
own director.
In the case of the BND and BTV, many construction loans
were granted without critical financial evaluations. Many
projects defaulted, as a consequence. These banks held many
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paper assets but were unable to take care of their liabili-
ties. With the intervention of the government, the cons-
truction projects which depended on these banks for finan-
cing stopped receiving the valuations and without working
cash, construction of other projects also stopped.
Other construction projects have stopped because the
developers are no longer interested in finishing them, given
the market conditions. Construction financing was 100%;
since less than 1/2 of the construction process accounts for
more than 60% of the valuations, developers had already re-
ceived most of the capital. In many cases, they have used
this capital to finance other projects, thus to finish the
projects will not give them any return because the earnings
for sale belong to the bank. They prefer to quit and use
their time in another investment.
Conclusions
From the evaluation of the production of housing units
by the private sector it is clear the concentration of the
production is on the most expensive categories, "D" and "E",
and on middle sized units. That outcome is in obvious con-
tradiction with the stated Program 4 goals that pretended to
concentrate the production on low cost housing units affor-
dable to households earning between 3,000 and 7,000 Bs per
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month. We saw how the weighted average of the units produ-
ced during the period required incomes higher than 8,000 Bs
per month before the implementation of the subsidy program,
and higher than 5,000 Bs per month after the subsidy was
implemented in July 1981. In addition, the concentration of
the production on units "D" and "E" increased to reach 68%
in 1983 while the share of units "A" and "B" dropped conti-
nuously to reach 1% in the same year. We also observed the
predominance of the most expensive units in the production
did not change, even though inventory accumulation started
being obvious since the beginning of the period. That
inventory accumulation reached a critical point in 1983 due
to the growing unemployment rate, lack of liquidity, and the
effects of high interest rates. In 1983 the level of sales
dropped by 30% compared to the previous years and the number
of units unsold amounted to 41,677 units. As a result of
the concentration of production on the most expensive units,
the weighted average of the units financed during the period
belonged to category "E". Similarly, 68% of the units which
benefited from the subsidy belonged to categories "D" and
"E". Their financing consumed 76% of the resources spent on
the subsidy program.
From the observed behavior, we could speculate about the
indication of a private sector "preference" to build the
most expensive units. Unfortunately, we lack empirical evi-
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dence to demonstrate causal relationships between the Pro
gram 4 and the supply characteristics. We lack a control
group to analyze what the outcome would have been without
the effects of the program. We are also unable to compare
the outcomes with the 1974-1978 presidential period simply
because statistics are not available. However, we can say,
based on the direct observations and on the interviews, that
"within the scope" of the program units "D" and "E" were the
kind of units the developers preferred to produce given the
existing market conditions. In this case we can argue whe-
ther the policy exacerbated the number of units produced at
those levels given the developers' perceived advantages from
building those units. This is not to say that had those
perceived advantages not existed, the low cost units would
have been produced, because it is likely to expect some de-
velopers would have preferred to build units for the non-
regulated market, to engage in non-residential construction
activity, or to undertake an alternative investment. Never-
theless, we can argue a bias toward production was built
into the array of choices. Moreover, the choices were
wrongly conceived in the policy because the higher catego-
ries of prices were not affordable by the program's target
group.
From the interviews and observations, it seems the deve-
lopers are unable or unwilling to produce in the amounts
expected, the lower cost units within the program and they
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argued the most important reasons were construction costs,
the scarcity and cost of land, the costly and lengthy red
tape, and the uncertainty of the marketability of the chea-
per units. In summary, the perceived risks compared to the
level of returns did not seem attractive enough as real es-
tate investments. Given the conditions of the market, we
could talk about an umbrella of prices. Given the prevai-
ling market conditions between 1979 and 1983, developers
felt that building the most expensive units was much more
profitable, regardless of the real risks of a smaller poten-
tial market. However, we said before that, the lack of mar-
ket studies and reliable statistics to forecast the demand
also contributed to make investment decisions based more on
intuition than on informed choices.
The reasons for the developers preferring the more ex-
pensive units are more extensive than those publicly expres-
sed. First of all, 100% financing was available for all
categories of units within the program. Second, ownership
of the land facilitated the common practice of inflating the
land prices in order to increase the value of the projected
units. Third, inflating construction costs for building
expensive units has more potential for success than for the
cheaper units. Fourth, tax payments as a deterrent to buil-
ding more expensively, it is not such an effective measure
given taxes are future, not present, payments and the oppor-
tunities for tax evasion are high in Venezuela. Fifth, the
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developers do not believe in the accessibility to formal
financing by the lower income households, regardless of the
program regulations and controls on the financing institu-
tions. Moreover, they were fearful about the potential
competition between the units they would produce in catego-
ries "A" and "B" and the similar units INAVI would produce,
but with better financing conditions for the buyer. Sixth,
the subsidy program also raised expectations in the develo-
pers of a more secure market for whatever units they
produced within the program.
The former considerations lead us to think many vari-
ables will need to be changed drastically in the program if
production of lower cost units by the private sector pre-
tends to be achieved. What those necessary changes should
be, their expected effects on the degree of efficiency, and
other alternatives or complementary approaches to produc-
tion, are questions that will be explored in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
THE FEASIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING THE PROGRAM 4:
COST-PRICE EVALUATION
We have seen in Chapter 4 that 66% of the units produced
within the range of prices of Program 4 concentrated on un-
its "D" and "E" and that the average price of the units pro-
duced during the period fell within category "E", the most
expensive one. We argued how the policy features could have
contributed to the distributional effects. Accordingly, we
identified the critical features in the Program and their
likely effects on production. We identified those features
that contributed to increasing the marginal benefits from
building the most expensive units and those features likely
to have no major effect on orienting production. In Chapter
5, we will argue production of the cheaper units was so low
because the policy was conceptually unrealistic and static.
The Program 4 intended to encourage the production of chea-
per units without taking into acount the market costs of
construction input, the average return from other more com-
petitive real estate investments in Venezuela, and the ef-
fects of inflation. This chapter will illustrate why it was
not feasible for the developers to build the cheaper units
without receiving complementary subsidies. We will observe
that it is not surprising the cheaper units almost did not
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get produced by the private developers, given the cost of
building and the less restrictive conditions and potential
higher benefits from building the more expensive units.
Next, we will highlight the cost reduction effects of
the building process carried out by the informal sector
operating in the squatter settlement areas. We will argue
that units with similar characteristics to the cheaper ones
encouraged by the Program 4 get produced by informal develo-
pers, but at a much lower price. This happens because, by
avoiding formal mechanisms, regulations, and expenses, in-
formal developers are able to drastically cut prices. Simi-
larly, we will illustrate how the production of units of
similar characteristics is also carried by the government
(INAVI and Vivienda Rural) but their construction is heavily
subsidized.
In light of the observations, we conclude that if the
government wants to effectively encourage the production of
low-cost housing by the formal private sector, the policy
would have to include heavier subsidies to reduce the costs
of production of the cheaper units. In addition, more
strict controls on the level of returns gotten from more
competitive real estate investments would have to be imple-
mented in order to make investing in the cheaper units more
attractive. Also, the policy would have to include regula-
tory changes concerning urbanization standards, building
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codes, and building systems, and it would have to consider
some land provision. Moreover, the procedural mechanisms to
obtain construction and occupancy permits would have to be
reviewed to eliminate the excess costs and delays. Finally,
we recommend the government explore alternative developers,
other than the big and well developed firms currently opera-
ting in the market, as a way to achieve higher reduction in
cost and to increase the adequacy of production to the con-
sumer needs.
Financial Evaluation of the Target Units within Program 4
As we have mentioned before, the variables to qualify
the units produced within the program were the sales price
and the number of bedrooms. Chart No. 31 presents the
minimum feasible areas for apartments with 2, 3, and 4
bedrooms. Even though those areas are smaller than the
average areas being offerred in the market, they represent
the minimum sizes that could be marketable. Chart No. 32
depicts the construction and land areas required by three
hypothetical buildings with apartments of 2, 3, and 4 bed-
rooms respectively. The Charts mentioned above were used to
develop three hypothetical residential buildings which will
illustrate the financial feasibility of the kind of units
promoted by the Program 4.
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Chart Number 31
Minimum Feasible Areas (sq. m)
No. of Room Areas (Sq. m) Total Area
Bedrooms (Sq. m)
per Unit
2 2 Bedrooms (1 of 12, and 1 of 10) 22
(A&B) Kitchen, Dining Room and Living Room 30 56
Bathroom and Service 4
3 3 Bedrooms (1 of 12, 2 of 11) 34
(C&D) Kitchen, Dining Room and Living Room 30 70
Bathroom and Service 6
4 4 Bedrooms (2 of 12, 2 of 10) 44
(E) Kitchen, Dining Room and Living Room 41 95
Bathroom and Service 10
The three hypothetical cases assume high rise buildings
which are the most common type of residential construction
currently carried out by the formal private sector. Single
family units, row houses, and duplexes are rarely built by
the formal sector, and when they are built, they correspond
to luxury houses. On the contrary, the kind of development
mentioned above (low-rise buildings), characterizes the in-
formal development taking place in the squatter settlement
areas. High rise buildings were undertaken to develop the
cases not because they are considered the most cost appro-
priate solution for low-cost of residential development, but
because they are the ones used to estimate the price indica-
tors backing up the cases and because given the scarcity of
land and the urbanization regulations, they represent the
most feasible solution.
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CHART NO 32
HYPOTHETICAL RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS
APARTMENT TYPE A&B C&D E
NO. OF BEDROOMS 2 Bedrooms 3 Bedrooms 4 Bedrooms
PER APARTMENT
APARTMENT AREA 56 sq. m. 70 sq. m. 95 sq. m.
NO OF APARTMENTS 4 4 4
PER FLOOR
NO OF FLOORS 12 12 12
FLOOR AREA 4 x 56 = 224 4 x 70 = 280 4 x 95= 380
(4 apts x Apt Area + 15% = 34 + 15% = 42 * 15% = 57
+ i% oo f irula- Area = 258 sq m Area= 380 sq m Area= 437 sq m
TOTAL BUILDING 3,096 sq m 3,864 sq m 5,244 sq m
AREA
BUILT UP AREA 258 sq m 380 sq m 437 sq m
L PARKING AREA 960 sq m 960 sq m 
960 sq m
A LANDSCAPE AND 382 sq m 460 sq m 460 sq m
N SET-BACKS
D
TOTAL LAND 1,600 sq m 1,800 sq m 1,857 sq m
AREA
LAY OUT.............
Parking
....................... .. . . .. . .. . .. .
Se.t bac ks
.xi ... ....... .... ... ... i*
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In order to develop the cost estimates for the cases,
price indicators for construction and land costs were under-
taken. These indicators represent below average construc-
tion costs in the private sector. They are thought to be
suitable for low-cost housing production. The land cost in-
dicator implies a peripheral urban location, although with
good accessibility, and construction costs represent plain
finishings and simple structures and materials. Given the
indicators available refer to the Caracas Metropolitan Area,
the cases are representative of that location, however, we
should be aware that it is likely in some cities in the in-
terior of Venezuela, costs are somewhat lower. The distri-
bution of costs within a project used to estimate the total
construction costs and soft costs is based on a sample of 6
buildings, carried out by a team from the Central University
in 1981. This analysis was also done for the Caracas Metro-
politan Area. All cases were developed assuming 1980 as the
starting year for construction, and a 2 year construction
period. In order to simplify the analysis, the estimation
of returns is done before income tax payments.
I. Hypothetical Case - Units A and B (2 Bedroom Units)
Cost Estimates
It assumes a high rise of 12 floors, 4 apartments per
floor, with 2 bedrooms per apartment and an apartment area
up to 56 sq. m.
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Land Cost: 1,600 sq. m at 1,500 Bs/sq. m = Bs 2,400,000
Hard Costs: 3,096 sq. m at 1,500 Bs/sq. m 2 = Bs 4,644,000
Bs 4,884,000
Land + Hard Costs = 69% of Total Construction Costs3
Total Construction Cost = 7,078,261
Soft Costs3.
Interest Financing (21% of TCC)
Promotion and Sales (5% of TCC)
Insurance and Municipal Taxes (1% of TCC)
Professional Fees (1.5% of TCC)
Management and Supervision (2.5% of TCC)
Total Cost:
1,486,435
353,913
70,782
106,174
176,957
2,194,261
Bs 7,078,261
Loan Amount 100% Construction Cost-Land = Bs 4,678,261
1. It assumes the cost of a peripheral piece of land but
with good accessibility for the Caracas Metropolitan Area.
El Diario de Caracas, Domingo 16 de Marzo de 1980. "Enfria-
miento" and "El Costo de los Terrenos aumentd 100% en dos
anos.
2. Projected cost taken from an average of 1,000 Bs/Sq. m
in 1977 assuming an average inflation of 15% annually.
Revista ISC, Septiembre-Octubre 1977, "Vivienda, Costos,
Precio y Ganancias."
3. Distribution of cost according to "Estructura de Costos
en la Produccion de Vivienda." Alberto Aranda Arocha UCV,
IDEC, Marzo 1981.
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Average Total Construction Cost per Sq. m of Apartment:
7,078,261 i 2,688 = 2,633 Bs per Sq. m
Estimation of Returns
Sales
2 years
Land Price = ,
(PV) 2,400,000
FV of land
3,750,000
, Loan Repayment
4,678, 261
1. FV of land at the end of second year when construction
is completed at 25% return on equity before taxes, Bs
3,750,000
Total Sales = FV of land + loan repayment
Total Sa-1-s-=--3,57-0,OOO + 4 678,261 = 8,428,261
Sales Price per Apartment = Bs 175,589 Category C
Sales Price per Sq. m = 2,702 Bs/Sq. m
Assuming apartments were sold at the regulated price of
100,000 Bs/unit, then sales 4,800,000
FV of Land = 4,800,000 - 4,678,261 = 121,739
which means the developer will have big losses.
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2. FV of land at 15% return on equity after 2 years =
3,174,000
Total Sales = 3,174,000 + 4,678,261 = 7,852,261
Sales Price per Apartment = Bs 163,588 Category C
Sales Price per Sq. m = 2,517 Bs/Sq. m
3. Cutting construction and land costs in half and with 25%
return on equity.
Land Cost = 1,200,000; FV = 1,875,000
Loan Repayment = 2,339,131
Total Sales = 1,875,000 + 2,339,131 = 4,214,131
Sales Price per Apartment = Bs 87,795 - we reach Category A
Sales Price per Sq. m = 1,320 Bs/Sq. m
4. Cutting construction and land costs 25% and with 15%
return on equity.
Land Cost = 1,800,000; FV = 2,380,000
Loan Repayment = 3,508,696
Total Sales = 2,380,000 + 3,508,696 = 5,899,196
Sales Price per Apartment = Bs 122,692 Category B
Sales Price per Sq. m = 1,888 Bs/Sq. m
5. Cutting construction and land cost 50% and with 15%
return on equity.
Land Cost = 1,200,0007 FV = 1,587,000
Loan Repayment = 2,339,131
Total Sales = 1,587,000 + 2,339,131 = 3,926,131
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Sales Price per Apartment = Bs 81,795 - we reach Category A
Sales Price per Sq. m = 1,258 Bs/Sq. m
II. Hypothetical Case - Units C and D (3 Bedroom Units)
Cost Estimates
It assumes a high rise of 12 floors, 4 apartments with 3
bedrooms per floor. Total area of an Apartment is 70 sq. m.
Land Cost: 1,800 sq. m at 1,500 Bs/sq. m = 2,700,000
Hard Costs: 3,864 sq. m at 1,500 Bs/sq. m = 5,796,000
Bs 8,496,000
Land + Hard Costs = 69% of Total Construction Costs
Total Construction Cost = Bs 12,313,044
Soft Costs:
Interest Financing (21% of TCC)
Promotion and Sales (5% of TCC)
Insurance and Municipal Taxes (1% of TCC)
Professional Fees (1.5% of TCC)
Management and Supervision (2.5% of TCC)
Total Cost:
2,585,739
615,652
123,131
184,696
307,826
3,817,044
Bs 12,313,044
Loan Amount 100% Construction Cost-Land = Bs 9,613,044
167
Average Total Construction Cost per Sq. m of Apartment:
12,313,044 t 3,360 = 3,665 Bs/sq. m
This cost is approximately equal to the average market sales
price for a unit produced by the formal private sector in
1978 in Caracas Metropolitan Area.
Estimation of Returns
2 years for construction
Land Price =
(PV)
Bs 2,700,000
N
Sales
FV of Land
4,281,750
/ Loan Repayment
9,613,044
1. FV of land at 25% return on equity = Bs 4,218,750
Total Sales = FV of Land + Loan Repayment
Total Sales = 4,218,750 + 9,613,044 = 13.831.794
Sales Price per Apartment = 288,163 Bs - out of Category C
Sales Price per Sq. m = 4,117 Bs/Sq. m - in Category E
2. FV of land at 15% return on equity = 3,570,750
Total Sales - 3,570,750 + 9,613,044 = 13,183,794
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Sales Price per Apartment = 274,662 Bs Category E
Sales Price per Sq. m = 3,924 Bs/Sq. m
3. Cutting construction and land costs in half and with 25%
return on equity.
Land Cost = 1,350,000 Bs; FV = 1,785,375
Loan Repayment = 4,806,522
Total Sales = 1,785,375 + 4,806,522 = 6,591,897
Sales Price per Apartment = 137,331 Bs Category B
Sales Price per Sq. m = 1,962 Bs/Sq. m
4. Cutting construction and land costs 25% and with a
return of 15% on equity.
Land Cost = 2,025,000; FV = 2,678,062
Loan Repayment = 7,209,783
Total Sales = 2,678,062 + 7,209,783 = 9,887,845
Sales Price per Apartment = 205,997 Bs Category C
Sales per Sq. m = 2,943 Bs/Sq. m
III. Hypothetical Case - Units E (4 Bedroom Unit)
Cost Estimates
It assumes a high rise with 12 floors, 4 apartments per
floor. Apartments with 4 bedrooms and an apartment area of
95 sq. m. 48 apartments per building. It keeps constant
unitarian land costs and construction costs.
S
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Land Cost: 2,112 sq. m at 1,500 Bs/sq. m = Bs 3,168,000
Hard Costs: 5,244 sq. m at 1,500 Bs/sq. m = Bs 7,866,000
11,034,000
Land + Hard Costs = 69% of Total Construction Costs
Total Construction Cost = 15,991,304
Soft Costs:
Interest Financing (21% of TCC)
Promotion and Sales (5% of TCC)
Insurance and Municipal Taxes (1% of TCC)
Professional Fees (1.5% of TCC)
Management and Supervision (2.5% of TCC)
Total Cost:
= 3,358,174
= 799,565
= 159,913
= 239,870
= 399,783
4,957,304
Bs 15,991,304
Loan Amount 100% Construction Cost-Land = Bs 12,823,304
Average Total Construction Cost per Sq. m of Apartment:
Bs 15,991,304 t 4,560 Apartments = 3,507 Bs/sq. m.
This cost represents the average sales price per square me-
ter in 1978 in the Caracas Metropolitan Area. We realize
the average price per sq. m starts reducing when we increase
the size of the apartment.
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Estimation of Returns and Apartment Market Sales Price
Sales
2 years
Land Cost ,FV of Land
(PV) 4,950,000
Bs 3,168,000 Loan Repayment
12,823,304
1. FV of Land at 25% return on equity = Bs 4,950,000
Total Sales = 4,950,000 + 12,823,304 = 17,773,304
Sales Price per Apartment = 370,277 Bs - out of Category E
in the Non-Regulated Market
Sales Price per Sq. m = 3,898 Bs/Sq. m
2. FV of land at 15% return on equity = Bs. 4,189,680
Total Sales = 4,189,680 + 12,823,304 = 17,012,984
Sales Price per Apartment = 354,437 Bs - Category E
3. Cutting construction and land costs in half and with 25%
of return on equity.
Land Cost = 1,584,000; FV = 2,475,000
Loan Repayment = 6,411,652
Total Sales = 2,475,000 + 6,411,652 = 8,886,652
Sales Price per Apartment = 185,139 Bs Category C
Sales Price per Sq. m = 1,949 Bs/Sq. m
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4. Cutting construction and land costs 25% and with 15%
return on equity.
Land Cost = 2,376,0007 FV = 3,142,260
Loan Repayment = 9,617,478
Total Sales = 3,142,260 + 9,617,478 = 12,759,738
Sales Price per Apartment = 265,827 Bs Category E
Sales Price per Sq. m = 2,799 Bs/Sq. m
Conclusions
From the evaluation of the former cases, we concluded it
was very unlikely to expect developers to be able to produce
the cheaper units given the restrictions in sales price and
number of bedrooms. The market costs were too high to allow
the developers to earn attractive returns from those invest-
ments. Charts No. 33 and 34 illustrate the maximum price
per square meter allowed to qualify for the benefits of Pro-
gram 4 and the maximum sales price of the hypothetical buil-
ding cases. From their comparison, we realize that the con-
struction of the units within the program, gave the develo-
pers few possibilities to make a profitable investment.
Even though the difference between the maximum sales price
and the market sales price is significant for all the units,
it is especially dramatic for units "A" and "C". This is a
logical outcome given units "A" and "C" required the same
area as units "B" and "D" respectively, but they had to be
sold at a lower price. We realize that high reductions in
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Chart No. 33
Maximum Sales Price Allowed
According to Parameters of Program
(Bs/Sq. m)
4
Chart No. 34
Maximum Sales Price of
Hypothetical Buildings
(Bs/Sq. m)
Housing Minimum Sales Price Sales Price Sales Price
Category Feasible (1) (2) (3)
Areas -
A & B 56 2,702 1,320 1,888
C & D 70 4,117 1,962 2,943
E 95 3,898 1,949 2,799
1. Sales Price at Market Construction Costs with 25% Return
on Equity (Bs/Sq. m).
2. Sales Price Cutting Construction Costs 50% and with 25%
Return on Equity (Bs/Sq. m).
3. Sales Price Cutting Construction Costs 25% and with 15%
Return on Equity (Bs/Sq. m).
Housing Maximum Maximum Maximum Difference
Category Sales Price Feasible Sales Price Between Sales
(Bs) Area Bs/Sq. m Price and Ma-
(Sq. m) ximum Price
(Sq. m)
A 100,000 56 1,786 916
B 150,000 56 2,678 24
C 200,000 70 2,857 1,620
D 250,000 70 3,571 546
E 350,000 95 3,684 214
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cost are necessary to reach the level of prices required by
Program 4. For a developer to be able to build units A, for
example, construction and land costs would have to be redu-
ced 50% and the potential level of return on equity would be
15%. Similarly, for the construction of units B to be pos-
sible, construction and land costs would have to be reduced
25%, also assuming a return of 15%. This conclusion becomes
even more serious when we consider that land at 1,500 Bs/sq.
m was not abundant and construction costs at 1,500 Bs/sq. m
were not easy to obtain. It is obvious that if a developer
owned a piece of land appropriate for low-cost housing, he
would prefer to build the units within the program which
could give him higher returns and less construction and mar-
ketability risks. Those units were not the cheaper ones.
That argument is also valid for investment decisions based
on construction costs. Inflation, which averaged 16% annu-
ally in the last years of the period also contributed to
make construction of the cheaper units more difficult be-
cause it increased construction and land costs. The libera-
tion of the interest rates in 1981 is likely to have increa-
sed the proportion of construction financing to at least 25%
of construction costs . Returns of 15% are also lower com-
pared to the average of 25% decleared earnings in alterna-
tive real estate investments. For all these reasons, we
1. El Factor Financiamiento en la Produccion de la
Mercancia Vivienda en Venezuela. A. Cilento Sardi, UCV,
IDEC, Caracas 1981, p. 26.
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could expect the cheaper units would rarely be produced and
their production will be further reduced with increases in
the general level of prices. This conclusion confirms the
findings in Chapter 4 where we realized how the proportion
of units "A" and "B" dropped from 25% in 1979, to 1% in
1983, considering only private production within the regula-
ted market. The construction of the more expensive units,
even though more feasible, also required some reduction in
the level of costs and returns. In order to build units
with 3 bedrooms that qualify for category "C", for example,
cost reductions of 25% would be necessary using the conser-
vative estimate of 15% returns, similar reductions were
necessary to obtain units "E".
However, regardless of the cost restrictions, units of
all categories got produced during the period. We can
speculate about the reasons for that outcome. First of all,
we have to be aware that in the distribution of soft costs,
some profits are already built in. These profits become
higher when we consider in most of the cases, the developer
participates in the earnings throughout the whole construc-
tion process. The developer is usually the land owner, he
has connections with the construction materials industry, he
owns or belongs to an architectural and engineering firm, he
manages and supervises the construction, and moreover, he
advertizes and sells his own building. Some developers, re-
gardless of regulations, are also connected to the financing
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institutions. Therefore, when we talk about 15% of return,
the real return is much higher. Second, it is likely the
developer had found a way of cutting costs down by reducing
the quality of construction or location. This argument
could be supported by evaluating the quality of the invento-
ry. The argument that developers built in smaller cities
where land costs or construction costs could be lower is not
likely given that most of the production and inventory con-
centrated in the biggest and fastest growing cities of the
country. Third, the statistics accounting for private pro-
duction included units built with public-private partnership
schemes and with government subsidies. This is the case of
El Bosque in Aragua State, in which INAVI sold the land to
the developer at below market price and financed it at 9%
interest rate in a time when the interest rates on short
term mortgages was at 18% or more. Also, in public-private
partnership some changes in urbanization and building stan-
dards are allowed. Therefore, construction costs can be re-
duced. It is also true those projects, given they are
backed up by government institutions, can avoid some of the
lengthy and expensive processes of approvals and permits.
Finally, most of the units built with the public-private ap-
proach were likely to concentrate in the middle and lower
categories, thus contributing to the share of units "A",
"B", and "C" in the production of the regulated market.
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There are many factors that contributed to the high con-
struction and land costs in Venezuela. As it has been men-
tioned, one of the key elements is land availability. In
the main urban areas, land is scarce and when available, it
is used for the most profitable investments. Even though
FONDUR, since 1975, has undertaken the task of assembling
urban land for low-cost housing development, the amount of
land purchased in every period has been below the policy
target goals. Even though the land assembled does not
amount to much, we could argue the increases in demand for
land by INAVI have contributed to the increase in prices.
Financing in 1980 represented 21% of total construction
costs and after the liberation in 1981, became even more
expensive. The building codes also contributed to. higher
construction costs because they require unrealistic stan-
dards for the prices of the units produced. Urbanization
norms make the development of low-rise residental areas
using row house or duplex approaches very expensive. Land
prices also contribute to making high rise developments the
most likely approach, regardless of the fact that the struc-
tural and equipment requirements are higher for vertical
developments. The technology used in construction is also
responsible for the high costs because the concrete frame
system requires a lot of steel and cement, materials which
have to compete at the international market prices. That
technology also requires a greater use of machinery and
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specialized labor that affects costs. Reducing the propor-
tion of imported input into construction and increasing the
amount of labor, some cost reductions could be achieved.
An interesting question is, what are the mechanisms that
have allowed the construction of units with equivalent cha-
racteristics to those encouraged by the Program 4, but at
cheaper prices in Venezuela7 knowing they are indeed produ-
ced by the government and by the informal sector. Govern-
ment production of the cheaper units is carried out by INAVI
and Vivienda Rural. The units built by INAVI have an ave-
rage price between 900 and 1,200 Bs/sq. m, excluding land.
For Vivienda Rural, the average price without land is even
lower, 600 Bs/sq. m. These costs are attainable because of
the level of subsidies in construction. Both institutions
subsidized the sale of the units, selling them at below
market prices. Vivienda Rural has a very interesting mecha-
nism for construction, based on small local contractors, who
are paid by weekly valuations. In addition, Vivienda Rural
subsidizes material and its construction is based on single
family units using a very traditional, but very easy to
build system. Besides being effective, construction is
faster. In general, both institutions bear the cost of land
development and land price.
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On the other hand, the informal sector, even though it
does not make use of strong subsidies at the beginning of
the process (public facilities come later without the users
paying), it can reduce construction costs by practically
eliminating all soft costs incurred by formal construction
and reducing hard costs. In addition, it eliminates land
costs given that units are developed, in most cases, on land
without holding legal ownership. The producers in the in-
formal sector do not pay interest on financing, because con-
struction is done incrementally out of savings, family bor-
rowing, or informal financing. Thus, the financing system
adapts very well to the family budget constraints. Informal
developers do not pay municipal income taxes, or any kind of
insurance, they do not make use of management and supervi-
sion, or promotion and sales. These expenses are not neces-
sary simply because the building process is carried out on a
small scale and in most cases, under the direct supervision
of the owner itself. For all these reasons, it is not sur-
prising they can reduce the costs by more than 50% compared
to the formal construction.
The government and the informal sector approach illus-
trate some mechanisms that could be used by the government
if it wants to encourage the construction of low-cost hou-
sing for moderate income households. Undoubtedly, given the
market prices and conditions, if the formal private sector
is going to be the targeted developer, higher and different
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kinds of subsidies will have to be included within the pro-
gram. Moreover, the government will have to review building
codes and urbanization norms and increase the controls on
the returns earned from building outside the regulated
housing market.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From the analysis carried out in Chapters 4 and 5, we
concluded that drastic changes are needed in the design of a
program of incentives for the formal private sector if the
production of low-cost housing is to be achieved. These
changes must be oriented toward restricting the comparative
benefits from producing the higher cost units within the re-
gulated market and outside it, changes that increase the
comparative profitability from building the less costly
units. Those changes must be carefully related among them-
selves and must be consistent with the overall state of the
economy if we want to avoid negative side effects. We are
well aware of the important connections formal housing pro-
duction has with the financing sector, the employment level,
and the growth of the other related industries. We also
know the strong dependence the demand for housing has from
the welfare of the country. Thus, different kinds and lev-
els of changes are necessary. Some of them require underta-
king some macro-economic measures, others imply the enforce-
ment of the judicial and taxation system. Still other
changes are related to the mechanisms available to the
government to encourage and regulate the producers' beha-
vior. We will talk mainly about the most detailed level of
changes, those concerned with modifying the variables to
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qualify the units produced, those related to the implemen-
tation of complementary subsidies and cost reductions to
make feasible the construction of cheaper units, and those
modifications to the incentives to the private sector; even
though the connections with the more general level of chan-
ges will be discussed.
The Recommended Changes to the Program
The first group of changes refer to the variables that
regulate the production of housing units by categories,
those being the units' sales price and the number of bed-
rooms. We have explored along the development of this paper
the inadequacy in the definition of the target household
group in relation to the proposed sales price categories.
We argued in Chapter 2 how the overall housing policy only
left out around 5% of the total households of the country in
1979, and we discussed the unrealistic nature of that goal,
given the limited resources of the country. We estimated in
Chapter 3 the level of monthly income required to purchase
categories "D" and "E" without the subsidy was well above
the 7,000 Bs level, stated in the Program 4 as the top
household group protected. We also analyzed that if a
household earning 7,000 Bs/month in income wanted to buy a
unit "D" in 1981, an average of 4% interest would have to be
paid by the government to the bank during 6 years (see Chart
No. 9). The corresponding average subsidized interest rate
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would be 6% over 8 years if a household earning 3,000 Bs of
monthly income wanted to buy a unit "C". These estimates
consider an expense income ratio of 40% which is considered
to be high given the priorities of other expenses. We also
showed in Chapter 4 that a great majority of the units pro-
duced belonged to categories "D" and "E", just at levels un-
affordable by 67%1 of the target households; that 67% repre-
sented households with monthly earnings between 3,000 and
5,000 Bs/month in 1983. The number of households with in-
comes between 3,000 and 5,000 Bs/month was about 886,813 for
the same year. We also explored the reasons behind the con-
centration of the production. From the analysis we conclu-
ded it is imperative to reduce the range of households under
the policy protection. If, as it was discussed in Chapter
4, categories "D" and "E" are the ones that seem to be att-
ractive to the developers and having argued the subsidy pro-
gram did not initiate a switch in production, we concluded
the cheaper categories will not be produced unless the most
expensive categories are taken out of the program of incen-
tives and additional subsidies are allowed for the construc-
tion of the cheaper categories. We can expect categories
"D" and "E" will still be produced, and very possibly in
more appropriate amounts, if they are excluded from the pro-
gram protection because their production is likely to be
profitable without the program incentives.
1. OCEI. Encuesta de Hogares por Muestreo. 1er Semestre
1983.
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Consequently, it seems reasonable to think only the con-
struction categories "A", "B" and "C" should be encouraged
and subsidized. This proposition also reflects the belief
that the target group should cover those families with mon-
thly earnings between 3,000 and 5,000 Bs. In general,
households with incomes of 5,000 Bs could afford units up to
a price of 200,000 Bs with some unexaggerated level of sub-
sidies. For instance, assuming 40% of income is spent on
housing and a standard fixed rate mortgage with a 20 year
term and 85% loan to value ratio, the affordable interest
rate would be around 13%. Under the same mortgage terms,
but using only 25% of income for housing consumption, the
affordable interest rate will be around 6%, which undoubted-
ly will require a higher level of subsidy. More realistic
expense income ratios of 30% and 35% will result in interest
rates of 9% and 11% respectively. Thus, if the government
was again to regulate interest rates at reasonable levels,
for example at 14%, the level of direct subsidy required
wouldn't be so high as it was in the 1979-1983 period. In
addition, innovative mortgage mechanisms1 should be evalua-
ted by the government to increase the affordability level of
the households and to take into account inflation. Provi-
sions must be made in order to avoid tying the government
1. For references see, "The Inflation Proof Mortgage," by
Franco Modigliani and "New Mortgage Designs for Stable
Housing in an Inflationary Environment," edited by
Modigliani and Lessard.
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subsidy program to fluctuations in the interest rates, like
the ones experienced in the period considered. In sum the
reduction in the range of target households, the reduction
in construction costs, and the implementation of construc-
tion subsidies for the target units, will make the goal of
concentrating production for the lower-middle income group
more attainable.
In relation to the control of quality of the units
built, the variable of areas should accompany that of the
number of bedrooms. For the government to include this va-
riable as an additional feature to qualify the units a mar-
ket study of costs of land, materials, labor, and capital
must be carried out in realistic terms with considerations
of an acceptable level of profits. Even though that study
will involve some level of generalization, the inclusion of
the variable area in the program is very important if we
want to avoid the shrinkage effects observed in the period
analyzed. In this cost estimation study, the establishment
of realistic standards and the consideration of inflation
effects are also paramount. The standards considered would
refer not only to building codes and land occupation, but to
standards for infrastructure, public services, and communal
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facilities. In this regard the recently introduced "Guide
for the Design of Residential Areas" should prove very
helpful1 .
Cost Reduction Strategies
In relationto cost reductions we could look at the
example given by the informal developers to realize that in
fact some cost reductions could be obtained if the govern-
ment implemented the necessary changes. First, a revision
of ordinances and norms pertaining not only to the building
itself, but to the requirements of public facilities and
communal services is necessary. That revision should in-
clude the regulations concerning the ratio of built up area/
land area and the required set backs. The revision should
be oriented toward encouraging the production of lower rise
developments which offer potential for high density of land
occupation and allow cost reductions, because they eliminate
the expensive structural supports and the use of complicated
construction equipment. Second, an evaluation of the buil-
ding system and building technology should be carried out to
evaluate substitution of the traditionally expensive con-
crete frame high rise system with low-rise structures from 1
to 4 floors which allow reductions in the proportion of in-
1. See Caminos, Goethert, Caminos, "Guia de Desarrollo
Urbano para Nuevos Projectos de Vivienda," Noviembre 30,
1982.
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ternationally traded materials such as cement and steel.
Reducing the proportion of those inputs into construction
and basing the construction on cheaper materials like
bricks, we could obtain high reductions in costs. In this
sense, production by Vivienda Rural has proved that a rela-
tively simple construction system can indeed allow low cons-
truction costs to be obtained and can easily be carried out
by non-sophisticated contractors. Here, it is also conveni-
ent to mention the need for an evaluation between labor in-
tensive and capital intensive construction. While it is
true that capital intensive construction frees the construc-
tion process from union claims and increases in wages, capi-
tal intensive construction in Venezuela has the problem of
requiring high initial capital investments and labor exper-
tise. A more labor intensive approach also generates higher
employment levels, so necessary to the country.
Complementary Construction Subsidies
From the financial evaluation carried out in Chapter 5,
we concluded complementary construction subsidies are neces-
sary in order for the developers to build the cheaper units.
Those subsidies would have to be higher, the lower the sales
prices of the unit be produced. The government could imple-
ment additional subsidies from the ones already contained
within the Program 4. For example, the government could
provide construction materials and could lease equipment at
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below market prices. The government could also allow reduc-
tions of standards for certain projects and facilitate the
issuance of permits. These elements combined would undoubt-
edly contribute to considerable reductions in costs. More-
over, the government could reinforce the subsidies already
built into the program, like making land available at below
market prices, refinancing construction loans with high loan
to value ratio, and reducing the marketability risks for the
developers. However, all those subsidies should be careful-
ly outlined, being specific for every housing category in
order to control speculation. Control mechanisms would also
need to be included.
A subsidy element which seems to have been effective in
orienting production toward the lower cost units is the
supply of land by the government. This practice included in
the overall housing policy and in the Program 4 gave in some
cases positive results. Some projects were built and sold
successfully even though others were subject to corruption
and speculation . The procedures had been that the govern-
ment sells the land to the developer, usually well below
market price. After, the developer builds the units and
sells them at market prices. A contract is signed between
the developer and the government, usually represented by
FONDUR or INAVI, in which the developer compromises to build
the units with the characteristics of prices, areas, and
1. See the case of the project La Chamarreta in Chapter 1.
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services specified by the institution. Financing is obtai
ned from a bank.
Three questions arise with this procedure. The first
one touches on the social justice issue. Land owned by the
government is also a scarce resource. FONDUR, the institu-
tion created in 1975 to assemble and purchase land to deve-
lop public projects and control land speculation has not
been able to achieve the assigned goals mainly because of
lack of funds1 . Thus, there is relatively little urban land
owned by the government in relation to the amount needed to
pursue the required public projects. As we saw in Chapter
2, the government is directly carrying out projects of sites
and services and finished units for a strata of the popula-
tion with even lower incomes than the one attended to by the
private sector. Supplying too much land for the private
sector programs will reduce the land available for the deve-
lopment of projects targeted to the group below 3,000 Bs of
monthly income. However, developing public/private partner-
ships where the government acted as an equity investor,
could be a way of orienting the production of housing for
the low-middle income groups and at the same time generating
more resources to carry out the lowest-cost housing pro-
jects. These kinds of arrangements, although perhaps not
attractive for big developers, who own land, are likely to
1. See Declarations of Victor Fossi, President of FONDUR.
El Universal 1980.
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be attractive for small to medium scale contractors who
don't own land and who could be willing to share in some
profits. In any case, the decisions of whether or not to
supply land for the development of finished units, requires
the evaluation of trade-offs, taking into account the time,
effort, and money invested by the government in the assembly
of urban land and the reduction of land available to under-
take other public projects.
The second question relates to the chances the purchase
and sale of land benefits a few. We must be aware of the
possibility that land could be bought from and sold to the
same group or developer. Even though restrictions on con-
tracts were contained within the policy, there would always
be room for speculation. The third question refers to the
effectiveness of the controls on the units' characteristics.
Check ups are always difficult to carry out and they consume
time and money. However, they must be carefully outlined
and carried out. In addition, penalties for failures of the
contracts should be included. In order to minimize the ad-
ministrative expenses within the government, the financing
institution could carry out the supervision. It is also im-
portant to evaluate the possibility of laying penalties if
the project does not sell, for an unjustifiable reason. In
this way, we will use the market control mechanisms to im-
prove the quality of the units produced. Those penalties
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should include also the banks if they have received the
refinancing.
Another subsidy element already built into the program
refers to the availability of construction financing. In
Chapter 4 it was demonstrated this variable was critical to
orienting investment. In the interviews, the developers ex-
pressed that given 100% financing was available for all ca-
tegories, they chose to build the more costly units because
the households who could afford them have higher potentiali-
ties for getting long term mortgages, the units could be
built at the regulated prices given construction costs, and
still left them with a fair amount of profit. Land was
their equity, so they would try to maximize its utility.
For the preceding reasons, we conclude the availability
of construction financing can be used to orient production.
In order to achieve distributional effects, construction
financing must be graded among the categories "A", "B", and
"C". The availablility of construction financing for units
costing more than 200,000 Bs should be left to market condi-
tions because we can expect their production will occur
without the government spending the scarce resources. A
positive measure included in the policy was to tie the deve-
lopers benefits to the condition of them getting long term
credit for the buyers with the terms expressed by the pro-
gram. This measure speeds up the process and avoids the
government getting involved in the obtaining of long term
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credit, thus reducing bureaucratic expenses. Consequently,
it is suggested that condition be kept.
Modification to the Incentives
The first modification related to the incentives to the
developers is the tax exemption. It was mentioned in Chap-
ters 3 and 4; the fiscal incentives could have been a fai-
lure because of three reasons. First, even though the tax
exemptions were graduated higher for the lower cost units,
we could argue the comparative tax savings between building
the cheaper or the more expensive units were not so diffe-
rent. In order to support this argument better, we will
need to carry a comparative analysis of tax savings. The
information required for that kind of analysis is very dif-
ficult to obtain because we need to obtain the earnings from
sale, the incurred construction costs, and financing charges
to be able to apply the corresponding tax rate. Developers
are in general unwilling to provide that information. More
over, in the cases the information was obtained, we may ex-
pect inaccurate data. However, regardless of this limita-
tion, we know that even though tax exemptions are higher for
the lower cost units, the comparative earnings are also
smaller7 on the contrary for the higher cost units, tax ex-
emptions are lower, but the earnings are much higher. Se-
cond, the taxation system in Venezuela is very inefficient
and it is plagued with evasions and bribes. Third, tax pay-
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ments are money due in the future. For these reasons, we
argue the tax regulations only complicated the program, but
did not contribute to orient production toward the lower
cost units. They generated additional red tape and bureauc-
ratic expenses and they increased the potential for corrup-
tion in the country. In addition, they contributed to
encouraging the generalized attitude in Venezuela of, "If
nobody pays the required amount of taxes, why should I?"
The Venezuelan taxation system needs a serious revision in
design and implementation, but until a more effective regu-
lation is implemented we should not rely on it to orient
housing production. Another argument to support the elimi-
nation of the tax shelters is that in the years to come, the
Venezuelan government will need to rely more on the internal
sources of revenues given the reduction of income for con-
ception of oil exports. The knowledge of the expected tax
revenues from construction activities would allow the go-
vernment to plan better for the future. The tax losses for
concept of fiscal incentives can be estimated, but it would
be better to simplify the system until it functions pro-
perly.
Another important variable that our analysis revealed as
critical in influencing the characteristics of the units
supplied, and one that could be reinforced, is the perceived
marketability of the units. This variable is linked with
the state of the economy and with the willingness or ability
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of the financing institutions to provide long term mortgage
credit. A higher level of confidence in the marketability
of the low cost units could be built up if the government
acquires the compromise of purchasing the units built after
a reasonable period. However, the definition of that period
and the conditions under which the units will be purchased
will require close examination. It could happen that the
developers might prefer to make a single and simplified sale
to the government which would generate a lot of expenses and
time consumed by the government in marketing the units. It
also could happen the developers overlooked the quality of
the units produced given the reduction of marketability
risks. Thus, the likely advantages and disadvantages of
this measure should be weighed.
Complementary measures to reduce the marketing risks
have to do with strengthening the regulations and incentives
for the financing institutions. A new regulation for port-
folio restrictions should be outlined. That new regulation
should be more specific about the proportion of mortgages
issued per category. Lumping the categories, as in the last
regulation, should be avoided in order to better control the
distribution of prices. The portfolio regulations need to
be backed up by tax exemptions to compensate for the issu-
ance of higher risk loans. Here, controls on tax payments
should also be enforced, given the way the taxation system
works. Similarly, it is very important to keep the refinan-
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cing program to assure continued influx of funds to the
housing financing system. Given that we are proposing to
restrict the range of beneficiaries, the amount of resources
needed by the government to accomplish the refinancing task
would be more attainable. However, macro-economic measures
are necessary as well, for the banks to have funds for long
terms loans. Those measures relate mainly to the interest
rate paid by the banks for time deposits and savings ac-
counts and the interest rate charges on short and long term
loans. Given the results from the last period, it seems in
Venezuela a system of control of the interest rates is more
effective because the degree of control over the housing
market increases and speculation with interest rates re-
duces. Nevertheless, the regulation of the interest rates
reduces the funds circulating in the system because savers
prefer to invest in the more competitive international mar-
kets. However, the discussion about the most appropriate
measures for the capital market is out of the scope of this
paper, but we should be conscious that whatever the deci-
sions are the features of the housing program must be
coordinated with them.
Assuming there were no major inconveniences in the mort-
gage banks issuing long term loans, effective controls on
the portfolio restrictions, tax payment, and illegal invest-
ment banking would be necessary. These considerations lead
us to evaluate the feasibility of implementing such cont-
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rols. We must keep in mind the financing sector represents
one of the strongest elements in the Venezuelan socio-poli-
tical structure. In many cases, in order to achieve more
strict controls, profound changes would need to be made.
Thus, we could assume irregular behavior will take place.
The subsidy program seems to be an appropriate measure,
not only to increase the affordability level of the house-
holds, but to decrease the developers' perceived higher
risks in marketing the cheaper units. Of course, this pro-
gram depends on the financing institutions providing the
long term loans, but assuming that were not an obstacle, we
see it as a positive measure. However, the subsidy program
needs to be evaluated in depth to determine the feasibility
of positive changes. Currently, it has proved to be very
difficult to bear with the government given the enormous
differences between the market interest rates and the sub-
sidized rates. As it was mentioned before, alternative
mortgage mechanisms should be analyzed to come up with a
more realistic approach.
Summary of Modifications to the Program 4
In sum, the recommendations to increase the likelihood
of private developers undertaking the supply of low cost
housing units and responding better to the government's
objectives, are as follows. First, a reduction in the range
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of target households is proposed, because we can achieve
better distributional effects and we will avoid the concen-
tration on production of the most expensive units. More-
over, the limited resources would be channelled to the popu-
lation that the private sector would not attend to other-
wise. In this sense, we are proposing to take out of the
program the construction of the units "D" and "E". Second,
a variable regarding areas should be included among those
designed to regulate the quality of the units. This recom-
mendation pretends to avoid the speculation carried out by
reducing exaggeratedly the areas of the units. Third, com-
plementary actions to allow cost reductions for the produc-
tion of the lower-cost units must be undertaken and encou-
raged by the government. Those actions involved the revi-
sion of urbanization norms and building codes to allow the
development of alternative design approaches to the high
rise development that could reduce costs and the evaluation
of the building system and building technology currently in
use by private developers in order to search for alternative
cost-effective solutions. Fourth, a higher level of subsi-
dies is necessary in order for the developers to produce the
cheaper units and get a reasonable profit from it. In this
sense, it has been recommended to evaluate the possibility
of making government owned land available to the developers,
but including a proposal for equity participation by the
government. It is also recommended that the availability of
construction financing be kept within the program and be
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tied to the developer's getting the long term financing for
the users. However, it is recommended the proportion of
construction financing be graded in inverse relation to the
sales price of the units produced. Fifth, tax exemptions
should be eliminated from the package of benefits to the
developers because they have not been effective instruments
to regulate production, but they contribute to increasing
administrative expenses and room for violations. Sixth, we
are proposing that it is necessary to increase the confi-
dence of the developers in the marketability of the lower
cost units, and we are advising to keep the concept of the
subsidy program for the buyer, but re-evaluating it.
In order to increase the marketability confidence, dif-
ferent measures have to be taken. Some of them are tied to
the incentives and regulations for the financing institu-
tions. Others refer to actions the government could carry
out itself. Still others are related to macro-economic mea-
sures that make it feasible for the banks to issue long term
mortgages. This last refers mainly to the regulation of the
interest rates. Among the regulations for the financing in-
stitutions, one of the most important is the control of the
portfolio composition. It is also recommended that tax ex-
emptions be kept as a counterpart for the issuance of higher
risk loans. The refinancing program is considered critical
to guarantee the flow of funds to the housing market. In
addition, it is recommended the government examine the pos-
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siblity of securing for the developers, the purchase of the
units. Lastly, the subsidy program should be maintained to
increase the affordability level of the target group and
also to contribute to improving the marketability expecta-
tions. However, a proposition is made to evaluate in depth
the outcome of the past 3 years experience to correct the
shortcomings. In this sense, it is recommended that a look
be taken at the level of subsidies the government could un
dertake and to avoid tying the government input to the pro-
gram to interest rate fluctuations that make the program
unmanageable.
We must be aware from our analysis, the developers' con-
fidence depends much more on expectations, than on promises
implied in regulations. They are within the system, and
they know of its failures and weaknesses. Consequently, for
some of the measures to be more effective_,-profound changes
in the overall socio-economic system would need to occur.
Since these changes are not likely, at least in the short
run, we remain uncertain to what extent we can improve the
developers' attitude toward building the lower cost units.
However, we think that the increase in the level of subsi-
dies for the construction of cheaper units would be effec-
tive. Some level of "disinvestment" could occur in private
residential construction for the more expensive units as a
consequence of the more stringent regulations, but that
would be one of the desired outcomes. It is difficult to
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estimate how much the disinvestment will be. However, we
can get a first approximation of the problem by recognizing
those developers who have a stake in residental construction
or in construction in general, are likely to remain. This
is because they have already built up the organizational
infrastructure, such as personnel and offices, and they have
capital invested in materials and equipment. Also, in most
cases, these developers are part of the construction materi-
als industry and are owners of land. Therefore, it will be
hard for them, at least in the short run, to switch to other
investments. On the other hand, other investors, who have
not built up a stake yet, and who entered the market recent-
ly because of the potential benefits, are likely to leave if
alternative investments offer them higher expectations for
profits, with less risk.
In order to evaluate the consequences of a reduction in
the level of private residential construction, an input-out-
put analysis would prove very helpful. The analysis could
be carried out on two levels. An interindustry analysis
could evaluate the impact on directly or indirectly related
industries. Similarly, it could allow estimations of im-
pacts on the GNP, employment, and incomes. An intraindustry
analysis could give us more detailed insights within the
construction industry. However, in the evaluation of the
outcomes, we should be aware that decisions are a matter of
trading off potential outcomes. In this case, we are balan-
201
cing the benefits from keeping the private sector working at
the preceding levels, but helping to promote units that do
not sell; or reducing the level of production, but trying to
get more appropriate outcomes. In any case, resources as
invested previously in residential construction by the
private suppliers, could be channelled to other kinds of
construction activities.
The Search for Alternative Developers
Until now, we explored some measures to improve the
producer oriented approach for producing low-cost housing
for the low-middle income groups. At least two other alter-
natives remain. A second approach considers the government
as producer. In it, the government will take the responsi-
bility for planning, financing, and developing the project,
although construction and design could be carried out by
private firms. This approach has the government owning the
land, obtaining the financial resources, and marketing the
units. This scheme is the one currently followed by INAVI
and Vivienda Rural. The third alternative, a consumer ori-
ented approach, requires the participation of the potential
buyers. Governmental responsibility will not be to carry
out the project, but rather, to facilitate its development.
The responsibility of planning, financing and developing the
project would be in the hands of cooperatives and civil
societies. Those associations could contract out specific
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stages of the process, such as design and construction.
Government support could be making land and financing more
accessible, providing materials and equipment, or backing up
their purchase or rent, and providing assistance in mana-
gerial or administrative tasks. The scheme of incentives
and subsidies recommended before for the producer approach
could be evaluated for its applicability to the consumer
approach.
The producer and government approaches had been tried
out in Venezuela. The consumer approach, although it has
been mentioned in the last two housing policies, has not
been really implemented, mostly because resources and effort
have not been channelled to it. The scheme of incentives to
cooperatives and associations has been briefly mentioned as
included in the incentives for the private sector, but there
has not been a particular program or regulation to allow its
development. There are some private experiences in Venezu-
ela with this approach, the efforts coming in the majority
from starting professionals. Examples are built in the
Caracas Metropolitan Area, Ciudad Guayana and Maracaibo.
Similar approaches that were carried out, but with public
subsidies, are the upgrading projects for the squatter set-
tlement areas implemented by FUNDACOMUN.
There are advantages and disadvantages in each one of
these approaches. The producer approach makes use of the
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existing suppliers who have access to the resources and know
how to move within the system. The likelihood of faster and
greater production is also higher compared to the public
sector. When we evaluated the production during the 1979-
1983 period, we found the private sector produced 36,000
units more than the public sector. However, this comparison
without taking into account the amount of resources invested
and the quality of the units produced, gives us only an in-
dication. We know the units built by the public sector in-
cluded low-cost finished single and multifamily units, and
the so-called "housing solutions", being those core units,
sites and services projects and loans for home improvement.
The planning of private production by the government is ba-
sed on estimates from the amount of resources available, but
real control of the production is lower. The task of the
government in this approach, consists of designing and le-
gislating an effective policy to orient the private produc-
tion. The disadvantages with this approach are related to
the adequacy of the units produced. As it was mentioned,
units produced will respond less to the needs of the consu-
mers, and they will tend to be too expensive, too small, or
in bad locations. In addition, the potential for market
deformities is greater because the legislation requires a
high degree of sophistication that could never take care of
all potential loopholes. The degree of control required, if
we were to check up on every item, would be unmanageable.
Thus, the resources targeted by the government have no
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guarantee of being used in the intended manner, and there is
a high degree of uncertainty about whether by introducing
more strict measures, we will get the desired outcomes.
Another disadvantage is that this approach tends to generate
gigantic projects that require huge sums of capital.
Leaving aside the issue of environmental quality, we can
question whether the issuance of such large construction
financing for single projects increases the risk of fai-
lures, and represents a threat to the portfolio balances of
the banks. This is exacerbated when we recall the low level
of feasibility studies carried out by the developers and the
financing institutions. Finally, an addtional drawback of
this approach is that it incites the concentration of wealth
in powerful groups, the ones who currently enjoy the access
to resources.
The main advantage of the government approach is that
the degree of control over what gets produced will be
higher. This approach will be easier to program and will be
politically, very convenient, in the sense that it will re-
inforce the image of a paternalistic government solving the
country's problems. On the other hand, it will face poli-
tical opposition from the industrialists, who will claim too
much interference. We will have high uncertainty about the
performance of the approach, in the sense of quantity of
units produced and production speed. However, given past
performances, it seems inadvisable to increase the produc-
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tion load of the government. If the government were to un-
dertake the direct production of housing units for the lower
middle class, in addition to the programs for the lowest
income groups of the country, the resources needed would at
least double those estimated for the last housing program.
This would be a direct consequence of the fact the additio-
nal units are more expensive. In addition, some resources
like land, are simply not available in the amounts required,
unless they were taken away from other programs. If the go-
vernment has failed in achieving the goals for other pro-
grams because of the lack of funding, we can not realisti-
cally expect the resources allocated to housing will in-
crease by such an amount. In addition, with the public
approach, the government will have to acquire the financial
compromise, invest the time and effort required to put up
housing projects, and undertake the marketing risks. Thus,
the equity required from the government with the public ap-
proach would be much higher. The producer approach is in
this sense, the one which requires from the government a
lesser amount of direct resources and less equity. The pub-
lic approach would also increase the degree of bureaucrati-
zation and we will not encourage the development of the
human resources existing outside the bureaucratic structure.
In this sense, we would not stimulate the entrepreneuership
so badly needed in the country. We would also increase the
potential for corruption and at the end, the responsibility
for failures would be left entirely with the government.
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Overall, to increase the public program to that magnitude,
would make it administratively very difficult to handle.
The potential for the adequacy of the units produced
will be greater with the consumer approach. Since the ini-
tiative will come from cooperatives or civil associations
which will organize, find the land and financing, and con-
tract the constructor- the possibility the units will ref-
lect better the needs and desires of the buyers is greater.
Besides, this procedure will stimulate personal contacts
among the different actors involved in the program. Vari-
ables like prices, size, and location are likely to be
weighed better and the outcome will be more appropriated.
This mechanism is in contrast with that of the producer
approach where the projects are built for unknown users.
The consumer approach will also require a lesser amount of
__- resources per project because the scale will be reduced so
that financing risks could be distributed better. Wealth
will be distributed more evenly because small to medium
sized contractors and developers will have the opportunity
to participate. Given the administration of the projects
will not be in the hands of the government, there will be
less room for bureaucratization and corruption. However,
the planning and programming of this approach will be more
difficult because it is a new approach and it will require
the design of special legislation. It is also likely it
will find political opposition because to introduce it would
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imply a reduction of the benefits to the formal private de-
velopers. Fedecamaras and La Camara de la Construccion
(Chamber of Construction) will voice their concerns aloud.
A very important consideration is that alternative uses for
the resources, mainly labor, will have to be planned. This
is necessary because this approach will need a learning
stage, and there will be difficulty to maintain the rhythm
of production at the same level as the one with the producer
approach. A minimization of this effect can be achieved by
combining the two approaches. For the consumer approach to
be implemented, public support is needed given the housing
production system is now adapted to the producer approach.
Therefore, the government will need to facilitate produc-
tion, at least until momentum has built up in the process.
As a consequence of the former evaluation, we could
argue the most viable alternative is a mixed approach which
combines the producer oriented approach and the consumer or-
iented approach. That combination will allow the making use
of the existing resources and expertise, while introducing a
new alternative into the system with greater potential for
producing the units with the required characteristics. In
any case, additional subsidies will be necessary in order
for any kind of developer to build the cheaper units given
the market costs, but a combination of the aforementioned
strategies to cut down the costs with a redesign of the pro-
gram of incentives and an increase in the level of subsi-
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dies, is likely to increase the production of the cheaper
units. A mixed approach will not face such strong political
opposition because the formal private sector will still par-
ticipate. Moreover, it will not cause a drastic reduction
in residential construction activity that could have serious
consequences in economic growth and unemployment. This
mixed approach will leave the government carrying out the
programs for the lowest income strata but it will not assign
to the government unrealistic responsibilities. Lastly,
with this mixed approach, we will create the incentives for
a better distribution of wealth because another scale of de-
velopers now oppressed by the market, will have the opportu-
nity to participate. The first step in pursuing this ap-
proach will be to undertake an evaluation of the potential
for the development of cooperatives and civil societies in
Venezuela among the middle income groups. That analysis
will have to evaluate the past experiences and identify the
obstacles for its implementation. Undoubtedly, experiences
from other countries will be helpful as a framework and for
reference purposes.
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